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Introduction
Having spent most of my time and energy over the past four years on writing this
doctoral thesis, I find myself somewhat reluctant to spend the pages of this introduc-
tion exclusively on emphasizing the importance and relevance of the insights I gained
throughout this process for people both inside and outside the economic profession. A
minor reason for this reluctance, I guess, is that I hope that my co-authors and I have
convincingly done that already in the introductory sections of the papers collected in
this thesis. A second more substantial reason, which is not that much rooted in the
desire to avoid doing the same work twice, is that—in my opinion—much would be
lost when focusing on the final output alone. Therefore, at this point, I want to pause,
take stock, and take a look back at how this thesis came to be.
Three of four chapters gathered in this thesis are settled in the realms of “behavioral
economics”, which I first became aware of during a 10-month stay at the University
of Berkeley. Over that time, it was the enthusiasm of a certain Professor Matthew
Rabin, when talking about how insights from psychological research may enrich eco-
nomic modeling, that drew my interest toward this relatively young but nevertheless
fascinating area of economic research. So what, in a nutshell, is behavioral economics,
also known as “economics and psychology”?
The core model used in orthodox economic theory posits that individuals make
choices in order to maximize the expected value of a utility function, using and correctly
processing all the available information. Moreover, individuals’ preferences are assumed
to depend only on own payoffs, to be unaffected by the framing of the decision, and to
be time consistent. A growing body of evidence documents, however, that aspects of
behavior deviate from the forecasts of standard theory both in laboratory experiments
as well as actual market environments, thereby casting serious doubt on the underlying
assumptions. For a very recent survey, see DellaVigna (2009). The research in behav-
ioral economics suggests that individuals deviate from the core model in several respects
and offers various modifications to the orthodox economic conception of human choice
in order to make this model more realistic. Following the classification in Rabin (1999),
the first important class of deviations is nonstandard preferences, the most prominent
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examples of which are reference dependence and social preferences. Roughly spoken,
nonstandard preferences advocate a modification of the utility function that allows for
an individual’s utility to depend not only on the absolute level of the own final payoff
but also on changes in outcomes relative to a reference level as well as the payoffs other
individuals receive. The second class of deviations from the standard model, which
considers biases in judgment under uncertainty, allows for individuals making errors
when attempting to maximize their utility function, thereby presenting a more drastic
challenge to the familiar economic setup. These inferential errors are acknowledged to
come in various forms, with the tendency to infer too much from too little evidence
as well as the propensity to misread contradicting evidence as confirming a previously
held hypothesis being among the most widely known manifestations of such biases in
judgment. An even more radical critique of the economics model is posed by the third
class of deviations, which posits that people have tremendous difficulties in evaluating
their own preferences and, in particular, in forecasting their own future preferences.
These difficulties, which inter alia can be rooted in overprojection of current tastes on
future tastes, different evaluation modes or only partial awareness of a taste for im-
mediate gratification, can give rise to phenomena such as habit formation, preference
reversals or self-control problems. While careful modeling and incorporation of these
deviations into formal economic analysis definitely is a challenging and perhaps even
daunting task, the reward seems promising: Over the past decade there have been
numerous contributions to a wide variety of fields of economic interest, ranging from
industrial organization over labor economics to finance, that adopted the behavioral
approach sketched above and thereby helped to reconcile theoretical predictions with
actually observed behavior in situations where the standard economics model was hard
pressed in explaining the evidence in question. Thus, with one of the proclaimed goals
of behavioral economics being the improvement of behavioral realism of economic mod-
els, it seems only appropriate that most of the ideas that led to the chapters of this
dissertation popped up while I stumbled through life with my eyes open—perhaps a
little bit wider open than before encountering Professor Matthew Rabin.
The first chapter of this dissertation, which is based on a joint paper with Fabian
Herweg, inquires into the effects of the imposition of binding deadlines on the perfor-
mance of an individual with time-inconsistent preferences. With time-inconsistency
giving rise to self-control problems, this chapter draws on the third class of deviations
from the standard model according to the above classification. The idea of thinking
about the incentive effect of deadlines came to me while talking to one of my colleagues.
It was shortly after the first semester of grim coursework in the Bonn Graduate School
of Economics, that I found myself dodging work and instead talking to Daniel Enge-
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lage, whose office was next to mine. With all the doctoral students of my class being
required to present a first research idea in the brown-bag seminar in the upcoming
semester, and at that point being on the look-out for an idea myself, I asked Daniel
whether he already knew what he would talk about, which he answered in the affirma-
tive. Begrudging Daniel the opportunity to prepare his brown-bag presentation that
much ahead of time, even before the detailed schedule of who was supposed to present
when was announced, his answer to my next question left me puzzled. Asking him if
he had already started preparing his presentation, he told me the following: “Well, I
know I should start working on that presentation right away since I am not stressed
right now, but I don’t see myself doing that as long as I don’t know when it is due.”
Seeing Daniel, a doctoral student of economics with a background in financial mathe-
matics, whom I always had thought of as a well-organized and straightforward person,
putting off an unpleasant task while at the same time being fully aware that the cost of
completing the task was as low as it probably ever would be, and moreover making his
decision when to start working on that task conditional on a deadline being imposed
on him, intrigued me.
When looking for a starting point in order to inquire into the incentive effects of
deadlines, my conversations with Fabian Herweg turned out to be very helpful for
getting things straight in my miond. More importantly, Fabian finally became hooked
up with the topic, which should be the beginning of a mutually inspiring cooperation
for the years to come. Before long we realized that everyday life is virtually pervaded
with situations in which people who are working on a task over a certain span of time
find themselves faced with interim deadlines: next to a final exam, students taking a
class for credit often have to hand in mandatory problem sets in order to pass; students
writing a thesis meet in regular intervals with their thesis adviser to report on their
progress; employees working on a long-term project have to submit memos at different
stages of completion of a project; comic book artists, when working for a major comic
publisher, have to turn around a five to six page strip in about three weeks when
drawing a 24-pages comic book. Moreover, as the following quote of Tim Townsend, a
comic book artist inking for major comic companies for over 17 years by now, suggests,
people seem to value the presence of deadlines:
“It’s always the deadlines. I think that every artist would like to be able to put as much time as they
see fit into their work. Its tough to have to cut corners for the sake of deadlines. That’s the nature of
the beast though. I’m not complaining though. That would be like going to the beach and complaining
about the heat.”
— Tim Townsend
This observation seemed particularly puzzling to us because, through the lense of the
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standard economics model, a perfectly rational decision maker with time-consistent
preferences would not welcome such restrictions on his choice set. Nevertheless, the
somewhat subtle hint of the importance of deadlines being the prevention of an artist
to get lost in his striving for perfectionism when the top priority is to finish the comic
book on time, gave us a first sense that a possible reason for the ubiquity of deadlines
might be rooted in people having problems to focus on priorities. What finally allowed
us to call a spade a spade was the following statement made by Tim Seeley, another
renowned artist in the comic industry who also authored the book “How to be a Comic
Book Artist”:
“The biggest pitfalls facing any comic book artist are video games and pornography. Seriously, most
artists work from their homes and they can’t structure their day without the atmosphere of an office.
Video games are pretty much responsible for about 85% of late comics. I think ’Grand Theft Auto’
alone nearly destroyed the industry.”
— Tim Seeley
Thus, having identified self-control problems—like giving into the temptation of video
gaming or watching porn instead of drawing the final pages of a comic book—as a
possible candidate for the driving forces underlying the widespread phenomenon of
deadlines, we delved into the literature of self-control problems and procrastination in
order to prepare the stage for a more thorough investigation.
The origin of the standard economics model of intertemporal choice dates back to
Paul Samuelson, who proposed the discounted utility model in 1937 as a generalized
model of intertemporal choice that was applicable to multiple time periods. While
Samuelson himself never made any claims on the model’s descriptive validity, due to
its high tractability the discounted utility model was almost instantly adopted by the
economic profession and thereupon became the standard framework for analyzing in-
tertemporal decision making. A key assumption of this model is that all psychological
motivations possibly underlying intertemporal choice can be squeezed in a single pa-
rameter, a discount rate between any two periods which is independent of when the
utility is evaluated. The assumption of constant discounting implies that a decision
maker’s intertemporal preferences are time consistent in the sense that a person’s rela-
tive preference for well-being at an earlier over a later date is the same no matter when
that person is asked to state this preference. Over the years, however, ample evidence
has been compiled which gives testimony to various inadequacies of the discounted
utility framework as a descriptive model of behavior, the best documented of which is
hyperbolic discounting. The term hyperbolic discounting refers to a person discounting
events in the near future at a higher discount rate than events in the distant future.
With discount rates declining, while patient when evaluating outcomes in the distant
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future, people become increasingly impatient as the future draws near. Preferences with
these features induce time inconsistency and thus are capable of capturing self-control
problems. During a surge of interest among economists in the implications of hyper-
bolic discounting in a variety of contexts, in the late 1990s a tractable two-parameter
model was established which allowed to capture the essence of hyperbolic discount-
ing by only slightly modifying Samuelson’s discounted utility model. This model of
“quasi-hyperbolic discounting”, which was originally introduced in Phelps and Pollak
(1968) to study intergenerational altruism, was reapplied by David Laibson on the one
hand, and Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin on the other hand, to rigorously study
intra-personal decision making with self-control problems in the realms of consumption-
saving decisions and procrastination. With the concept of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
having become the framework of choice for analyzing time-inconsistent decision making
in the applied economics literature over the past decade, we also apply this model to
inquire into the effects of interim deadlines on performance and well-being of agents
with self-control problems.
We develop a model of continuous effort choice over time that shifts the focus away
from completion of to performance on a task, where the delayed reward for a task
depends on the total effort devoted to that task. Besides showing that procrastination
induced by time-inconsistent preferences in general hampers performance, we mainly
ask two questions: First, does awareness of own self-control problems increase perfor-
mance and overall well-being? Secondly, do interim deadlines enhance performance?
With regard to the first question, we find that being aware of one’s own self-control
problems can reduce a person’s performance as well as his overall well-being. This find-
ing is in stark contrast to the extant literature on time-inconsistent procrastination,
where sophistication was found to be rather boon than bane when costs are imme-
diate and rewards are delayed. Regarding the second question, we show that being
exposed to an interim deadline increases performance as well as overall well-being of a
hyperbolic discounter, irrespectively of his awareness of own self-control problems. The
forces at work have a clear intuition: an interim deadline, which limits the time avail-
able to work on a particular of several tasks, helps a time-inconsistent person combat
procrastination on that task and thereby to achieve a more efficient allocation of effort
over time. This more favorable allocation reduces effort cost, which in turn leads to the
individual devoting overall more effort, which results in a better performance. Besides
providing an explanation for recent empirical evidence in the psychological literature,
these findings suggest that there is also scope for the employer of a time-inconsistent
agent to benefit from imposing interim deadlines. Therefore, Chapter I provides a
theoretical underpinning for the frequent observation of interim deadlines in working
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environments.
The second chapter of this thesis, which is based on joint work with Fabian Herweg
and Philipp Weinschenk, enriches a principal-agent framework with moral hazard by
incorporating reference-dependent preferences, i.e., a notion of nonstandard preferences
in the sense of the first class of deviations from the standard model. We were inspired
to inquire into the incentive effects of loss aversion when watching the motion picture
“Dodgeball — Grab Life by the Balls”. When asked whether he is just apathetic or if
he really has no goal in life, Vince Vaughn, who plays the owner of a run-down gym in
dire financial distress, answers:
“I found that if you have a goal you might not reach it. But if you don’t have one, then you are never
disappointed—and I gotta tell you it feels phenomenal.”
— Vince Vaughn
Though a hilarious funny movie otherwise, there certainly is a grain of truth in that
almost philosophical quote. People suffer from disappointment when they fail to reach
goals that they wanted to achieve and, moreover, people may prefer not to try at all
in order to avoid that disappointment. But then, if the prospect of not obtaining
a desired reward may discourage an individual from trying to reap that reward, one
question is immediately at hand: Why do so many incentive schemes put forth in the
economic literature propose to reward an agent for good performance which is more
likely—but not certain—to be observed the higher the agent’s effort? The idea that
performance-dependent incentive schemes might possibly backfire in this sense piqued
our curiosity, and we decided to pursue this idea more rigorously.
One formal way proposed in the economic literature to capture the phenomenon
of disappointment is loss aversion, first proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in
their seminal contribution that introduced prospect theory into the economic discourse:
when an outcome falls short compared to some reference point, people incur a loss which
looms larger than a gain of equal size. With reference-dependent preferences being at
the heart of loss aversion, each modeling approach that makes use of this concept
faces the task of specifying how this reference point is determined. With no unifying
approach provided how to determine a decision maker’s reference point, however, the
choice of the reference point basically is subject to the full arbitrariness of the modeler.
While most of the literature that emerged in the wake of the original formulation of
prospect theory assumed that an individual’s reference point should be equated with
the status quo, over time serious doubts have been raised about the adequacy of this
approach. One criticism that has been propelled particularly forceful is that in many
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situations of economic interest, a person’s reference point should not only be backward-
looking, but also incorporate expectations about future events. A very recent concept of
reference-dependent preferences and reference-point determination proposed by Botond
Ko˝szegi and Matthew Rabin seems capable of accounting for both afore-mentioned
difficulties. In this approach, the reference point is completely determined by a decision
maker’s rational expectations about outcomes and thus allows for the reference point
to be forward-looking on the one hand, while at the same time removing modeling
arbitrariness by deriving the reference point coherently from the economic environment.
Beside this methodological advantages, we opted for this concept of reference-dependent
preferences because our gut feeling regarding the statement of Vince Vaughn—that
the fear of being disappointed might be demotivating—was directly challenged by a
conjecture found in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). Here it is argued that if agents are loss
averse and expectations are the driving force in the determination of the reference point,
then “in principal-agent models, performance-contingent pay may not only directly
motivate the agent to work harder in pursuit of higher income, but also indirectly
motivate [him] by changing [his] expected income and effort.” So we set out to answer
the the question who was right, Hollywood-based philosophy or economic intuition?
The answer we should find—which, by the way, turned out to be the favorite answer of
many economists: “It depends.”—before long was pushed into the background of our
research efforts when we suddenly found ourselves on the trail of a puzzle of by far
greater economic interest.
In the classical principal-agent model with moral hazard, a principal seeks to contract
with an agent who is supposed to exert costly effort which stochastically influences the
principal’s profits. With effort being costly and unobservable, in order to provide the
agent with incentives to exert the desired level of effort, the principal has to make the
agent’s compensation payment depend on a verifiable performance measure which is
imperfectly correlated with the agent’s choice of action. Besides creating incentives,
such a contractual arrangement also imposes some income risk on the agent since the
performance measure is only a noisy signal of his effort choice. With most individuals
being risk averse at least to some degree in the sense that they dislike being exposed to
risky situations, this constitutes the classical tradeoff faced by the principal between
providing incentives and optimal risk sharing. Orthodox economic theory models risk
aversion by assuming a strictly concave utility function, which implies that an individ-
ual exhibits local risk neutrality. In consequence, as was shown, for example, in the
pioneering contributions by Holmstro¨m (1979), the optimal compensation scheme for a
risk averse agent in the afore-mentioned sense is based on the agent’s performance in a
fairly complicated way. In particular, with paying slightly different wages for different
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signals improving incentives at negligible costs due to local risk neutrality of the agent,
the optimal performance-based compensation scheme was found to result in a fully
differentiated wage scheme which rewards pieces of information that differ in their
informative content about the agent’s effort differently. This theoretically predicted
complexity of contractual form, however, often is at odds with the form contracts take
in observed practice. While already Prendergast (1999) referred to the discrepancy
between theoretically predicted and actually observed contractual form about a decade
ago, the same question was raised somewhat more pointedly by Bernard Salanie´ in his
paper “Testing Contract Theory” from the year 2003:
“The recent literature provides very strong evidence that contractual forms have large effects on be-
havior. As the notion that ‘incentive matters’ is one of the central tenets of economists of every
persuasion, this should be comforting to the community. On the other hand, it raises an old puzzle: if
contractual form matters so much, why do we observe such a prevalence of fairly simple contracts?”
— Bernard Salanie´
With the standard notion of risk aversion implying a fully differentiated wage profile,
a particular prevalent form of contractual arrangement observed in practice is hard to
reconcile with standard economic theory: (lump-sum) bonus contracts. This contrac-
tual form pays out a base wage if the employees performance falls below a prespecified
threshold, whereas for performances above this threshold the employee receives the
base wage plus a fixed—and otherwise performance-independent—bonus payment.
As recently was demonstrated in Rabin (2000), the orthodox way of modeling risk
preferences describes actually observed risk preferences only inadequately. With the
tradeoff between incentive provision and risk sharing being at the core of moral hazard,
allowing for a richer description of the agent’s risk preferences that goes beyond stan-
dard risk aversion seems a natural starting point to gain deeper insights into contract
design. Following the model of reference-dependent preferences according to Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007), we assume that the agent is expectation-based loss averse, with
his reference point being determined by his rational expectations: the agent compares
his actual wage pairwise which each other wage that he could have received instead,
where each comparison is weighted by the occurrence probability of the alternative
outcome. Our main finding is that, no matter how rich the performance measure the
principal can deploy, a simple (lump-sum) bonus scheme is optimal when loss aversion
is the driving force of the agent’s risk preferences. Though hard to grasp in only a few
words, the basic intuition for this finding, which is in stark contrast to the predictions
made by the standard economics model, is as follows: specification of many different
wage payments induces uncertainty for the agent as to what he will receive. If he earns
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a relatively low wage, he compares this to higher wages he could have received, and ex-
periences the sensation of a loss from this comparison. The anticipation of these losses
reduces the agent’s expected utility and thus he demands a higher average payment.
While the principal has a classic rationale for rewarding signals strictly higher if they
are stronger indicators of good performance, this negative “comparison effect” domi-
nates this consideration if standard risk aversion plays a minor role. This makes a bonus
contract, i.e., the most basic form an incentive contract can possibly take, the optimal
contractual arrangement. In this sense, reference-dependent preferences according to
Ko˝szegi and Rabin introduce an endogenous complexity cost into contracting based on
psychological foundations.
After working on this project for about eighteen months and presenting it at about
ten conferences or workshops, Fabian, Philipp, and I myself are very happy to have
seen the paper“Binary Payment Schemes—Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion”, on which
this second chapter is based, being accepted for publication in the American Economic
Review.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I discuss a particular form of workplace
design, job rotation, as a promising approach for organizations to cope with problems
arising from their members being subject to confirmation bias. With confirmation bias
being recognized as one of the most important forms of inferential errors, this third
chapter incorporates nonstandard beliefs in the sense of the second class of deviations
from the orthodox economic model into the context of organizational design. The idea
for this third chapter presented itself shortly after accepting Professor Matthias Kra¨kel’s
offer to work as a scientific assistant at his Chair for Personnel and Organizational
Economics, with my main field of activity being to act as supervisor for students
writing their diploma, master or bachelor theses. Before long, I was contacted by a
bachelor student, Meike Ahrends, who asked me if I was willing to be her thesis adviser.
After finishing her bachelor degree at the University of Bonn, Meike planned to go for
a master degree in business administration. With regard to her future applications for
a slot in the master program of whatever university she fancied, we agreed on looking
for a thesis topic with immediate relevance for business administration. Starting out
from the survey on relational contracting in MacLeod (2007), and after taking a detour
over dissolution of partnerships, we finally arrived at subjective performance evaluation
and performance appraisal. Somehow, not really knowing why, I found myself going
astray, visiting various internet platforms for topical debate, exchange of experience,
and informed opinion on management, leadership and human resources issues. And
then, without me being on the lookout for it, there it was again, behavioral economics
all over the place, with raters’ biases in performance evaluations seeming a particular
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“hot topic”.
The practice of performance appraisal is an important cornerstone for many decisions
made in organizations, in particular personnel decisions like promotion, training, and
firing decisions. Performance appraisal itself, however, is a process by which humans
judge other humans. With many performance measures regarding a firm’s employees
being subjective rather than objective in nature, the doors are wide open for behavioral
biases and inferential errors to enter and—more importantly—to distort this process.
According to Brian Davis, executive vice president of Personnel Decisions International,
a Minneapolis-based consultancy firm, raters’ bias in performance appraisal by now is
considered a severe problem in organizational practice:
“The problem with rater-bias is that it takes away the organization’s ability to objectively use data
from performance evaluations with any validity. [In consequence,] you can’t count on the objectivity
or accuracy of a performance assessment, and you have no differentiating data that allows you to make
confident decisions about promotions, training or leadership development.”
— Brian Davis
The reason for organizations to worry about their decisions being undermined by raters’
bias seems obvious: According to Right Management, a globally operating career tran-
sition and organizational consulting firm, the average cost of coping with an employee
who does not work out is 2.5 times his salary, with lower employee morale, decreased
productivity, and lost customer share being the most dire consequences of bad promo-
tion decisions. So it hardly seems surprising that organizations strive to find a way for
dealing with the problem of raters’ bias, as for example stated by Rick Smith, Senior
Vice President of Right Management:
“There is a smaller margin for error today in selection and promoting people into key positions, and
a greater need to target development efforts to ensure that they really make a difference.”
— Rick Smith
What puzzled me about the suggestions posted on the various internet platforms how
to cope with raters’ bias is that—at least to my eyes—they seemed somewhat half-
heartedly. For example, a call for an objectification of the performance management
process seems somewhat off-color because if there was a sufficiently rich set of objective
performance measures, firms would not have to rely on subjective performance measures
in the first-place. Likewise, awareness training, which informs supervisors about the
types of subtle bias that can interfere with their performance as appraisers, surely
is a reasonable first line of defense against raters’ bias. But with raters’ bias often
taking the form of inferential errors which enter the human judgment process most
often unknowingly and unwittingly, it seems questionable that awareness training can
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get the problem under control. So I started pondering whether organizational design
provides some other, perhaps more reliable means to overcome the problems associated
with raters’ bias.
Raters’ bias is documented to manifest itself in all sorts of ways. One of the most
prominent notions is the so-called “horns-and-halo effect”, which refers to supervisors’
tendency to judge employees as either good or bad, thus putting on them an angelic halo
in the first case and fiendish horns in the latter, and then to seek evidence that supports
their opinion. In the psychological literature, the horns-and-halo effect is widely known
as one of the many notions of a phenomenon called confirmation bias. Confirmation bias
in general refers to unintentional and unknowing selectivity in the acquisition and use
of information. Abundant empirical evidence supports the view that once one has come
to believe in a position on an issue, one’s primary purpose becomes that of justifying
or defending that position. The conception that information is treated partially once
an opinion has been established clearly represents a deviation from the assumption of
the traditional economics model that, when faced with uncertainty, people correctly
form their subjective probabilistic assessment according to the laws of probability. The
first model to formalize this idea was proposed in Rabin and Schrag (1999). This
model captures a manifestation of confirmation bias known as “primacy effect”, which
is intimately connected with the horns-and-halo effect. The primacy effect refers to
the finding that, when information is gathered and integrated over time, evidence
acquired in early stages is likely to carry more weight than evidence acquired later on.
In consequence, opinions are formed early in the process and subsequently acquired
information evaluated and interpreted in a way that is partial to that opinion: people
tend to see ambiguous evidence more likely as supporting rather than disconfirming an
established opinion, to question conflicting information more willingly than information
supportive of preexisting beliefs, to explain away events that are inconsistent with a
held position, and even to interpret evidence that should count against a hypothesis as
counting in favor of it.
Applying the model by Rabin and Schrag (1999), I develop a simple framework
which allows me to argue that organizational design provides a tool which is capable
of thwarting confirmation bias: job rotation. In this model, with different types of jobs
being available, the efficient allocation of a worker within an organization depends on
his ability, which is assumed to be commonly unknown. If the firm wants to base this
decision on a more solid informational footing by gathering additional information, it
has to rely on its divisions’ supervisors to do so. Supervisors are subject to confirmation
bias, which implies that a supervisor’s opinion about the worker’s ability established
early in the appraisal process will color all information this supervisor subsequently
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receives. Job rotation refers to a job practice which assigns an employee not to a single
specific task but to a set of several tasks, associated with a meaningful change in job
content, among which he rotates with some frequency. Thus, by implementing job
rotation, the firm regularly breaks up the matches of supervisors and their subordi-
nates, thereby creating multiple unbiased evaluations of many supervisors regarding
one particular employee. While rotation of an employee between several divisions is
acknowledged to cause costs by disrupting work flows or forgoing productivity gains
of specialization, I show that preventing confirmation bias from affecting supervisors’
judgment can indeed outweigh this cost, making job rotation the optimal form of job
design. Next to advocating job rotation as a potential remedy for the horns-and-halo
effect which harmonically blends in into many organizational forms in practice, these
findings also complement the extant theory on job rotation by providing a rationale for
this particular form of job design based upon psychological foundations.
Let me wrap up things by saying that I suggested to Meike Ahrends to write her thesis
about Rabin and Schrag’s (1999) model of confirmation bias and the phenomenon’s
implications in situations of economic relevance. On the one hand, being at least
partially sophisticated about my own self-control problems, this presented a useful
commitment device for myself, forcing me to read that paper in detail. On the other
hand, it provided Meike with the opportunity to write her thesis based on a topic
of importance for economics as well as business administration. She did extremely
well and by now participates in the master program in business administration at the
University of Mannheim.
The fourth chapter of this doctoral thesis, which is based on joint work with Fabian
Herweg, examines the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in intermediate-
good markets when the structure of the intermediate industry is not exogenously given
but allows for costly entry. With all parties having standard preferences, processing
information according to the laws of probability, and maximizing stable and correctly
perceived preferences, this fourth chapter incorporates none of the behavioral deviations
classified above but sticks to the orthodox economics model. So why, after delivering a
pleading in the defense of economics and psychology, does this last chapter of my thesis
build on the standard economics model? I don’t think that there is a way to convinc-
ingly argue why my interest in behavioral economics recently should have abated—in
particular, because it hasn’t in the slightest. On the other hand, while perhaps lying
dormant for some time, my interest in economic analysis based on the orthodox eco-
nomics model has never abated either. Therefore, I was not really surprised seeing
this interest rekindle when Fabian Herweg suggested to do some research in classical
industrial organization, which—I guess—will always be where his heart belongs.
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While looking for a starting point, a paper that caught our attention was by Inderst
and Valetti (2009), who inquire into the effects of a credible threat of demand-side
substitution in a model of third-degree price discrimination in input markets. In the
introduction, Inderst and Valetti often refer to“the extant theory”or“the extant litera-
ture” on price discrimination in intermediate-good markets, without being very specific
about what contributions constitute the extant literature. The insights gained by a
somewhat more thorough literature research conducted by Fabian and myself were
twofold: First, the extant theory on price discrimination in input markets turned out
to be a manageable field, beginning in 1987 with the seminal contribution by Michael
L. Katz. With the earlier papers by and large drawing the conclusion that allowing
discriminatory wholesale pricing results in adverse welfare effects, most recently there
has been a renewed surge of interest in the topic among both economists and practi-
tioners. These more recent contributions in particular point to situations in which price
discrimination may be welfare improving. Second, some evidently relevant questions
have not yet been addressed in the extant literature, even though these questions by far
are not far-fetched. For example, in all contributions on the topic so far, the upstream
supplier of the input is assumed to be perfectly informed about the downstream firms’
production technologies and associated efficiency in production, based upon which he
subsequently charges possibly discriminatory wholesale prices. While we inquire into
the implications of private information about production costs in another paper, in the
paper upon which this fourth chapter is based, we relax the ubiquitous assumption of
an exogenously given market structure of the downstream industry.
The common setup applied in the extant theory of third-degree price discrimination
in input markets considers a monopolistic upstream firm supplying some input to firms
in an intermediate industry which use this input to produce a final good subsequently
sold to final consumers. An assumption shared by all those contributions is that the
structure of the intermediate industry is exogenously given. As was already noted
by Katz in his chapter on vertical restraints in the first volume of the Handbook of
Industrial Organization,
“[t]here are several ways in which the manufacturer may influence the number of retailers.
The number of dealers may be chosen directly by the manufacturer [...]. Alternatively, the
manufacturer may indirectly control the number of dealers through his pricing policy or the
nonterritorial resale restraint provisions of his contract offer.”
– Michael L. Katz (1989)
Thus, abstracting from entry into the intermediate industry ignores the fact that pric-
ing decisions of the upstream supplier are a major determinant of the resulting industry
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structure and market outcome. With these pricing decisions in turn being determined
by the pricing instruments available to the upstream supplier, inquiring into the impli-
cations of banning discriminatory wholesale pricing for structure of the intermediate
industry and market outcome seems a natural question in this context.
In this chapter, we present a formal model of third-degree price discrimination in
input markets which allows for costly entry into the downstream industry. First we
consider the case where downstream firms operate in separate markets, which allows
us to isolate a first important effect: Price discrimination is found to foster entry in the
sense that whenever entry occurs under uniform pricing, entry also occurs under a dis-
criminatory pricing regime. Intuitively, if entry is very costly, the maximum wholesale
price the upstream supplier can possibly charge to the entrant such that entry occurs
becomes low. Under a discriminatory pricing regime the wholesale price charged to the
incumbent firm, and thus upstream profits from the incumbent downstream market are
unaffected by this constraint possibly imposed by the entry fee. Under uniform pricing,
on the other hand, the upstream supplier has to pass this low wholesale price on to the
incumbent firm as well, thereby reducing profits from the incumbent market. There-
fore, in contrast to a discriminatory pricing regime, under a uniform pricing regime the
input supplier may be willing to forgo profits from opening a new downstream market
in order to maintain high profits from the incumbent downstream market. Whenever
entry occurs under price discrimination but not under uniform pricing, social welfare
is strictly higher under the discriminatory pricing regime because opening of a new
market increases consumers’ surplus and upstream profits, and also gives rise to non-
negative profits for the entering downstream firm. We then consider the case where
downstream firms operate in the same market and entry into the intermediate industry
leads to downstream competition. While the entry-promoting effect of price discrimi-
nation is operative also in the case of downstream competition, entry occurring under a
discriminatory but not under a uniform pricing regime no longer is a sufficient condition
for an increase in welfare. The reason is that, if entry into the intermediate industry
occurs under price discrimination but not under uniform pricing, a part of the output
produced by the monopolistic incumbent under uniform pricing is shifted to the less
efficient entrant under a discriminatory pricing regime due to competition. While this
shift in production shares benefits the upstream supplier and consumers because the
associated increase in aggregate quantity attenuates the double-marginalization prob-
lem with a downstream monopolist, it may not be sufficient to make society better off
if the cost of entry or the increase in the cost of production is high. Thus, in the light
of our findings which identify the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in
input market as highly ambiguous, calls for a determinate legislature which either bans
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or permits discriminatory pricing practices seem inadequate.
Having reached the end of this introspective retrospect, there is nothing left to do
except for wishing you an enjoyable read.
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I. Performance of Procrastinators:
On the Value of Deadlines
Earlier work has shown that procrastination can be explained by
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We present a model of effort choice
over time that shifts the focus from completion of to performance
on a single task. We find that being aware of the own self-control
problems may reduce a person’s performance as well as his over-
all well-being, which is in contrast to the existing literature on
procrastination. Extending this framework to a multi-task model,
we show that interim deadlines help a quasi-hyperbolic discounter
to structure his workload more efficiently, which in turn leads to
better performance. Moreover, being restricted by deadlines in-
creases a quasi-hyperbolic discounter’s well-being. Thus, we pro-
vide a theoretical underpinning for recent empirical evidence and
numerous casual observations.
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1. Introduction
Life is pervaded with situations in which people have a certain span of time to work
on a task and the final reward depends on how much devotion they put into their
work: students studying for a final or writing a thesis, employees working on a long-
term project, etc. Next to the final deadline, these tasks often have additional interim
deadlines: mandatory problem sets are often a prerequisite to pass a class; students
meet in regular intervals with their thesis advisor to report on their progress; employees
have to hold several presentations or submit memos at different stages of completion
of a project. A rational decision maker with time-consistent preferences would not
welcome such restrictions on his choice set. But when people impulsively procrastinate,
such interim deadlines can be helpful.1 Earlier research has shown that one possible
explanation for procrastination on the completion of a task is hyperbolic discounting.
This paper analyzes the behavior of hyperbolic discounters in a model of effort choice
over time that shifts the focus from completion of to performance on a task. We show
that interim deadlines are a useful commitment device for a hyperbolic discounter,
which increases his “long-run utility”. Moreover - and more interestingly - interim
deadlines are also performance-enhancing. Thus, while implementing interim deadlines
always is in the interest of the hyperbolic discounter himself, these findings suggest
that there is also scope for the employer of such an agent to benefit from imposing
such deadlines. Therefore, our paper gives a theoretical underpinning for the frequent
observation of interim deadlines.
We start out from a model where an individual has a given number of periods to
work on a single task. In each period, this person can invest costly effort into this
task. Effort is modeled as a continuous decision variable. In the final period the in-
dividual receives a reward that depends on the total amount of effort he has invested.
Since serious procrastination can hardly be explained by exponential discounting with
a reasonable discount factor, we adopt the assumption that the agent discounts quasi-
hyperbollically, which gives rise to time-inconsistent preferences.2 We compare the
performance of three types of agents. Next to the benchmark of a time-consistent
individual without self-control problems, we consider two types of quasi-hyperbolic
discounters: naive persons who are totally unaware of their self-control problems, and
sophisticated persons who are fully aware of them. Besides finding that procrastination
in general hampers performance, we mainly ask two questions: First, does sophistica-
tion increase an individual’s performance and overall well-being? Second, do interim
1We do not claim that procrastination issues are the only explanation for observing interim deadlines.
Other explanations may be preferences for risk diversification or motives for information aquisition.
2See O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005) for some illustrative numerical examples.
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deadlines enhance performance, and if so, how? The answer to the first question is a
novelty in the literature: Earlier work on quasi-hyperbolic discounting has shown that
awareness of self-control problems will always benefit a person when costs are imme-
diate and rewards are delayed.3 We find, in contrast, that sophistication may actually
hurt an individual – even in this environment. In order to provide an intuition for why
this may be the case, we identify and discuss the effects that drive the differences in the
behavior of sophisticated and naive agents. A sophisticated agent realizes that he can
create incentives for his future selves to work harder by working only little today. This
may lead to an extremely uneven allocation of effort over time, which is undesirable
with regard to the agent’s long-run preferences. In order to address the second ques-
tion, we augment the basic model by introducing a second task. Two different regimes
are compared: a regime with an interim deadline and a regime without an interim
deadline. If no interim deadline is imposed, the agent can work on both tasks up to the
final period. Under an interim deadline, on the other hand, he has only half the time
to perform on the first task, and the whole span of time to work on the second task.
We show that being exposed to a deadline is beneficial for time-inconsistent agents.
Interim deadlines help hyperbolic discounters to structure their workload and to allo-
cate their effort more efficiently, leading to an overall performance increase, which in
turn improves long-run utility.
Our paper draws on two different strands of literature on time-inconsistent prefer-
ences. First, the literature on time-inconsistent procrastination, initiated by Akerlof
(1991), and second the literature on time-inconsistent consumption-saving decisions,
first studied by Strotz (1956). Earlier work on procrastination assumes that the de-
cision that an individual has to take is when to do a task. In general, these papers
are interested in the effects of awareness on behavior. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b),
for example, consider a setting where a single task has to be performed exactly once
over a certain span of time. Each period, a person faces the binary decision whether to
complete the task or not. They find that being sophisticated with regard to self-control
problems leads to an earlier completion of the task. When costs are immediate and
rewards are delayed, this in turn implies that sophistication never hurts a person. In
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001b) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008), these results are
shown to carry over to situations where an individual has to choose which task to per-
form from a menu of mutually exclusive tasks or where a person engages in long-term
projects.4
3See, for example, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b, 2001b, 2008).
4O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008) assume that a project requires two periods to be completed, one in
which it is started, and a second period in which it is finished. The decision the agent has to take
each period, however, remains a binary one.
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In the literature on time-inconsistent consumption-saving decisions, which was car-
ried on by Laibson (1996, 1997, 1998), Laibson et al. (1998), Angeletos et al. (2001),
and Diamond and Ko˝szegi (2003), an individual has to decide each period anew how
much to consume and how much to save, and thus chooses a continuous decision vari-
able. In this literature, most researchers assume sophisticated beliefs.5 The analysis
of sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounters and continuous action spaces is fairly
complicated. All the above contributions circumvent the arising analytical problems
by assuming that the agent’s instantaneous utility function for consumption is of the
constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) type. Borrowing the essential framework from
this literature, in particular the assumption of a CRRA-utility function and sophisti-
cated beliefs, Fischer (1999) analyzes procrastination issues, showing that sophisticated
persons choose a decreasing leisure profile over time. To the best of our knowledge,
our paper is the first that provides a detailed comparison of the behavior of naive and
sophisticated individuals in a continuous-action-space framework.6
Moreover, we analyze the value of interim deadlines as commitment technology.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999c) analyze optimal incentive schemes when a principal,
who faces a cost of delay, hires a time-inconsistent agent, who faces a stochastic task
cost, to perform a single task once. They find that under certain circumstances it is
optimal to implement a deadline scheme, that is, to fix a date beyond which procras-
tination is severely punished. While this kind of deadline in a sense compares to the
final deadline in our model, our main interest is in the impact of interim deadlines.
That interim deadlines may be a valuable commitment mechanism for hyperbolic dis-
counters is conjectured in O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005). We show that this indeed is
the case, and, moreover, we lay open the beneficial effect of interim deadlines. With
respect to consumption-savings decisions, there is no natural analog to the concept of
interim deadlines.7
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present the
basic single-task model, and briefly review the concept of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
and the notions of naivete´ and sophistication. This model is analyzed in Section 3. In
Section 4, we identify the effects driving the differences in behavior of differently aware
5Diamond and Ko˝szegi (2003) briefly discuss the behavior of naive agents without comparing sophis-
ticates and naifs. Skiba and Tobacman (2008) identify partially naive hyperbolic discounting as
the most consistent explanation for payday borrowing without theoretically analyzing the effects
of awareness on behavior.
6An exception is Tobacman (2008), who, in a purely technical note, analyzes how consumption
depends on the degree of sophistication. An intuitive explanation for the different behavior of
differently aware agents or welfare implications, however, are not derived.
7In the consumption-savings context, for example, an interim deadline would compare to a christmas
club that allows to deposit money only during the first half of the year.
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agents and discuss the impact of awareness on performance and overall satisfaction.
Section 5 extends the basic model to allow for a meaningful analysis of the effect of
deadlines on performance. The final section concludes. All proofs are deferred to the
appendix.
2. The Model
An agent has to perform a task, e.g. writing a term paper. He has two periods to work
on that task in the sense that in each period t ∈ {1, 2} the agent chooses an effort level
et ≥ 0 which he invests in the task. If the agent invests some positive effort in period t
then in the same period an effort cost c(et) arises. This cost function is assumed to be
time-invariant. The agent is rewarded for the task in period 3. This delayed reward,
which is assumed to be a function of total effort invested, is denoted by g(
∑2
t=1 et).
8
Assumption: It is assumed that the cost function and that the reward function satisfy
the following properties: ∀x > 0,
c′(x) > 0, c′′(x) > 0, c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0
g′(x) > 0, g′′(x) < 0, g(0) = 0, g′(0) > 0
To motivate the above functional assumptions, once again consider the example of
the student who has to write a term paper. The effort is the time he spends on
writing the paper. Thus, the costs of effort are the opportunity costs of not enjoying
leisure time. Making the standard assumption of decreasing marginal utility of leisure
time is equivalent to assuming a convex cost function. The reward function is the
expected grade of the term paper. The expected grade increases when the student
spends more time on writing the paper. Typically, by investing somewhat more effort
the probability to receive a C instead of a D increases significantly, whereas the increase
in effort necessary to receive an A instead of a B is much higher.
Within this framework, we study the behavior of individuals with time-inconsistent
preferences due to hyperbolic discounting.9 In particular, we assume that a person’s
intertemporal preferences from the perspective of period t are given by
Ut(ut, ut+1, ..., uT ) = ut + β
T∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tuτ ,
8We focus on a three-period model, the shortest possible time horizon that actually generates quasi-
hyperbolic discounting effects. For longer time horizons the analysis becomes very quickly very
complicated.
9Hyperbolic discounting refers to a person discounting events in the near future at a higher discount
rate than events in the distant future. For an overview of empirical studies that provide evidence
of hyperbolic discounting, see Frederick et al. (2002).
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where ut denotes that person’s instantaneous utility in period t. This functional form,
which often is referred to as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, captures the essence of hy-
perbolic discounting.10 While δ ∈ (0, 1] represents a time-consistent discount factor,
β ∈ (0, 1] introduces a time-inconsistent preference for immediate gratification and
represents a person’s self-control problem: for β < 1, at any given moment the person
has an extra bias for the present over the future.11 In order to focus on the effects
that arise from the present bias embodied in the agent’s preferences, we abstract from
time-consistent exponential discounting, that is, formally we set δ = 1.
An individual is modeled as a composite of autonomous intertemporal selves. These
selves are labeled according to their respective periods of control over the effort deci-
sion. During its period of control, self t observes all past effort choices. The current self
cannot commit future selves to a particular path of effort decisions. Within this frame-
work, we study three types of agents: time-consistent agents (TC) as a benchmark, and
two types of hyperbolic discounters, naifs (N) and sophisticates (S).12 A naif is com-
pletely unaware of future self-control problems and hence wrongly predicts his future
behavior: He believes that his future self’s preferences will be identical to his current
self’s, not realizing that as the date of action gets closer his tastes will have changed. A
sophisticate, in contrast, is fully aware of his future self-control problems and therefore
correctly predicts how he will behave in the future. The first-period intertemporal util-
ity of an agent of type i ∈ {TC,N, S} is given by U i1 = −c(e1)− βc(e2) + βg (e1 + e2).
Accordingly, given first-period effort eˆ1, the second-period intertemporal utility takes
the form U i2 = −c(e2) + βg (eˆ1 + e2). The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of
present bias. For a time-consistent agent we have β = 1.
Following the literature on present-biased preferences, we assume that agents follow
perception-perfect strategies, that is, strategies such that in all periods a person chooses
10Throughout this paper, we use the terms“present-biased preferences”, “hyperbolic discounting”, and
“quasi-hyperbolic discounting” interchangeably.
11While originally introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) to study intergenerational altruism, these
present-biased preferences have been reapplied by Laibson (1996, 1997) to study intra-personal,
time-inconsistent decision problems. Besides procrastination and consumption-saving decisions,
present-biased preferences have been applied to a broad range of contexts of economic interest, for
example contract design (DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004, 2006)), industrial organization (Nocke
and Peitz (2003), Sarafidis (2005)), bargaining (Akin (2007)), information acquisition (Carrillo
and Mariotti (2000), Benabou and Tirole (2000)), and labor economics (DellaVigna and Paserman
(2005)).
12The two extreme assumptions about awarness, naivete´ and sophistication, already have been dis-
cussed by Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968). Though we focus on these two extreme cases of
awareness, in Appendix B we show that all our results extend to agents who are partially naive in
the sense of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001b).
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the optimal action given her current preferences and her perception of future behavior.
In each period, time-consistent and naive agents are just choosing an optimal effort
path. While a time-consistent agent will always follow the effort path chosen in the
first period, a naif, in contrast, will often revise his chosen effort path as his preferences
change over time. Sophisticates, on the other hand, in a sense play a game against
their future selves. Their behavior therefore incorporates reactions to behavior by
their future selves that they cannot directly control as well as attempts to strategically
manipulate the behavior of their future selves.
3. The Analysis
In this section, we solve the model for the three types of agents: time-consistent individ-
uals, naifs and sophisticates. Hyperbolic discounters have a preference for immediate
gratification. As was shown, for instance in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b), due to this
present bias hyperbolic discounters are prone to procrastinate working on unpleasant
tasks. Therefore, in our model with continuous effort choice over several periods, one
should expect both naifs and sophisticates to procrastinate in the sense of an increasing
effort profile over time. Moreover, compared to a time-consistent agent, both types of
hyperbolic discounters perceive immediate effort costs as higher relative to future effort
costs and future rewards. Hence, one should expect both types of hyperbolic discoun-
ters to exert less effort in total than a time-consistent agent. We begin the analysis
with the benchmark case of an agent without self-control problems.
The Time-Consistent Agent Since the preferences of a time-consistent agent do
not change over time, his intertemporal decision problem boils down to maximizing
lifetime utility, UTC1 , by choosing both first- and second-period effort levels simulta-
neously. From the corresponding first-order conditions we immediately obtain that a
TC chooses the same effort level in both periods. This optimal effort level, eTC , is
characterized by
c′(eTC) = g′(eTC + eTC) . (I.1)
Hence, a TC prefers to smooth effort in the sense that in each period he invests the
same effort level in the task.13 This is intuitively plausible: With the cost of effort
being a convex function, a time-consistent agent can improve on any uneven allocation
of effort over time by keeping total effort - and thus the final reward - constant, but
13This clearly is an artifact of our choice to abstract from time-consistent discounting. With δ < 1, a
time-consistent agent would choose an increasing effort path, as was shown by Fischer (2001).
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shifting effort from the high-effort period to the low-effort period, thereby reducing
total effort costs.
The Naive Agent A naive agent is unaware that his preferences will change over
time. In the first period he believes that his second-period self will have the same
preferences, that is, he believes he will stick to the plan he chooses now. When the
second period finally rolls around, however, a naif’s preferences will have changed.
Definition I.1: A perception-perfect strategy for a naive agent is given by (eN1 , e
N
2 (eˆ1))
such that (i) (eN1 , e
TC
2 ) ∈ argmax(e1,e2) UN1 (e1, e2), and (ii) ∀ eˆ1 ≥ 0, eN2 (eˆ1) ∈ argmaxe2
UN2 (eˆ1, e2). Let e
N
2 = e
N
2 (e
N
1 ).
In the first period a naive agent maximizes UN1 with respect to e1 and e2.
14 The actual
first-period effort, eN1 , and the planned second-period effort, e
TC
2 , are characterized by
the following conditions:
g′(eN1 + e
TC
2 ) = c
′(eTC2 ) (I.2)
βg′(eN1 + e
TC
2 ) = c
′(eN1 ) . (I.3)
Since there is no decision to be made after period 2, beliefs about own future behavior
play no further role in determining the second-period effort. Hence, in the second
period a naive person maximizes UN2 with respect to e2. The corresponding first-order
condition which caracterizes the second-period effort, eN2 , is given by
βg′(eN1 + e
N
2 ) = c
′(eN2 ) . (I.4)
From equations (I.1)-(I.4) the following result is readily obtained.
Proposition I.1: (i) A naive agent invests more effort in period 2 than in period 1,
i.e., eN1 < e
N
2 . (ii) The total effort a naive agent invests is lower than the total effort of
a time-consistent person, i.e., eN1 + e
N
2 < 2e
TC. (iii) A naive agent is overly optimistic
when predicting his future-self ’s willingness to work, i.e., eN2 < e
TC
2 .
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition I.1 state that the two intuitive conjectures made above
hold true for naive hyperbolic discounters. According to part (i), a naive agent pro-
crastinates in the beginning and tries to catch up in the end. Part (ii) compares
the behavior of a naif and a time-consistent agent. The present bias leads to higher
14Equivalently, we could solve for the behavior of a time-consistent agent in period 2 for a given
first-period effort, eTC
2
(e1). Then, wrongly believing himself to behave time-consistently in the
future, in period 1 a naive agent maximizes UN
1
with respect to e1 subject to e2 = e
TC
2
(e1). We
will actually make use of this procedure in the appendix.
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perceived costs for a naif, which makes him exhibit lower overall effort than a time-
consistent agent. Moreover, part (iii) says that a naive agent overestimates his own
capabilities. Believing that he will behave time-consistently in the future, a naive agent
makes ambitious plans today, that he does not follow through tomorrow.
The Sophisticated Agent In contrast to a naif, a sophisticate is fully aware that
his preferences will change. Therefore, correctly predicting his own future behavior, a
sophisticate plays a game against his future self, which can be solved per backwards
induction.
Definition I.2: A perception-perfect strategy for a sophisticated agent is given by (eS1 ,
eS2 (eˆ1)) such that (i) ∀ eˆ1 ≥ 0, eS2 (eˆ1) ∈ argmaxe2 US2 (eˆ1, e2), and (ii) eS1 ∈ argmaxe1
US1 (e1, e
S
2 (e1)). Let e
S
2 = e
S
2 (e
S
1 ).
For a given first period effort level eˆ1, in period 2 a sophisticate maximizes U
S
2 with
respect to e2. The second-period effort obviously is a function of the first-period effort,
eS2 (eˆ1), and satisfies the corresponding first-order condition,
βg′(eˆ1 + e
S
2 (eˆ1)) = c
′(eS2 (eˆ1)) . (I.5)
Differentiating (I.5) with respect to e1 yields
deS2 (e1)
de1
= − βg
′′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))
βg′′(e1 + eS2 (e1))− c′′(eS2 (e1))
∈ (−1, 0) .
The above derivative describes how a second-period sophisticate reacts to a change
in the first-period effort. A higher first-period effort reduces the second-period effort.
Due to the strict convexity of the cost function, however, the absolute value of this
reduction is lower than the increase in effort in the first period. In the first period the
sophisticate maximizes US1 with respect to e1 subject to e2 = e
S
2 (e1). In the appendix
we show that the effort level that globally maximizes US1 , e
S
1 , is characterized by the
corresponding first-order condition.15 This first-order condition is given by
−c′(eS1 ) + βg′
(
eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 )
)
+
deS2 (e
S
1 )
de1
β
[
g′
(
eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 )
)− c′(eS2 (eS1 ))] = 0. (I.6)
With the behavior of a sophisticated agent being characterized by (I.5) and (I.6), the
following result is obtained.
15 While there is not necessarily a unique perception-perfect strategy for a sophisticated agent, all
perception-perfect effort pairs are characterized by the corresponding first-order conditions. Mul-
tiple perception-perfect strategies are a well-known phenomenon for sophisticated hyperbolic dis-
counters, see for instance O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008).
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Proposition I.2: (i) A sophisticated agent invests more effort in period 2 than in
period 1, i.e., eS1 < e
S
2 . (ii) The total effort a sophisticated agent invests is lower than
the total effort of a time-consistent person, i.e., eS1 + e
S
2 < 2e
TC.
Except for the fact that a sophisticated agent correctly predicts his own future be-
havior, his behavior otherwise qualitatively parallels that of a naive agent: First, a
sophisticated agent procrastinates working on the task in the sense of an increasing
effort profile over time.16 Secondly, with the present bias increasing the perceived cost
of effort, in total a sophisticate works less than a time-consistent agent.17
4. Comparison of the Naive and the Sophisticated Agent
Having compared the behavior of both types of hyperbolic discounters with the behavior
of a time-consistent agent, now we are interested in how naifs and sophisticates compare
to each other. Put differently, what effects does awareness of self-control problems have
on performance and overall satisfaction? To answer this question a welfare criterion
needs to be defined. Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b, 2005) we use people’s
long-run preferences.
Definition I.3: A person’s long-run preferences are given by U0(e1, e2) ≡ −c(e1) −
c(e2) + g(e1 + e2).
Long-run preferences reflect a person’s preferences when asked from a prior perspective
when he has no option to indulge immediate gratification. To formalize this long-run
perspective, it is assumed that there is a (fictitiuos) period 0 where a person has no
decision to make.18 It turns out that comparing first period efforts is sufficient to
answer the question who is better off, naifs or sophisticates.
Lemma I.1: Suppose that ei1 > e
j
1, for i, j ∈ {S,N} and i 6= j. Then (i) ei2 < ej2, (ii)
ei1 + e
i
2 > e
j
1 + e
j
2, and (iii) U
i
0 ≥ U j0 .
The lemma has a clear intuition. Since there is no decision to be made in the future,
awareness plays no role in the second period. Hence, for a given effort level from
the first period, both types of hyperbolic discounters face the same problem in period
2. Consequently, the type who works more in the first period works less in the second
16A similar result can be found in Fischer (1999) for log utility functions.
17Similar results can be found in the consumption-saving literature for sophisticated present-biased
consumers, see for instance Laibson (1996).
18Another possibility would be to apply the Pareto criterion, where one outcome is deemed better
than another if and only if the person views it as better at all points in time. A discussion of these
two welfare criteria for hyperbolic discounters is provided in O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005).
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period. Due to the convexity of the cost function, however, the difference in first-period
efforts is larger than the difference in second-period efforts. Thus, the type who invests
more effort in the first period, in the end also has the overall better performance. The
optimal effort levels from a long-run perspective are those chosen by a TC. While for
both types of hyperbolic discounters total effort is below this optimal level of total
effort, the type who works more in the first period is closer to the optimal total effort.
Moreover, this total effort is more evenly – and thus, more efficiently – allocated over
the two periods. Therefore, the type of hyperbolic discounter who works more in the
first period is better of from a long-run perspective.
An intuitive guess would be that a sophisticate, who is aware of his self-control
problems, will exhibit a higher first-period effort – and hence a higher total effort – than
a naif. This would also be in line with previous research. For instance, O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999b) show that “when costs are immediate, sophisticates do at least as
well as naifs (i.e. US0 ≥ UN0 )” (p.113).19 While previous research analyzing the effects of
awareness solely focuses on models with discrete action spaces, we analyze a continuous
action space model. The following simple example demonstrates that the earlier result
that sophisticates are always better off than naifs when costs are immediate does not
hold true in general.20
Example: Let the cost function be c(e) = (5/3)(1 + z)(1/10)ze2 for e ≤ 1/10,
c(e) = (1/3)e1+z − 1/3(1/10)1+z(1− z)/2 for e ∈ (1/10, 1) and c(e) = (1/6)(1 + z)e2 +
1/3[1 − (1/10)1+z(1 − z)/2 − (1 + z)/2] for e ≥ 1. The reward function is given by
g(e1 + e2) = 2(e1 + e2)− (1/2)(e1 + e2)2 for e1 + e2 ≤ 2 and g(e1 + e2) = 2 otherwise.
Suppose that z = .005 and β = 1/4.21 The optimal effort choices of a sophisticate in
the perception-perfect equilibrium are eS1 = .02602 and e
S
2 = .63700. In contrary, a naif
chooses eN1 = .03718 and e
N
2 = .62595 in the perception-perfect equilibrium. In this ex-
ample, a naif invests more effort in the task than a sophisticate both in the first period
19That sophisticates are better off than naifs when costs are immediate is shown in several other
papers. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001b), extend their earlier finding to a setting where a person
has to choose which task to perform from a nenu of mutually exclusive tasks. Most recently,
considering long-term projects, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008) have shown that in contrast to
sophisticates, naifs may start costly projects but then procrastinate finishing these projects, thus
never reaping the reward.
20That sophistication may hurt a hyperbolic discounter is well known in the literature for models
where costs are delayed and rewards are immediate like models of addiction, see O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2001a).
21 While the cost function is continuously differentiable, it is not twice continuously differentiable.
Thus, the example does not fit perfectly to our Assumption 1.
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and in total.22 Hence, a naif is better of than a sophisticate from a welfare point of view,
i.e., US0 −UN0 < 0. Thus, in contrast to earlier findings, awareness of future self-control
problems can hurt the agent even in a model of immediate costs and delayed rewards.23
As the above discussion suggests, characterizing the impact of awareness is complicated.
Identifying the underlying effects that drive the different behavior of naifs and sophis-
ticates, however, allows us to derive sufficient conditions for a sophisticate exhibiting
higher first-period effort than a naif.
Pessimism Effect and Incentive Effect Why does sophistication may not help
to increase first-period effort and thereby long-run utility? What are the driving forces
behind this observation? O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001a) carefully identify two
effects how awareness of self-control problems can influence an agent’s behavior. First,
as O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) point out, “sophistication about future self-control
problems can make a person pessimistic about future behavior” (p.16). Knowing that
– from today’s perspective – the future self will not behave optimally may induce a
sophisticate to directly respond to his future shortcommings. Reasoning like “I know
that I won’t work hard tomorrow, so I’ll work more today” probably is familiar to
everyone. This is what O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001a) call the pessimism
effect. This, however, is only half the story. Sophistication about one’s own self-control
problems has a second, less direct effect on today’s behavior. Knowing about his own
future misbehavior also makes a sophisticate aware of the need and the potential to
strategically influence his future behavior via his behavior today. This second channel
is labeled incentive effect by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001a).24 So the following
question is immediately at hand: How are these effects operative in the model presented
in this paper?
A sohisticate in period 1 realizes that he will work less in period 2 than is optimal
from today’s perspective. He directly responds to his future shortcomings by working
more today. Thus, due to the pessimism effect a sophisticate tends to work more in
22A similar finding is obtained by Tobacman (2008) in a consumption-saving framework with CRRA
preferences. He shows that current consumption can be decreasing in the degree of naivete´. Welfare
implications, however, are not drawn.
23While this result may be somewhat counterintuitive, there actually is empirical evidence supporting
this suggestion. Wong (2008) finds that time-inconsistency is associated with lower class perfor-
mance irrespective of awareness. Effects of time-inconsistency on class performance, however, are
smaller in magnitude and less statistically significant under naivete´ than under sophistication.
24The pessimism effect and the incentive effect represent a decomposition of the “sophistication effect”
identified by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b).
Essays in Applied Microeconomics and Management 29
period 1 than a naif.25 The incentive effect, however, in tendency leads to a lower first-
period effort. The first-period self of a sophisticate would like to see his future self invest
more effort in the task than he actually does. Since the second-period self increases
effort when first-period effort is reduced, the first-period self can create incentives for
his future self to work more by working less today. Formally, adding and subtracting
βg′(e1+ e
TC
2 (e1)) from dU
S
1 /de1 yields the following formulation of the marginal utility
of a sophisticate in period 1:
dUS1
de1
= βg′(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1))− c′(e1)
+ β
[
g′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))− g′(e1 + eTC2 (e1))
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
PE
+(1− β)(deS2 /de1)c′
(
eS2 (e1)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IE
,
where eTC2 (e1) is the effort a TC chooses in period 2 for a given first period effort.
Note that the first term equals zero for e1 = e
N
1 . The second term, PE, is positive
and reflects the pessimism effect. The agent knows that his future self chooses eS2 (e1)
instead of eTC2 (e1), which would be optimal from today’s perspective. The third term,
IE, is negative and characterizes the impact of the incentive effect.26 Given that US1
is a quasi-concave function in e1, then a sophisticate chooses higher effort levels than
a naif if the incentive effect does not outweigh the pessimism effect.
At first glance, the two effects seem to be weighted by the present bias parameter
β.27 When having a closer look at the problem, however, it turns out that things are
more complicated. When the present bias is low (β → 1) then eS2 is close to eTC2 and
25O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001a) use the term pessimism effect in models of addictive goods
and present-biased preferences. In addictive good models, where rewards are immediate and costs
are delayed, the pessimism effect can hurt the agent. In our context, the pessimism effect helps
the sophisticate to achieve a better performance than a naif. Thus, in the model of this paper the
term pessimism effect is a little bit misleading. Here, it would be more suitable to call this effect
“realism effect”.
26To be precise, it is not possible to completely disentangle the two effects, because the incentive
effect is only operative if the pessimism effect is operative.
27For a low degree of present bias the pessimism effect seems to be more important than the incentive
effect. The agent cares more about a high reward than delegating work to his future self, and
thus works harder today. On the other hand, for a high degree of present bias the incentive effect
seems to be more important. The agent’s perceived cost in the second period is remarkably lower
than his cost today. Thus, the agent prefers to create incentives for his future self to work harder
by working less today. And indeed, this is what happens in our example: For a high degree of
present-biasedness, β = 1/4, sophistication hurts the agent because it makes him work less in the
first period than under naivete´. For a low degree of present bias, on the other hand, for instance
if β = 3/4, a sophisticate works more than a naif, and hence is better off . A similar finding is
obtained by Gruber and Ko˝szegi (2001) who analyze the behavior of sophisticates in a model of
addictive goods.
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there is not much pessimism involved. When the present bias is extreme (β → 0) then
deS2 /de1 → 0 and the agent cannot set incentives for his future self effectively.
With pessimism effect and incentive effect moving in opposite directions, it is com-
plicated to obtain general results concerning the comparison of naive and sophisticated
behavior. Nevertheless, using the insights gained from the above discussion we can
characterize sufficient conditions for the cost and reward function such that sophisti-
cated agents are better off than naive ones.
Lemma I.2: Suppose that c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0. Then a sophisticated agent chooses
a strictly higher effort in the first period than a naive agent, i.e., eS1 > e
N
1 .
In the proof of the above lemma we compile sufficient conditions such that the incentive
effect never outweighs the pessimism effect. So Lemma I.2 states a very intuitive result:
given the pessimism effect outweighs the incentive effect, then sophisticates choose
higher first-period efforts than naifs.
Proposition I.3: Suppose that c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0. Then the long-run utility of
a sophisticated agent is at least as great as the long-run utility of a naive agent, i.e.,
US0 ≥ UN0 . Moreover, the performance of a sophisticated agent is strictly higher than
the performance of a naive agent, i.e., eS1 + e
S
2 > e
N
1 + e
N
2 .
5. Deadlines
In daily life deadlines are an often encountered phenomenon. As an example consider
the “good-standing rules” of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics: after a year of
coursework, a first paper has to be completed at the end of the second year, a second
paper at the end of the third year, and a third paper at the end of the fourth year. A
rational decision-maker with time-consistent preferences would not welcome constraints
on his choices. But if people impulsively procrastinate, and if they are also aware of
their procrastination problems, deadlines can be strategic and reasonable. Perhaps the
best empirical demonstration is the study of Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002), which
we will discuss in more detail at the end of this section. In this section we ask if and
how the behavior of a present-biased agent is affected by the existence of deadlines.
Our main finding is that deadlines help an individual to structure his workload more
efficiently, which decreases effort costs and in turn improves performance.28
28One caveat is in order: While we solely focus on the positive commitment effect of deadlines,
flexibility has a strictly positive value if, for instance, future task costs are uncertain. In this case,
a deadline is welfare enhancing only if the positive commitment effect outweighs the negative effect
due to the reduction in flexibility. See Amador et al. (2006) for a detailed analysis of the tradeoff
between commitment and flexibility.
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A Multi-Task Model To tackle this question we have to modify the simple frame-
work introduced above. While we stick to the case of two periods, we now assume that
there are two independent tasks to be undertaken by the agent, task A and task B.
We consider two regimes: deadline and no deadline. When the agent faces no (interim)
deadline he is completely free in his decision how to divide his effort on tasks and over
time. More precisely, the agent can work in both periods on both tasks. When there
is an (interim) deadline, however, the agent can invest effort in task A only in period
1, whereas he can work on task B in both periods.29 The reward for a task depends
on the total effort invested in that task up to its deadline.30 Effort costs for a particu-
lar period are determined by the sum of efforts invested in both tasks in that period.
Formally, let eit denote the effort invested in task i ∈ {A,B} in period t ∈ {1, 2}.
Moreover, let et = eAt + eBt be the total effort that the agent exhibits in period t, and
ei = ei1+ ei2 be the total effort invested in task i. The reward for task i ∈ {A,B} then
is given by gi(ei1+ ei2), and the total effort cost in period t ∈ {1, 2} is c(eAt+ eBt). We
assume that the grade function is the same for both tasks, that is, gA(·) = gB(·) = g(·).
Moreover, we keep the functional assumptions imposed in Section 3. In all that follows,
the double-superscript refers to the regime that the agent faces: D for a situation with
a deadline, and ND for a situation without a deadline.
The Time-Consistent Agent As a benchmark, consider a time-consistent agent
who faces no deadline. In the above language, the intertemporal utility of this agent
in period 1 is given by
UTC
ND
1 = −c(eA1 + eB1)− c(eA2 + eB2) + g(eA1 + eA2) + g(eB1 + eB2).
Choosing eA1, eA2, eB1, eB2 in order to maximize this expression yields
c′(eTC
ND
1 ) = c
′(eTC
ND
2 ) = g
′(eTC
ND
A ) = g
′(eTC
ND
B ). (I.7)
It follows immediately that a time-consistent agent equates effort over tasks and smoothes
effort over time, that is, eA = eB and e1 = e2. Put differently, when 2e
TCND denotes
the overall effort that a time-consistent agent invests over the two periods, then he
29In order to obtain a comparison of the two regimes in terms of the effort level chosen, we introduce a
second task which allows us to consider a regime-independent reward scheme. With only one task,
the reward under the regime without deadlines would have to be a function of total effort only,
whereas the reward under the regime of deadlines would have to be a function of both first-period
effort and total effort, making a comparison infeasible.
30Our model also encompasses another kind of deadline where task B is handed out after the deadline
for task A, as it is typically the case for students’ homework assignments. Formally, eB1 = 0 a
priori. Since – and now we are jumping ahead – the agent optimally chooses eB1 = 0 anyway, this
does not impose any additional restrictions and results do not change.
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invests eTC
ND
in the first period and eTC
ND
in the second period. Moreover, eTC
ND
is
spent on task A and eTC
ND
is spent on task B. Note, however, that a time-consistent
agent does not care about how he splits up his per period effort between the two tasks
as long as he invests evenly in both tasks. This implies that being subject to a deadline
does not help a time-consistent agent. When investment in task A is possible only in
period 1, for a desired overall effort level 2eTC
ND
the time-consistent agent still can
choose eTC
D
A = e
TCD
1 = e
TCND and eTC
D
B = e
TCD
2 = e
TCND .
The Sophisticated Agent First consider a sophisticate who faces no deadline.
Having two periods of time to work on two tasks is similar to having two periods of
time to work on one task. The only additional question is how to divide the total effort
on the two tasks. The reward function is identical for both tasks, thus it is optimal to
invest half of the total effort in each task. From the single-task exercise we know that
a sophisticate has a tendency to work more in period 2 than in period 1. By always
working harder in the second period the agent can achieve effort smoothing over tasks
in the second period irrespectively of the proportion of first-period effort spent on a
specific task. This observation allows us to focus on the agent’s effort choice over time.
With effort being spread out evenly among the two tasks, the optimal second-period
effort as a function of first-period effort, eS
ND
2 (eˆ1), is characterized by
c′(eS
ND
2 (eˆ1)) = βg
′((1/2)(eˆ1 + e
SND
2 (eˆ1))). (I.8)
The effort level choosen by a sophisticate in the first period, eS
ND
1 , is determined by
the following first-order condition,31
βg′((1/2)(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))− c′(eS
ND
1 )
+
deS
ND
2 (e1)
de1
β
[
g′((1/2)(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))− c′(eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 ))
]
= 0 . (I.9)
Note that the two first-order conditions are very similar to those obtained in the single
task case. Recapitulatory, when not facing a deadline, a sophisticated agent equates
effort over tasks like a time-consistent agent, but does not achieve effort-smoothing over
time, i.e. eS
ND
1 < e
SND
2 and eA = eB = (1/2)(e
SND
1 + e
SND
2 ), where e
SND
2 = e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ).
Next, consider a situation where a sophisticated agent faces a deadline in the sense
described above: task A is due at the end of the first period, while task B is due at the
end of the second period. Put differently, the agent can invest effort in task A only in
period 1, whereas he can work for task B in both periods. Formally, eA2 = 0, eA = eA1
31The first-order approach is valid according to the same reasoning as in the single-task case.
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and eB2 = e2. For given effort levels eˆA and eˆB1, in the second period the agent’s utility
is given by
US
D
2 = −c(eB2) + βg(eˆA) + βg(eˆB1 + eB2) .
The optimal second-period effort invested in task B as a function of the first-period-
effort invested in task B, eS
D
B2 (eˆB1), satisfies
c′(eS
D
B2 (eˆB1)) = βg
′(eˆB1 + e
SD
B2 (eˆB1)) . (I.10)
Differentiation of (I.10) yields
deS
D
B2 (eB1)
deB1
= − βg
′′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))
βg′′(eB1 + eS
D
B2 (eB1))− c′′(eSDB2 (eB1))
∈ (−1, 0) .
Correctly predicting his own future behavior, in period 1 a sophisticated agent chooses
eA and eB1 in order to maximize his intertemporal utility,
US
D
1 = −c(eA + eB1)− βc(eS
D
B2 (eB1)) + βg(eA) + βg(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1)) .
This utility maximization problem, however, does not have an interior solution.32 When
facing a deadline, a sophisticated agent considers it optimal to work exclusively on
task A in the first period, that is, eS
D
B1 = 0. Intuitively, the single-task case and the
no-deadline case suggest that a present-biased agent will work harder in the second
period. Hence, under a deadline, there is a tendency to invest more effort in task B
anyway. But then investing in task B in the first period is not optimal, because, due
to decreasing marginal rewards, the agent can benefit from shifting first-period effort
from task B to task A. While intuitively plausible, the formal proof of this statement
is somewhat elaborate and therefore deferred to the appendix. The effort levels which
are chosen strictly positive, eS
D
A and e
SD
B2 , are characterized as follows:
c′(eS
D
A ) = βg
′(eS
D
A ) (I.11)
c′(eS
D
B2 ) = βg
′(eS
D
B2 ) (I.12)
From (I.11) and (I.12) it follows immediately that eS
D
A = e
SD
B2 . To sum up: When
facing a deadline, a sophisticated agent smoothes effort over time and equates effort
over tasks. Moreover, he does not invest in task B in period 1. Let eS
D
denote the
effort level that is chosen under a regime of deadlines in each period and per task.
Formally we have eS
D
1 = e
SD
A = e
SD and eS
D
B = e
SD
2 = e
SD .
After all, we are interested in whether deadlines are helpful to overcome self-control
problems and thereby to improve performance and the agent’s satisfaction. The fol-
lowing proposition compares the behavior and well-being of a sophisticate under both
regimes, deadlines and no deadlines.
32With interior solution we refer to a pair of first-period effort choices (eA, eB1) with 0 < eA, eB1 <∞.
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Proposition I.4: When facing a deadline, a sophisticated agent chooses a higher effort
level in the first period and a higher total effort level than under a regime without a
deadline, i.e., eS
ND
1 < e
SD and eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 < 2e
SD . Moreover, the sophisticated
agent is strictly better off from a long-run perspective when facing a deadline, i.e.,
US
D
0 > U
SND
0 .
The above proposition has a clear intuition: a deadline helps a sophisticate to better
structure his work on the two tasks. He has to complete task A in the first period
and therefore he cannot procrastinate finishing task A as he does without a deadline.
Thus, the deadline helps the sophisticate to combat procrastination and thereby effort
is allocated more efficiently over the two periods. This more efficient allocation reduces
effort cost, which in turn leads to a higher overall effort and a better performance.
The optimal total effort level from a long-run perspective is the one chosen by a TC.
Furthermore, for any total effort level the optimal allocation is investing equal amounts
in both tasks and exhibiting the same amount of effort in each period. Irrespectively
of the regime, deadline or no deadline, the total effort a sophisticate invests in the
tasks is below the optimal total effort of a TC. With a deadline, however, the level of
total effort a sophisticate chooses is closer to a TC’s total effort. Moreover, this more
desirable level of total effort is more evenly allocated over the two periods. For this
reason a sophisticate is better off when being constrained by a deadline.33
The Naive Agent Since the analysis for the naive agent is completely analogous to
the one of the sophisticated agent for the regime with a deadline and to the single-task
case for the regime without a deadline, we defer the formal analysis to the appendix.
Here we briefly state the main results and then move on to a discussion of our findings.
When not facing a deadline, a naive agent equates efforts over tasks, but chooses a
higher effort level in the second period, that is, eN
ND
1 < e
NND
2 . When being subject to
a deadline, a naive agent also equates effort over tasks, but – in contrast – smoothes
effort over time. In particular, the first-period effort is spent exclusively on task A and
the second-period effort is spent exclusively on task B. Formally, eN
D
1 = e
ND
A = e
ND
and eN
D
B = e
ND
2 = e
ND . As a consequence, under a deadline a naive agent achieves
a more desirable allocation of his effort, which in turn leads to a higher level of total
effort under deadlines. Hence, with the same reasoning as above, a deadline also makes
a naive agent better off.
Proposition I.5: When facing a deadline, a naive agent chooses a higher effort level
in the first period and a higher total effort level than under a regime without a deadline,
33That restrictions on the choice set may help to reduce procrastination is also shown by O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2001).
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i.e., eN
ND
1 < e
ND and eN
ND
1 + e
NND
2 < 2e
ND . Moreover, from a long-run perspective,
being subject to a deadline makes a naive agent strictly better off, i.e., UN
D
0 > U
NND
0 .
One question is immediately at hand: Which type of hyperbolic discounter benefits
more from being exposed to an interim deadline? As it turns out, under a deadline
sophisticates and naifs choose the same allocation of effort, that is, eS
D
= eN
D
.34
Thus, with long-run utility being the same for both types of hyperbolic discounters
when facing a deadline, we just have to compare long-run utilities when there are
no deadlines in order to answer the question of interest. With effort being evenly
distributed over tasks no matter what, the situation without an interim deadline is
comparable to the single-task case. Hence, from our earlier findings we know that
in general it is undetermided which type of hyperbolic discounter benefits more from
being exposed to deadlines. When c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0, however, a naive agent will
benefit at least as much from the imposition of a deadline as a sophisticated agent.
Discussion We have shown so far that simple deadlines can help people with self-
control problems to improve their performance. The reason is that being exposed to
deadlines allows people to allocate their effort more efficiently, which in turn leads
to a higher amount of total effort and an overall better performance. Our findings
are highly in line with the empirical observations of Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002).
They demonstrate the value and effectiveness of deadlines for improving task per-
formance in two different studies both conducted at MIT. In one study participants
were “native English speakers [who were given the task to] proofread papers of other
students to evaluate writing skills”. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions: evenly-spaced deadlines, end-deadline, or self-imposed deadlines.35
In each condition a participant had to read three texts and payment was contingent
on the quality of the proofreading with a penalty for each day of delay.36 The num-
ber of errors correctly detected was highest in the evenly-spaced-deadlines condition,
followed by the self-imposed-deadlines condition, with the lowest performance in the
end-deadline condition. Moreover, particpants were asked to estimate how much time
they had spent on each of the three texts. Participants in the evenly-spaced-deadlines
condition spent the highest amount of time on each text, followed by the participants of
the self-imposed-deadlines condition, while participants of the end-deadline condition
34This result, which is an artefact of our model where the agent faces as many deadlines and tasks as
periods, is formally established in the proof of Proposition I.5.
35While the evenly-spaced deadlines condition is comparable to our deadline regime, our regime of no
deadlines corresponds to the end-deadline condition.
36By setting their deadlines as late as possible, the participants would have the most time to work on
the texts and the highest flexibility in arranging their workload.
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have invested the least amount of time. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) summarize
these observations as follows: “[T]he results show that when deadline constraints in-
creased, performace improved [and] time spend on the task increased” (p.223). These
observations are predicted by our theoretical analysis of agents with self-control prob-
lems: a deadline increases total effort, which in turn improves performance. In the
other study professionals participating in an executive-education course at MIT had
the task to write three short papers. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
two treatments: no-choice or free-choice. In the no-choice treatment deadlines were
fixed and evenly spaced, in the free-choice treatment participants were free to choose
the deadlines. In both treatments deadlines were binding and there was a penalty for
late submission.37 The main finding is that the grade in the no-choice treatment is
significantly higher than the grade in the free-choice treatment. This observation also
is in line with the theoretical results obtained in this paper. The focus of the latter
study is on self-imposed deadlines and inefficiencies arising due to suboptimal spacing
of these deadlines. Even though we do not endogenize the timing of deadlines, our
model also captures this result - in a highly stylized way. Let ∆US0 denote the long-
run utility gain of a sophisticated agent from being exposed to a deadline. Formally,
∆US0 ≡ USD0 −USND0 . Analogously define ∆US1 ≡ USD1 −USND1 to be the utility gain of
a sophisticated agent from being exposed to a deadline as perceived from the beginning
of the first period. Correctly predicting his future behavior, a sophisticate will always
welcome being subject to a deadline in (fictitious) period zero. When asked in period
1, however, a sophisticate is not very enthusiastic about facing a deadline. Formally,
∆US1 < 0 < ∆U
S
0 .
38 In period zero, a naive agent considers a deadline neither helpful
nor harmful, that is, ∆UN0 = 0. In period 1, on the other hand, a naive agent considers
a deadline an undesirable restriction. Formally we have ∆UN1 < 0. Thus, while both
types of time-inconsistent agents may be willing to accept a deadline long before the
task is to be performed, this will not be the case when the task is immediately at hand.
Hence, when interpreting “suboptimal spacing of tasks” as not setting deadlines at all,
asking present-biased agents too late whether they are willing to accept deadlines or to
voluntarily impose deadlines on themselves may lead to agents rejecting this opportu-
nity. Moreover, this finding illustrates what O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005) point out
37Besides giving the students the most time to work on the papers and the highest flexibility in
arranging their workload, by setting their deadlines as late as possible they would also have the
opportunity to learn the most about the topic before submitting the papers. Students also had an
incentive to set submission dates late because the penalty would be applied only to late submissions
and not to early ones. Finally, students who wanted to submit assignments early could privately
plan to do so without precommitting to the instructor.
38 This result is readily established by a simple revealed-preference argument.
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to be general principles when considering “incentives and present bias”. Present-biased
individuals are sensitive to exactly how decisions are made - e.g. choosing in advance
vs. in the moment. When all consequences of a decision are sufficiently far in the
future, however, present bias is not a problem and it may be possible to induce better
behavior when people are given the opportunity to make decisions now about future
behavior.
6. Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that people have self-control problems, in particular a
tendency to procrastinate unpleasant tasks. Former research has shown that this pro-
crastinative behavior can be explained by hyperbolic discounting. The focus of this
paper is not on procrastination itself, but on the effects of hyperbolic discounting and
awareness of the arising self-control problems on performance. We present a simple
model in which an agent has two periods to work on a specific task. His performance
depends on the total effort invested. We find that self-control problems reduce perfor-
mance. Moreover, sophistication about one’s own self-control problems not necessarily
leads to better performance than naivete´.
In a next step, in a slightly augmented version of the basic model, we analyze the
value and effectiveness of interim deadlines as commitment device. In line with recent
empirical evidence we find that interim deadlines improve performance when indi-
viduals impulsively procrastinate. This improvement of performance, which makes a
present-biased agent better off from a welfare point of view, is based on a more favor-
able allocation of effort. The restrictions imposed by deadlines help an agent to better
structure his workload, which in turn leads to lower effort costs and an overall higher
effort level. These results are of interest not only because they provide a theoretical
underpinning of recent empirical work, but also because they explain many types of
deadlines encountered in daily life. To get back to one of the examples that we have
mentioned so far: Deadlines implemented by the “good-standing” rules of graduate
schools make grad students work focused on each of their papers, finishig a paper thor-
oughly before starting another one, thereby improving chances to write high-quality
papers. Without these deadlines, grad students cannot commit themselves to work in
their last year in school exclusively on the their final paper. Instead, they possibly will
end up spending effort on - perhaps unfinished - older papers, resulting in a bunch of
low-quality papers that are finished in a hurry and written sloppy.
The model of this paper is simple in the sense that we consider the shortest possi-
ble time horizon that actually generates quasi-hyperbolic discounting effects. Without
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imposing further assumptions on cost and reward functions, analyzing a longer time
horizon in a continuous action space framework, in particular the analysis of the be-
havior of sophisticated individuals, becomes very complicated very quickly. In the
literature the arising complications are sidestepped by assuming instantaneous utility
functions of the CRRA type. Facing the trade off between the analysis of a longer time
horizon on the one hand, and less restrictive functional assumptions on the other hand,
we opted for the latter. We think, however, that the main insights are to be obtained
in our model.
Last, throughout the paper we focused on two extreme cases of awareness, total
naivete´ and full sophistication. As we show in Appendix B, the behavior of a partially
naive person is somewhere between these two extremes. In consequence, with both
extreme types of hyperbolic discounters benefiting from the presence of interim dead-
lines, it is little surprising that this result carries over to the case of partially naive
individuals.
II. Binary Payment Schemes:
Moral Hazard and Loss
Aversion
In this chapter, we extend the principal-agent model with moral
hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse
according to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal
contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich perfor-
mance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully con-
tingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic refer-
ence point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the
agent’s expected utility without providing strong additional incen-
tives. Moreover, for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all
signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his perfor-
mance exceeds a certain threshold.
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1. Introduction
A lump-sum bonus contract, with the bonus being a payment for achieving a certain
level of performance, is probably one of the most simple incentive schemes for employees
one can think of. According to Thomas J. Steenburgh (2008), salesforce compensation
plans provide incentives mainly via a lump-sum bonus for meeting or exceeding the
annual sales quota.1 The observed plainness of contractual arrangements, however, is
at odds with predictions made by economic theory, as nicely stated in the above quote
by Bernard Salanie´ (2003). While Canice Prendergast (1999) already referred to the
discrepancy between theoretically predicted and actually observed contractual form,
over time this question was raised again and again, recently by Edward P. Lazear and
Oyer (2007), and the answer still is not fully understood.
Beside this gap between theoretical prediction and observed practice, both theoretical
and empirical studies demonstrate that these simple contractual arrangements create
incentives for misbehavior of the agent that is outside the scope of most standard
models. As Oyer (1998) points out, facing an annual sales quota provides incentives
for salespeople to manipulate prices and timing of business to maximize their own
income rather than firms’ profits. This observation raises “the interesting question of
why these (...) contracts are so prevalent. (...) It appears that there must be some
benefit of these contracts that outweighs these apparent costs” (Lazear and Oyer, 2007,
16).
To give one possible explanation for the widespread use of binary payment schemes,
we modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is
expectation-based loss averse according to Botond Ko˝szegi and Matthew Rabin (2006,
2007).2 With the tradeoff between incentive provision and risk sharing being at the
heart of moral hazard, allowing for a richer description of the agent’s risk preferences
that goes beyond standard risk aversion seems a natural starting point to gain deeper
insights into contract design. Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin, we posit that the agent—
next to standard consumption utility—derives gain-loss utility from comparing the
actual outcome with his lagged expectations. Specifically, the agent compares his actual
1Incentives for salespeople in the food manufacturing industry often are solely created by a lump-sum
bonus, see Paul Oyer (2000). Moreover, in his book about designing effective sales compensation
plans, John K. Moynahan (1980) argues that for a wide range of industries lump-sum bonus
contracts are optimal. For a survey on salesforce compensation plans, see Kissan Joseph and
Manohar U. Kalwani (1998). Simple binary contracts are commonly found not only in labor
contexts, but also in insurance markets, where straight-deductible contracts are prevalent.
2We will use the terms bonus contract, bonus scheme, and binary payment scheme interchangeably to
refer to a contract that specifies exactly two distinct wage payments, a base wage and a lump-sum
bonus.
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wage pairwise with each other wage that he could have received instead, where each
comparison is weighted by the occurrence probability of the alternative outcome. Our
main finding is that a simple (lump-sum) bonus scheme is optimal when loss aversion is
the driving force of the agent’s risk preferences. We derive this finding in a model where
the principal can make use of a rich performance measure and where the standard notion
of risk aversion would predict fully contingent contracts. Intuitively, specifying many
different payments induces uncertainty for the agent as to what he will receive. If he
earns a relatively low wage, he compares this to higher wages he could have received,
and experiences the sensation of a loss from this comparison. The anticipation of
these losses reduces the agent’s expected utility and thus he demands a higher average
payment. While the principal has a classic rationale for rewarding signals strictly
higher if they are stronger indicators of good performance, the negative “comparison
effect” dominates this consideration if standard risk aversion plays a minor role.3 In
this sense, reference-dependent preferences according to Ko˝szegi and Rabin introduce
an endogenous complexity cost into contracting based on psychological foundations.
We establish several properties displayed by the optimal contract. Let a signal that
is the more likely to be observed the higher the agent’s effort be referred to as a “good”
signal. We find that the subset of signals that is rewarded with the bonus payment
contains either only good signals, or all good signals and possibly a few bad signals
as well.4 By paying the bonus very often or very rarely, the principal can minimize
the weight the agent puts ex ante on the disappointing event of feeling a loss when
not obtaining the bonus. When abstracting from integer-programming problems, it is
optimal for the principal to order the signals according to their relative informativeness
(likelihood ratio). Put differently, the agent receives the bonus for all signals that are
more indicative of high effort than a cutoff signal, e.g., a salesperson receiving a bonus
for meeting or exceeding the annual sales quota.
In addition, we show that an increase in the agent’s degree of loss aversion may
allow the principal to use a lower-powered incentive scheme. The reason is that a
higher degree of loss aversion may be associated with a stronger incentive for the agent
to choose a high effort in order to reduce the scope for incurring a loss. The overall
cost of implementation, however, increases in the agent’s degree of loss aversion.
3The term “comparison effect” was first introduced by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
4The theoretical prediction that inferior performance may also well be rewarded with a bonus is
in line with both Joseph and Kalwani’s (1998) suggestion that organizations tend to view the
payment of a bonus as a reward for good or even acceptable performance rather than an award for
exceptional performance, and Gilbert A. Churchill, Neil M. Ford and Orville C. Walker’s (1993)
prescription that bonuses should be based on objectives that can be achieved with reasonable
rather than Herculean efforts.
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While assuming for most of the paper that the agent is not too loss averse, which
guarantees that the first-order approach is valid, we also briefly investigate the princi-
pal’s problem for higher degrees of loss aversion. Here, to keep the analysis tractable,
we focus on binary measures of performance. We show that if the agent’s degree of loss
aversion is sufficiently high and if the performance measure is sufficiently informative,
then only extreme actions—work as hard as possible or do not work at all—are incen-
tive compatible. Put differently, the principal may face severe problems in fine-tuning
the agent’s incentives. These implementation problems, however, can be remedied if
the principal can commit herself to stochastically ignoring the performance measure.
Moreover, for high degrees of loss aversion, stochastic ignorance of the performance
measure also lowers the cost of implementing the desired level of effort. The logic of
this result is that stochastic ignorance allows the principal to pay the bonus to the
agent even if she observes the signal that indicates low effort. By doing this, the agent
considers it ex ante less likely that he will be disappointed at the end of the day, and
thus he demands a lower average payment. In this case, with the optimal contract
including randomization which would not be optimal under the standard notion of risk
aversion, loss aversion leads to more complex contracts than predicted by orthodox
theory.
Before launching out into the model description, we briefly review the existing ev-
idence documenting that expectations matter in the determination of the reference
point, which is a key feature of the Ko˝szegi-Rabin concept.5 While mainly based on
findings in the psychological literature,6 evidence for this assumption is provided also
by some recent contributions to the economic literature. Investigating decision making
in a large-stake game show, Thierry Post et al. (2008, 62) come to the conclusion that
observed behavior is“consistent with the idea that the reference point is based on expec-
tations.” Alike, analyzing field data, Vincent P. Crawford and Juanjuan Meng (2009)
propose a model of cabdrivers’ labor supply that builds on the Ko˝szegi-Rabin theory of
reference-dependent preferences. Their estimates suggest that a reference-dependent
model of drivers’ labor supply where targets are carefully modeled significantly im-
proves on the neoclassic model. In a real-effort experiment, Johannes Abeler et al.
(forthcoming) manipulate the rational expectations of subjects. They find that effort
provision is significantly different between treatments in the way predicted by models
5The feature that the reference point is determined by the decision maker’s forward-looking expecta-
tions is shared with the disappointment aversion models of David E. Bell (1985), Graham Loomes
and Robert Sugden (1986), and Faruk Gul (1991).
6For instance, Barbara Mellers, Alan Schwartz and Ilana Ritov (1999) and Hans C. Breiter et al.
(2001) document that both the actual outcome and unattained possible outcomes affect subjects’
satisfaction with their payoff.
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of expectation-based loss aversion.
In the following Section II, we formulate the principal-agent relationship. Section III
specifies the principal’s problem and derives the set of feasible contracts. In Section IV,
the principal’s problem is solved and properties of the optimal contract are discussed.
Section V investigates the implications of high degrees of loss aversion. In Section VI,
next to the related literature, alternative notions of loss aversion are discussed. Section
VII concludes. All proofs as well as additional technical discussions are relegated to
the Appendix.
2. The Model
A principal offers a one-period employment contract to an agent, who has an outside
employment opportunity yielding expected utility u¯.7 If the agent accepts the contract,
then he chooses an effort level a ∈ A ≡ [0, 1]. The agent’s action a equals the proba-
bility that the principal receives a benefit B > 0. The principal’s expected net benefit
is
pi = aB − E[W ] ,
where W is the compensation payment the principal pays to the agent.8 The principal
is assumed to be risk and loss neutral, thus she maximizes pi. We wish to inquire into
the form that contracts take under moral hazard and loss aversion. Therefore, we focus
on the cost minimization problem to implement a certain action aˆ ∈ (0, 1).
The action choice a ∈ A is private information of the agent and unobservable for the
principal. Furthermore, the realization of B is not directly observable. A possible inter-
pretation is that B corresponds to a complex good whose quality cannot be determined
by a court, thus a contract cannot depend on the realization of B. Instead the principal
observes a contractible measure of performance, γˆ, with s ∈ S ≡ {1, . . . , S} being the
realization of the performance measure. Let S ≥ 2. The probability of observing signal
s conditional on B being realized is denoted by γHs . Accordingly, γ
L
s is the probability
of observing signal s conditional on B not being realized. Hence, the unconditional
probability of observing signal s for a given action a is γs(a) ≡ aγHs + (1− a)γLs .9 For
technical convenience, we make the following assumption.
7The framework is based on W. Bentley MacLeod (2003), who analyzes subjective performance
measures without considering loss-averse agents.
8The particular functional form of the principal’s profit function is not crucial for our analysis. We
assume this specific structure since it allows for a straight-forward interpretation of the performance
measure.
9The results of Section IV do not rely on the linear structure of the performance measure. The
linearity is needed to show validity of the first-order approach and in Section V.
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Assumption (A1): For all s, τ ∈ S with s 6= τ ,
(i) γHs /γ
L
s 6= 1 (informative signals),
(ii) γHs , γ
L
s ∈ (0, 1) (full support),
(iii) γHs /γ
L
s 6= γHτ /γLτ (different signals).
Part (i) guarantees that any signal s is either a good or a bad signal, i.e., the overall
probability of observing that signal unambiguously increases or decreases in a. Part
(ii) ensures that for all a ∈ A, all signals occur with positive probability. Last, with
part (iii) signals can unambiguously be ranked according to the relative impact of an
increase in effort on the probability of observing a particular signal.
The contract which the principal offers to the agent consists of a payment for each
realization of the performance measure, (ws)
S
s=1 ∈ RS.10
The agent is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences in the sense of Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006): overall utility from consuming x = (x1, . . . , xK) ∈ RK—when having
reference level r = (r1, . . . , rK) ∈ RK for each dimension of consumption—is given by
v(x|r) ≡
K∑
k=1
mk(xk) +
K∑
k=1
µ(mk(xk)−mk(rk)).
Put verbally, overall utility is assumed to have two components: consumption utility
and gain-loss utility. Consumption utility, also called intrinsic utility, from consuming
in dimension k is denoted by mk(xk). How a person feels about gaining or losing in
a dimension is assumed to depend in a universal way on the changes in consumption
utility associated with such gains and losses. The universal gain-loss function µ(·)
satisfies the assumptions imposed by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1991) on
their “value function”. In our model, the agent’s consumption space comprises of two
dimensions, money income (x1 =W ) and effort (x2 = a).
11 The agent’s intrinsic utility
for money is assumed to be a strictly increasing, (weakly) concave, and unbounded
function. Formally, m1(W ) = u(W ) with u
′(·) > ε > 0, u′′(·) ≤ 0. The intrinsic
disutility from exerting effort a ∈ [0, 1] is a strictly increasing, strictly convex function
of effort,m2(a) = −c(a) with c′(0) = 0, c′(a) > 0 for a > 0, c′′(·) > 0, and lima→1 c(a) =
10Restricting the principal to offer nonstochastic wage payments is standard in the principal-agent
literature and also in accordance with observed practice. In Section V, we comment on this
assumption.
11We implicitly assume that the agent is a “narrow bracketer”, in the sense that he ignores that the
risk from the current employment relationship is incorporated with substantial other risk.
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∞. We assume that the gain-loss function is piece-wise linear,12
µ(m) =
{
m , for m ≥ 0
λm, for m < 0
.
The parameter λ ≥ 1 characterizes the weight put on losses relative to gains.13 The
weight on gains is normalized to one. When λ > 1, the agent is loss averse in the sense
that losses loom larger than equally-sized gains.
Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), the agent’s reference point is determined
by his rational expectations about outcomes. A given outcome is then evaluated by
comparing it to all possible outcomes, where each comparison is weighted with the ex
ante probability with which the alternative outcome occurs. With the actual outcome
being itself uncertain, the agent’s expected utility is obtained by averaging over all these
comparisons. We apply the concept of choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE)
as defined in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), which assumes that a person correctly predicts
his choice set, the environment he faces, in particular the set of possible outcomes and
how the distribution of these outcomes depends on his decisions, and his own reaction to
this environment. The eponymous feature of CPE is that the agent’s reference point is
affected by his choice of action. As pointed out by Ko˝szegi and Rabin, CPE refers to the
analysis of risk preferences regarding outcomes that are resolved long after all decisions
are made. This environment seems well-suited for many principal-agent relationships:
often the outcome of a project becomes observable, and thus performance-based wage
compensation feasible, long after the agent finished working on that project. Under
CPE, the expectations relative to which a decision’s outcome is evaluated are formed
at the moment the decision is made and, therefore, incorporate the implications of
the decision. More precisely, suppose the agent chooses action a and that signal s
is observed. The agent receives wage ws and incurs effort cost c(a). While the agent
expected signal s to come up with probability γs(a), with probability γτ (a) he expected
signal τ 6= s to be observed. If wτ > ws, the agent experiences a loss of λ(u(ws)−u(wτ )),
whereas if wτ < ws, the agent experiences a gain of u(ws) − u(wτ ). If ws = wτ , there
is no sensation of gaining or losing involved. The agent’s utility from this particular
12In their work on asset pricing, Nicholas Barberis, Ming Huang, and Tano Santos (2001) argue that
for prospects involving both gains and losses, loss aversion at the kink is more relevant than the
degree of curvature away from the kink. Implications of a more general gain-loss function are
discussed in Section VII.
13Alternatively, one could introduce a weight attached to gain-loss utility relative to intrinsic util-
ity, η ≥ 0. We implicitly normalized η = 1 which can be done without much loss, since this
normalization does not qualitatively affect any of our results.
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outcome is given by
u(ws) +
∑
{τ |wτ<ws}
γτ (a)(u(ws)− u(wτ )) +
∑
{τ |wτ≥ws}
γτ (a)λ(u(ws)− u(wτ ))− c(a).
Note that since the agent’s expected and actual effort choice coincide, there is neither a
gain nor a loss in the effort dimension. We conclude this section by briefly summarizing
the underlying timing.
1) The principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent.
2) The agent either accepts or rejects the contract. If the agent rejects, the game
ends and each party receives her/his reservation payoff. If the agent accepts, the
game moves to the next stage.
3) The agent chooses his action and forms rational expectations about the mon-
etary outcomes. The contract and the agent’s rational expectations about the
realization of the performance measure determine his reference point.
4) Both parties observe the realization of the performance measure and payments
are made according to the contract.
3. Preliminary Analysis
Let h(·) := u−1(·), i.e., the monetary cost for the principal to offer the agent utility us
is h(us) = ws. Due to the assumptions imposed on u(·), h(·) is a strictly increasing and
weakly convex function. Following Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1983),
we regard u = (u1, . . . , uS) as the principal’s control variables in her cost minimization
problem to implement action aˆ ∈ (0, 1). The principal offers the agent a contract that
specifies for each signal a monetary payment or, equivalently, an intrinsic utility level.
With this notation, the agent’s expected utility from exerting effort a is
EU(a) =
∑
s∈S
γs(a)us − (λ− 1)
∑
s∈S
∑
{τ |uτ>us}
γτ (a)γs(a)(uτ − us)− c(a). (II.1)
For λ = 1 the agent’s expected utility equals expected net intrinsic utility. Thus, for
λ = 1 we are in the standard case without loss aversion. Moreover, from the above
formulation of the agent’s utility it becomes clear that λ captures not only the weight
put on losses relative to gains, but that (λ − 1) can also be interpreted as the weight
put on gain-loss utility relative to intrinsic utility. Thus, for λ ≤ 2, the weight attached
to gain-loss utility is below the weight attached to intrinsic utility. For a given contract
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u, the agent’s marginal utility of effort is
EU ′(a) =
∑
s∈S
(γHs − γLs )us
− (λ− 1)
∑
s∈S
∑
{τ |uτ>us}
[γτ (a)(γ
H
s − γLs ) + γs(a)(γHτ − γLτ )](uτ − us)− c′(a). (II.2)
A principal who wants to implement action aˆ ∈ (0, 1) minimizes her expected wage
payment subject to the usual individual rationality and incentive compatibility con-
straints:
min
u1,...,uS
∑
s∈S
γs(aˆ)h(us)
subject to EU(aˆ) ≥ u¯ , (IR)
aˆ ∈ argmax
a∈A
EU(a) . (IC)
Suppose the agent’s action choice is contractible, i.e., the incentive constraint (IC)
is absent. In this first-best situation, the principal pays a risk- or loss-averse agent a
fixed wage uFB = u¯ + c(aˆ). In the presence of moral hazard, on the other hand, the
principal faces the classic tradeoff between risk sharing and providing incentives: when
the agent is anything but risk and loss neutral, it is neither optimal to have the agent
bear the complete risk, nor fully to insure the agent.
At this point we simplify the analysis by imposing two assumptions. These assump-
tions are sufficient to guarantee that the principal’s cost minimization problem exhibits
the following two properties: first, there are incentive-compatible wage contracts, i.e.,
contracts under which it is optimal for the agent to choose the desired action aˆ. Second,
the first-order approach is valid, i.e., the incentive constraint to implement action aˆ
can equivalently be represented as EU ′(aˆ) = 0. The first assumption that we introduce
requires that the “weight” attached to gain-loss utility does not exceed the weight put
on intrinsic utility.
Assumption (A2): No dominance of gain-loss utility, λ ≤ 2.
As carefully laid out in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), CPE implies a strong notion of
risk aversion, in the sense that a decision maker may choose stochastically dominated
options when λ > 2. The reason is that, with losses looming larger than gains of equal
size, the person ex ante expects to experience a net loss. In consequence, if reducing the
scope of possibly incurring a loss is the decision maker’s primary concern, the person
would rather give up the slim hope of experiencing a gain at all in order to avoid the
disappointment in case of not experiencing this gain. In our model, if the agent is
sufficiently loss averse, the principal may be unable to implement any action aˆ ∈ (0, 1).
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The reason is that the agent minimizes his expected net loss by choosing one of the two
extreme actions. The values of λ for which this behavior is optimal for the agent depend
on the precise structure of the performance measure. Assumption (A2) is sufficient,
but not necessary, to ensure that there is a contract such that aˆ ∈ (0, 1) satisfies the
necessary condition for incentive compatibility. In Section V, we relax Assumption
(A2) and discuss in detail the implications of higher degrees of loss aversion.
To keep the analysis tractable, we impose the following additional assumption on
the agent’s cost function.
Assumption (A3): Convex marginal cost function, ∀ a ∈ [0, 1] : c′′′(a) ≥ 0.
Given (A2), Assumption (A3) is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the
first-order approach to be applicable.14 In fact, our results only require the validity of
the first-order approach, not that Assumption (A3) holds. In Section V, we consider
the case in which the first-order approach is invalid.
Lemma II.1: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold, then the constraint set of the principal’s cost
minimization problem is nonempty for all aˆ ∈ (0, 1).
The above lemma states that there are wage contracts such that the agent is willing
to accept the contract and then chooses the desired action. Existence of a second-best
optimal contract is shown separately for the three cases analyzed: pure risk aversion,
pure loss aversion, and the intermediate case.
Sometimes it will be convenient to state the constraints in terms of increases in
intrinsic utilities instead of absolute utilities. Note that whatever contract (uˆs)s∈S the
principal offers, we can relabel the signals such that this contract is equivalent to a
contract (us)
S
s=1 with us−1 ≤ us for all s ∈ {2, . . . , S}. This, in turn, allows us to write
the contract as us = u1 +
∑s
τ=2 bτ , where bτ = uτ − uτ−1 ≥ 0. Let b = (b2, . . . , bS).
With this notation the individual rationality constraint can be stated as follows:
u1 +
S∑
s=2
bs
[
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)− ρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
]
≥ u¯+ c(aˆ) , (IR′)
where
ρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) := (λ− 1)
[ S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
][ s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
]
.
Let ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = (ρ2(γˆ, λ, aˆ), . . . , ρS(γˆ, λ, aˆ)). The first part of the agent’s utility,
u1 +
∑S
s=2 bs(
∑S
τ=s γτ (aˆ)), is the expected intrinsic utility for money. Due to loss
aversion, however, the agent’s utility has a second negative component, the term
14The validity of the first-order approach under assumptions (A1)-(A3) is proven in Appendix B. The
reader should be aware that the proof requires notation introduced later in this section.
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b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ). With bonus bs being paid to the agent whenever a signal higher or equal to
s is observed, the agent expects to receive bs with probability
∑S
τ=s γτ (aˆ). With proba-
bility
∑s−1
t=1 γt(aˆ), however, a signal below s will be observed, and the agent will not be
paid bonus bs. Thus, with “probability” [
∑S
τ=s γτ (aˆ)][
∑s−1
t=1 γt(aˆ)] the agent experiences
a loss of λbs. Analogous reasoning implies that the agent will experience a gain of
bs with the same probability. With losses looming larger than gains of equal size, in
expectation the agent suffers from deviations from his reference point. This expected
net loss is captured by the term, b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ), which we will refer to as the agent’s “loss
premium”.15 A crucial point is that the loss premium increases in the contract’s degree
of wage differentiation. When there is no wage differentiation at all, i.e., b = 0, then
the loss premium vanishes. If, in contrast, the contract specifies many different wage
payments, then the agent ex ante considers a deviation from his reference point very
likely. Put differently, for each additional wage payment an extra negative term enters
the agent’s loss premium and therefore reduces his expected utility.16
Given that the first-order approach is valid, the incentive constraint can be rewritten
as
S∑
s=2
bsβs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c
′(aˆ), (IC′)
where
βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) :=
(
S∑
τ=s
(γHτ − γLτ )
)
− (λ− 1)
[(
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)(
S∑
τ=s
(γHτ − γLτ )
)
+
(
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
)(
s−1∑
t=1
(γHt − γLt )
)]
.
Here, βs(·) is the marginal effect on incentives of an increase in the wage payments
for signals above s − 1. Without loss aversion, i.e., λ = 1, this expression equals the
marginal probability of observing at least signal s. If the agent is loss averse, on the
other hand, an increase in the action also affects the agent’s loss premium. The agent’s
action balances the tradeoff between maximizing intrinsic utility and minimizing the
15Our notion of the agent’s loss premium is highly related to the average self-distance of a lottery
defined by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007). Let D(u) be the average self-distance of incentive scheme
u, then [(λ− 1)/2]D(u) = b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ).
16 While the exact change of the loss premium from adding more and more wage payments is hard
to grasp, this point can heuristically be illustrated by considering the upper bound of the loss
premium. Suppose the principal sets n ≤ S different wages. It is readily verified that the loss
premium is bounded from above by (λ− 1)[(uS − u1)/2]× [(n− 1)/n], and that this upper bound
increases as n increases. Note, however, that even for n→∞ the upper bound of the loss premium
is finite.
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expected net loss. Overall, loss aversion may facilitate as well as hamper the creation
of incentives. Let β(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = (β2(γˆ, λ, aˆ), . . . , βS(γˆ, λ, aˆ)).
As in the standard case, incentives are created solely by increases in intrinsic utilities,
b. In consequence, (IR′) is binding in the optimum. It is obvious that (IC′) can only
be satisfied if there exists at least one βs(·) > 0. If, for example, signals are ordered
according to their likelihood ratios, then βs(·) > 0 for all s = 2, . . . , S. More precisely,
for a given ordering of signals, under (A2) the following equivalence follows:
βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) > 0 ⇐⇒
S∑
τ=s
(γHτ − γLτ ) > 0 . (II.3)
4. The Optimal Contract
In this part of the paper, we first review the standard case where the agent is only risk
averse but not loss averse. Thereafter, the case of a loss-averse agent with a risk-neutral
intrinsic utility function is analyzed. Last, we discuss the intermediate case of a risk-
and loss-averse agent.
4.1. Pure Risk Aversion
Consider an agent who is risk averse in the usual sense, h′′(·) > 0, but does not exhibit
loss aversion, λ = 1.
Proposition II.1 (Holmstro¨m, 1979): Suppose (A1) holds, h′′(·) > 0, and λ = 1.
Then there exists a second-best optimal contract to implement aˆ ∈ (0, 1). The second-
best contract has the property that u∗s 6= u∗τ ∀s, τ ∈ S and s 6= τ . Moreover, u∗s > u∗τ if
and only if γHs /γ
L
s > γ
H
τ /γ
L
τ .
Proposition II.1 restates the well-known finding by Bengt Holmstro¨m (1979) for dis-
crete signals: signals that are more indicative of higher effort, i.e., signals with a higher
likelihood ratio γHs /γ
L
s , are rewarded strictly higher. Thus, the optimal wage scheme
is complex in the sense that it is fully contingent, with each signal being rewarded
differently.
4.2. Pure Loss Aversion
We now turn to the other extreme, a purely loss-averse agent. Formally, intrinsic utility
of money is a linear function, h′′(·) = 0, and the agent is loss averse, λ > 1. Whatever
contract the principal offers, relabeling the signals always allows us to represent this
contract as an (at least weakly) increasing intrinsic utility profile. Therefore we can
decompose the principal’s problem into two steps: first, for a given ordering of signals,
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choose a nondecreasing profile of intrinsic utility levels that implements the desired
action aˆ at minimum cost; second, choose the signal ordering with the lowest cost of
implementation. As we know from the discussion at the end of the previous section, a
necessary condition for an upward-sloping incentive scheme to achieve incentive com-
patibility is that for the underlying signal ordering at least one βs(·) > 0. In what
follows, we restrict attention to the set of signal orderings that are incentive feasible in
the aforementioned sense. Nonemptiness of this set follows from Lemma II.1.
The Optimality of Bonus Contracts.—Consider the first step of the principal’s prob-
lem, i.e., taking the ordering of signals as given, find the nondecreasing payment scheme
with the lowest cost of implementation. With h(·) being linear, the principal’s objec-
tive function is C(u1, b) = u1+
∑S
s=2 bs(
∑S
τ=2 γτ (aˆ)). Remember that at the optimum,
(IR′) holds with equality. Inserting (IR′) into the principal’s objective allows us to
write the cost minimization problem for a given order of signals in the following simple
way:
Program ML:
min
b∈RS−1
+
b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
subject to b′β(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c′(aˆ). (IC′)
Intuitively, the principal seeks to minimize the agent’s expected net loss. Due to the
incentive constraint, however, this loss premium has to be strictly positive.
We want to emphasize that solving Program ML also yields insights for the case
with a concave intrinsic utility function. Even though the principal’s objective will
not reduce to minimizing the agent’s loss premium alone, this nevertheless remains an
important aspect of her problem. Since the solution to Program ML tells us how to
minimize the loss premium irrespective of the functional form of intrinsic utility, one
should expect its properties to carry over to some extent to the solution of the more
general problem.
The principal’s cost minimization problem for a given order of signals is a simple
linear programming problem: minimize a linear objective function subject to one linear
equality constraint. Since we restricted attention to orderings of signals with βs(·) > 0
for at least one signal s, a solution to ML exists. Due to the linear nature of problem
ML, (generically) this solution sets exactly one bs > 0 and all other bs = 0. Put
differently, the problem is to find that bs which creates incentives at the lowest cost.
What remains to do for the principal, in a second step, is to find the signal ordering
that leads to the lowest cost of implementation; this problem clearly has a solution.
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Proposition II.2: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold, h′′(·) = 0 and λ > 1. Then there exists a
second-best optimal contract to implement action aˆ ∈ (0, 1). Generically, the second-
best optimal incentive scheme (u∗s)
S
s=1 is a bonus contract, i.e., u
∗
s = u
∗
H for s ∈ B∗ ⊂ S
and u∗s = u
∗
L for s ∈ S \ B∗, where u∗H > u∗L.
According to Proposition II.2, the principal considers it optimal to offer the agent
a bonus contract which entails only a minimum degree of wage differentiation in the
sense that the contract specifies only two different wage payments no matter how rich
the signal space. This endeavor to reduce the complexity of the contract is plausible
since a high degree of wage differentiation increases the loss premium. A loss-averse
agent considers a wage schedule as riskier if the average margin between any two wages
is higher. The principal can reduce the riskiness of the contract by setting the spread
of as many wage pairs as possible equal to zero.
More intuitively, what are the effects of the principal specifying many different wage
payments? With a contract specifying many different wages, receiving a relatively low
wage feels like a loss when comparing it to possible higher ones, which in turn decreases
the agent’s utility. Likewise, in the case of obtaining a high wage most comparisons
are drawn to lower wages, with the associated gains increasing the agent’s utility.
Since losses loom larger than gains, anticipating these comparisons ex ante reduces
the agent’s expected utility and thus a higher average payment is needed to make him
accept the contract. In order to avoid these unfavorable comparisons, the principal has
an incentive to lump together wages for different signals.
With effort being unobservable but costly for the agent, however, any incentive-
compatible contract has to display at least some degree of wage differentiation. Under
the standard notion of risk aversion, creating incentives via increasing the utility mar-
gin between two signal realizations becomes more and more costly due to the agent’s
marginal utility of money being decreasing. Loosely speaking, instead of creating in-
centives via one big bonus payment, provision of incentives is achieved at lower cost
by setting many small wage spreads. When facing a purely loss-averse agent, whose
marginal intrinsic utility of money is constant, the principal cannot capitalize on differ-
entiating payments according to performance. In this case, pooling together as many
wages as possible is beneficial to the principal and thus the optimal contract is a binary
payment scheme.
Features of the Optimal Contract.—Up to now we have not specified which signals
are generally included in the set B∗. In light of the above observation, the principal’s
problem boils down to choosing a binary partition of the set of signals, B ⊂ S, which
characterizes for which signals the agent receives the high wage and for which signals
he receives the low wage. The wages uL and uH are then uniquely determined by the
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corresponding individual rationality and incentive constraints. The problem of choosing
the optimal partition of signals, B∗, is an integer programming problem. As is typical
for this class of problems, and as is nicely illustrated by the well-known “Knapsack
Problem”, it is impossible to provide a general characterization of the solution.17
Next to these standard intricacies of integer programming, there is an additional
difficulty in our model: the principal’s objective behaves nonmonotonically when in-
cluding an additional signal into the “bonus set”B. From Program ML it follows that,
for a given bonus set B, the minimum cost of implementing action aˆ is
CB = u¯+ c(aˆ) +
c′(aˆ)(λ− 1)PB(1− PB)
[
∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γLs )][1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB)]
, (II.4)
where PB :=
∑
s∈B γs(aˆ). The above costs can be rewritten such that the principal’s
problem amounts to
max
B⊂S
[∑
s∈B
(γHs − γLs )
]{
1
(λ− 1)PB(1− PB) −
1
PB
+
1
1− PB
}
. (II.5)
This objective function illustrates the tradeoff that the principal faces. The first term,∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γLs ), is the aggregate marginal impact of effort on the probability of the
bonus b := uH − uL being paid out. In order to create incentives for the agent, the
principal would like to make this term as large as possible, which in turn allows her to
lower the bonus payment. This can be achieved by including only good signals in B.
The second term, on the other hand, is maximized by making the probability of paying
the agent the high wage either as large as possible or as small as possible, depending
on the exact signal structure and the action to be implemented. Intuitively, by making
the event of paying the high wage very likely or unlikely, the principal minimizes the
scope for the agent to experience a loss that he demands to be compensated for. These
two goals may conflict with each other. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the optimal
contract displays the following plausible property.
Proposition II.3: Let S+ ≡ {s ∈ S|γHs − γLs > 0}. The optimal partition of the
signals for which the high wage is paid, B∗, has the following property: either B∗ ⊆ S+
or S+ ⊆ B∗.
Put verbally, the optimal partition of the signal set takes one of the two possible
forms: the high wage is paid out to the agent (i) either only for good signals though
possibly not for all good signals, or (ii) for all good signals and possibly a few bad
signals as well.
17The Knapsack Problem refers to a hiker who has to select from a group of items, all of which may
be suitable for her trip, a subset that has greatest value while not exceeding the capacity of her
knapsack.
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Back to the Knapsack Problem, here it is well-established for the continuous version
of the problem that the solution can easily be found by ordering the items according
to their value-to-weight ratio. Defining κ := max{s,t}⊆S |γs(aˆ)−γt(aˆ)|, we can obtain a
similar result. Assuming that κ is sufficiently small, which is likely to hold if the perfor-
mance measure is, for instance, sales revenues measured in cents, makes the principal’s
problem of choosing B∗ similar to a continuous problem.18 With this assumption, we
can show that it is optimal to order the signals according to their likelihood ratios.
Proposition II.4: Suppose κ is sufficiently small, then there exists a constant K such
that B∗ = {s ∈ S | γHs /γLs ≥ K}.
If one is prepared to assume that higher sales revenues are associated with higher
likelihood ratios, then Proposition II.4 states that the sales agent receives the bonus
only if his sales exceed a previously specified sales quota.
Comparative Statics.—Last, we want to point out the following comparative static
results.
Proposition II.5: (i) The minimum cost of implementing action aˆ strictly increases
in λ. (ii) For a given feasible bonus set B, the wage spread necessary to implement
action aˆ decreases in λ if and only if PB > 1/2.
Part (ii) of Proposition II.5 relates to the reasoning by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006,
1156) that if the agent is expectation-based loss averse, then “in principal-agent mod-
els, performance-contingent pay may not only directly motivate the agent to work
harder in pursuit of higher income, but also indirectly motivate [him] by changing [his]
expected income and effort.” The agent’s expected utility comprises of two compo-
nents, the first of which is expected net intrinsic utility from choosing effort level aˆ,
u∗L + b
∗
∑
s∈B∗ γs(aˆ) − c(aˆ). Due to loss aversion there is a second component since
in expectation the agent suffers from deviations from his reference point. A deviation
from the agent’s reference point occurs with probability PB∗(1 − PB∗), which we refer
to as loss probability. Therefore, when choosing his action, the agent has to balance
off two possibly conflicting targets, maximizing expected net intrinsic utility and min-
imizing the loss probability. The loss probability is locally decreasing at aˆ if and only
if PB∗ > 1/2. In this case, an increase in λ, which makes reducing the loss probabil-
ity more important, leads to the agent choosing a higher effort level, which in turn
allows the principal to use lower-powered incentives. The principal, however, cannot
capitalize on this since, according to part (i) of Proposition II.5, the overall cost of
implementation strictly increases in the agent’s degree of loss aversion.
18Here, the probability of observing a specific signal, say, sales revenues of exactly $13,825.32 is rather
small.
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4.3. The General Case: Loss Aversion and Risk Aversion
While binary wage schemes based on a rich signal space are hard to reconcile with
the orthodox notion of risk aversion, it is well-known that bonus contracts may be
optimal if both contracting parties are risk (and loss) neutral. This finding, however,
immediately collapses when the agent is somewhat risk averse.19 As we argue in this
section, our finding that under loss aversion the optimal contractual arrangement takes
the form of a bonus scheme is robust towards introducing a slightly concave intrinsic
utility function. The intuition is as follows: with the intrinsic utility function for
money being concave the principal has a classic rationale for rewarding signals that are
stronger indicators of good performance strictly higher. Due to the agent being loss
averse, however, the principal still has an incentive to lump together wages in order
to eliminate the negative comparison effect. If risk aversion is relatively unimportant
compared to loss aversion, then this motive outweighs the principal’s benefit from
differentiating payments according to performance, and the optimal contract is a binary
payment scheme. More formal, when the agent’s intrinsic utility function becomes close
to linearity the risk premium goes to zero, whereas due to loss aversion there are still
first-order costs of wage differentiation. While we provide a more thorough discussion
as well as a formal proof of this intuition in Appendix C, at this point we content
ourselves by illustrating this conjecture by means of an example.
Suppose h(u) = ur, with r > 1. More precisely, R = 1 − 1
r
denotes the Arrow-
Pratt measure for relative risk aversion of the intrinsic utility function. The agent’s
effort cost is c(a) = (1/2)a2, the effort level to be implemented is aˆ = 1/2, and the
reservation utility u¯ = 10. Assume that the agent’s performance can take only three
values, excellent (E), satisfactory (S) or inadequate (I). Let
γHE = 5/10 γ
H
S = 4/10 γ
H
I = 1/10
γLE = 1/10 γ
L
S = 3/10 γ
L
I = 6/10.
It turns out that it is always (weakly) optimal to order signals according to their
likelihood ratio, i.e., u1 = uI , u2 = uS and u3 = uE. The structure of the optimal
contract for this specification and various values of r and λ is presented in Table 1.
Table 1 suggests that the optimal contract typically involves pooling of the two good
19With both contracting parties being risk neutral, a broad range of contracts—including bonus
schemes—is optimal. If the agent is protected by limited liability, Eun-Soo Park (1995), Son Ku
Kim (1997), Oyer (2000), and Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet (1998) show that the unique
optimal contract is a bonus scheme. As demonstrated by Ian Jewitt, Ohad Kadan, and Jeroen
M. Swinkels (2008), these findings break down if risk aversion is introduced even to the slightest
degree.
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@
@
@
@
r
λ
1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5
1.5 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 = u3 u1 < u2 = u3 u1 < u2 = u3
2 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 = u3 u1 < u2 = u3
3 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 = u3 u1 < u2 = u3
Table II.1.: Structure of the optimal contract with two “good” signals.
signals, in particular when the agent’s intrinsic utility is not too concave. Table 1 nicely
illustrates the tradeoff the principal faces when the agent is both risk and loss averse:
if the agent becomes more risk averse, pooling is less likely to be optimal. If, on the
other hand, he becomes more loss averse, pooling is more likely to be optimal.20
5. Implementation Problems and Stochastic Contracts
In order to explore the implications of a higher degree of loss aversion, we relax as-
sumption (A2), which implies that the first-order approach is not necessarily valid.
To ease the exposition, we consider a purely loss-averse agent and restrict attention
to binary measures of performance, i.e., S = {1, 2}. For notational convenience , let
γH and γL denote the probabilities of observing signal s = 2 conditional on B being
realized and not being realized, respectively.21 Thus, the unconditional probability of
observing signal s = 2 for a given action a is γ(a) ≡ aγH+(1−a)γL. Let γˆ = (γH , γL).
We assume that s = 2 is the good signal.
Assumption (A4): 1 > γH > γL > 0.
With only two possible signals to be observed, the contract takes the form of a bonus
contract: the agent is paid a base wage u if the bad signal is observed, and he is paid
the base wage plus a bonus b if the good signal is observed. For now assume that
b ≥ 0.22 We assume that the agent’s intrinsic disutility of effort is a quadratic function,
c(a) = (k/2)a2.23 The first derivative of the agent’s expected utility with respect to
effort is given by
EU ′(a) = (γH − γL)b [2− λ+ 2γ(a)(λ− 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB(a)
− ka︸︷︷︸
MC(a)
. (II.6)
20For a given r, the degree of pooling actually may decrease in λ. This can happen, however, only
locally: at some point, the degree of pooling increases in λ.
21In the notation introduced above, we have γH
1
= 1− γH , γH
2
= γH , γL
1
= 1− γL and γL
2
= γL.
22The assumption b ≥ 0 is made only for expositional purposes, the results hold true for b ∈ R.
23Allowing for more general effort cost functions does not qualitatively change the insights that are
to be obtained.
Essays in Applied Microeconomics and Management 57
While the marginal cost, MC(a), obviously is a straight line through the origin with
slope k, the marginal benefit, MB(a), also is a positively sloped, linear function of
effort a. An increase in b unambiguously makes MB(a) steeper. Letting a0 denote the
intercept of MB(a) with the horizontal axis, we have
a0 =
λ− 2− 2γL(λ− 1)
2(γH − γL)(λ− 1) .
Implementation problems in our sense refer to a situation where there are actions
a ∈ (0, 1) that are not incentive compatible for any bonus payment.
Proposition II.6: Suppose (A4) holds, then effort level aˆ ∈ (0, 1) is implementable if
and only if a0 ≤ 0.
Obviously, implementation problems do not arise when (A2) is satisfied. Implemen-
tation problems do occur, however, when a0 > 0, or equivalently, when γ
L < 1/2
and λ > 2(1 − γL)/(1 − 2γL) > 2. Somewhat surprisingly, this includes performance
measures with γL < 1/2 < γH , which are highly informative. These implementation
problems arise because the agent has two possibly conflicting targets: on the one hand,
he seeks to maximize net intrinsic utility, u+ bγ(a)− (k/2)a2, while on the other hand,
he wants to minimize the expected loss by choosing an action such that the loss proba-
bility, γ(a)(1− γ(a)), becomes small. For γL ≥ 1/2 these targets are perfectly aligned:
the loss probability is strictly decreasing in the agent’s action, which implies that an
increase in the bonus unambiguously increases effort and thus each action a ∈ (0, 1)
is implementable. For γL < 1/2, however, implementation problems do arise when
λ is sufficiently large. Roughly speaking, being very loss averse, the agent primarily
cares about reducing the loss probability. With the loss probability being inverted U-
shaped in this case, the agent achieves this by choosing one of the two extreme actions
a ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., the principal faces severe implementation problems.
Turning a Blind Eye.—One might wonder if there is a remedy for these implemen-
tation problems. The answer is “yes”. The principal can manipulate the signal in her
favor by not paying attention to the signal from time to time, but nevertheless paying
the bonus in these cases. Formally, suppose the principal commits herself to stochas-
tically ignoring the signal with probability p ∈ [0, 1). Thus, the overall probability of
receiving the bonus is given by γ(p, a) ≡ p+(1−p)γ(a). This strategic ignorance of in-
formation gives rise to a transformed performance measure with γH(p) = p+(1−p)γH
and γL(p) = p + (1 − p)γL denoting the probabilities that the bonus is paid to the
agent conditional on benefit B being realized and not being realized, respectively. We
refer to the principal not paying attention to the performance measure as turning a
blind eye. It is readily verified that under the transformed performance measure γˆ(p)
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the intercept of the MB(a) function with the horizontal axis,
a0(p) ≡
λ− 2− 2 [p+ (1− p)γL] (λ− 1)
2(1− p)(γH − γL)(λ− 1) ,
not only is decreasing in p but also can be made arbitrarily small, in particular, ar-
bitrarily negative. In the light of Proposition II.6, this immediately implies that the
principal can eliminate any implementation problems by choosing p sufficiently high.
Besides alleviating possible implementation problems, turning a blind eye can also
benefit the principal from a cost perspective. Differentiating the minimum cost of
implementing action aˆ under the transformed performance measure,
C(p; aˆ) = u+
k
2
aˆ2 +
kaˆ(λ− 1)(1− γ(aˆ))
(γH − γL)
γ(aˆ) + p(1− γ(aˆ))
1− (λ− 1) [1− 2γ(aˆ)− 2p(1− γ(aˆ))] ,(II.7)
with respect to p reveals that sign{dC(p; aˆ)/dp} = sign{2− λ}. Hence, an increase in
the probability of ignoring the performance measure decreases the cost of implementing
a certain action if and only if λ > 2. Hence, whenever the principal turns a blind eye
in order to remedy implementation problems, she will do so to the largest possible
extent.24
Proposition II.7: Suppose the principal can commit herself to stochastic ignorance of
the signal. Then each action aˆ ∈ [0, 1] can be implemented. Moreover, the implemen-
tation costs are strictly decreasing in p if and only if λ > 2.
To grasp this finding intuitively, remember the intuition underlying Proposition II.2:
by implementation of a bonus contract, the principal reduces the ex ante probability
of the agent incurring a loss by making it more likely that the agent receives what
he expects to receive. By the same token, turning a blind eye allows the principal to
reduce the agent’s loss premium even beyond what is achieved by a deterministic bonus
contract. While this reduction comes at the cost of making the performance measure
less informative, according to Proposition II.7, the positive effect on the agent’s loss
premium outweighs the negative effect on incentives if the agent is sufficiently loss
averse.
We restricted the principal to offer nonstochastic payments conditional on which
signal is observed. If the principal was able to do just that, then she could remedy
implementation problems by paying the base wage plus a lottery in the case of the bad
signal. For instance, when the lottery yields b with probability p and zero otherwise,
24Formally, for λ > 2, the solution to the principal’s problem of choosing the optimal probability to
turn a blind eye, p∗, is not well defined because p∗ → 1. If the agent is subject to limited liability
or if there is a cost of ignorance, however, the optimal probability of turning a blind eye is well
defined.
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this is just the same as turning a blind eye. This observation suggests that the principal
may benefit from offering a contract that includes randomization, which is in contrast
to the finding under conventional risk aversion, see Holmstro¨m (1979).25 In this sense,
while the optimal contract under standard risk aversion would specify only two distinct
wages, loss aversion increases the complexity of the optimal contract.
We conclude this section by pointing out an interesting implication of the above
analysis. Suppose the principal has no access to a randomization device. Then the
above considerations allow a straight-forward comparison of performance measures ζˆ =
(ζH , ζL) and γˆ = (γH , γL) if ζˆ is a convex combination of γˆ and 1 ≡ (1, 1).
Corollary II.1: Let ζˆ = p1 + (1 − p)γˆ with p ∈ (0, 1). Then the principal at least
weakly prefers performance measure ζˆ to γˆ if and only if λ ≥ 2.
The finding that the principal prefers the “garbled” performance measure ζˆ over
performance measure γˆ is at odds with Blackwell’s theorem. While Kim (1995) has
already shown that the necessary part of Blackwell’s theorem does not hold in the
agency model, the sufficiency part was proven to be applicable to the agency framework
by Frøystein Gjesdal (1982).26 Our findings, however, show that the latter is not the
case anymore when the agent is loss averse.
6. Alternative Notions of Loss Aversion and Related
Literature
With only little being known about how exactly expectations enter into the formation
of a person’s reference point, a discussion seems warranted to what extent our results
depend on the notion of loss aversion according to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007). The agent
in our model compares an obtained outcome with all other possible outcomes. This
pairwise comparison, which may lead to one and the same outcome being perceived as
both a gain and a loss at the same time, is in fact responsible for our main findings.27
An increase in the margins of payments always increases the agent’s expected loss. Even
though they are closely related to the CPE concept, this latter effect does not arise
under the forward-looking notions of loss aversion according to Bell (1985), Loomes
25The finding that stochastic contracts may be optimal is not novel to the principal-agent literature.
Hans Haller (1985) shows that in the case of a satisficing agent, who wants to achieve certain aspira-
tion levels of income with certain probabilities, randomization may pay for the principal. Moreover,
Roland Strausz (2006) finds that deterministic contracts may be suboptimal in a screening context.
26The sufficiency part of Blackwell’s theorem states that making use of more informative performance
measure implies that the principal is not worse off. See David Blackwell (1951, 1953).
27For at least suggestive evidence on mixed feelings, see Jeff T. Larsen et al. (2004).
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and Sugden (1986), or Gul (1991), which do not allow for mixed feelings. For the
sake of argument, consider an agent with linear intrinsic utility for money who is loss
averse in the sense of Bell (1985), i.e., his reference point is the arithmetic mean of
the wage distribution. Suppose there are only three signals, s = 1, 2, 3, which are
equiprobable for the action which is to be implemented. The associated wages are
w1 < w2 = w3 =: w23. If the principal increases the wage for signal 3 by ε > 0 and
reduces the wage for signal 2 by the same amount, then the average payment, and in
consequence both the principal’s cost and the agent’s reference point remain unaffected.
Moreover, given that ε is not too large, also the loss premium the principal has to pay
turns out to be independent of ε,28
LPBell(ε) = (2/9)(λ− 1)(w23 − w1). (II.8)
Thus, the individual rationality constraint also holds under this new contract. Since an
increase in the degree of wage differentiation often is accompanied by an improvement
of incentives, it is easily imagined that the principal benefits from specifying more than
two wages. With loss aversion a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin, in contrast, the loss premium
is strictly increasing in ε:
LPKR(ε) = (2/9)(λ− 1)(w23 − w1) + (2/9)(λ− 1)ε. (II.9)
In order to illustrate the differences between these two concepts more vividly, we discuss
in more detail the sensations of losses and gains under both concepts. Under Bell’s
notion of loss aversion, if s = 1 occurs, the loss felt is the same under both contracts.
For s = 2, under the new contract the agent feels a lower gain than under the original
contract. This lower gain, however, is exactly offset in expectations by an increased
gain for s = 3. With loss aversion a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin, under the new contract,
if s = 1 is realized then the agent feels a lower loss compared to the outcome for
s = 2 and a larger loss compared to the outcome for s = 3. In expectations, these
changes exactly cancel out. For s = 2, in contrast, under the new contract the agent
now feels a loss in comparison to the outcome for s = 3, while under the original
contract this comparison did not lead to the sensation of a loss. Thus, under the more
differentiated wage scheme, the ex ante probability of incurring a loss is higher, which
in turn increases the agent’s gain-loss disutility.
The above observations suggest that increasing the degree of wage differentiation
always increases the principal’s cost if the agent is loss averse a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin.
If, on the other hand, the agent is loss-averse according to Bell, then paying slightly
28The independence of the loss premium of ε does neither rely on the wages being equiprobable nor
on using Bell’s concept instead of Loomes and Sugden’s or Gul’s.
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different wages for different signals is costless, except when differentiating wages that
originally were equal to the reference point. With wage differentiation being less costly
in the absence of mixed feelings, one would expect the optimal contract to be more
differentiated under Bell’s notion of loss aversion. Nevertheless, with losses still being
painful for the agent, a fully contingent contract, which maximizes the scope for the
agent to incur a loss, hardly seems optimal for a rich performance measure even if the
agent’s reference point has no stochastic component.
This conjecture is highly in line with the extant literature on incentive design under
loss aversion.29 With no unifying approach provided how to determine a decision
maker’s reference point, it is little surprising that all contributions differ in this aspect.
Nevertheless, none of the earlier contributions applies a notion of loss aversion that
allows for mixed feelings. David de Meza and David C. Webb (2007) apply the concept
of Gul (1991), which posits that the reference point is the certainty equivalent of the
prospect and thus is closely related to Bell (1985). The optimal contract consists
of three regions: first compensation increases with performance up to the reference
point, thereafter for a range of signals the wage equals the reference point, and for
high performance the wage is strictly increasing in performance. As an alternative to
Gul’s concept, de Meza and Webb also consider the median as reference wage, which
captures the idea that a loss is incurred at all incomes for which it is odds-on that a
higher income would be drawn. Now, the optimal contract is discontinuous after the
flat-part, but otherwise qualitatively similar. Thus, the optimal contract derived by
de Meza and Webb provides a theoretical underpinning for the usage of option-like
incentive schemes in CEO compensation.
Focusing only on gain-loss utility, Emil P. Iantchev (2009) applies the concept of
Luis Rayo and Gary S. Becker (2007) to a multi-principal/multi-agent environment in
which an agent’s reference point is determined by the equilibrium conditions in the
market.30 Next to a dismissal region for very low performance, the optimal contract
is found to display a performance-independent flat part for intermediate performance,
which is followed by a region where rewards are increasing in performance. Evidence
for this theoretically predicted contractual form is shown to be found in panel data
from Safelite Glass Corporation.
Also abstracting from intrinsic utility but assuming that the reference point equals
previous year’s income, Ingolf Dittmann, Ernst Maug, and Oliver G. Spalt (forthcom-
29Nonstandard risk preferences different from loss aversion are analyzed in a moral hazard framework
by Ulrich Schmidt (1999), who applies Menahem E. Yaari’s (1987) concept of dual expected utility
theory, and by Ja´n Za´bojn´ık (2002), who incorporates Friedman-Savage utility.
30The assumption that only changes in wealth matter is based on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979)
original formulation of prospect theory.
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ing) find that a loss aversion model dominates an equivalent risk aversion model in
explaining observed CEO compensation contracts. The resulting contract under loss
aversion qualitatively resembles the optimal contract identified by Iantchev (2009).
The commonality of all loss aversion concepts, irrespective of mixed-feelings possibly
arising or not, is that there typically is a range of signals where payment does not vary
with performance.31 Without mixed feelings, however, the optimal wage schedule dis-
plays high sensitivity of pay to performance at least for signals that are very indicative
for high effort. Thus, none of the aforementioned papers provides a rationale for the
prevalence of binary payment schemes.32
To the best of our knowledge, Kohei Daido and Hideshi Itoh (2007) is the only
paper that also applies reference dependence a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin to a principal-
agent setting. The focus of Daido and Itoh greatly differs from ours. Assuming that the
performance measure comprises of only two signals, two types of self-fulfilling prophecy
regarding the impact of expectations on performance are explained. While sufficient
to capture these two effects, the assumption of a binary measure of performance does
not allow to inquire into the form that contracts take under moral hazard.
Though not placed in the literature on incentive design, the findings in Paul Heidhues
and Ko˝szegi (2005) in spirit are closely related to our results. Here it is shown that
consumer loss aversion a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin can explain why monopoly prices react
less sensitively to cost shocks than predicted by orthodox theory. The driving force
underlying this price stickiness is the aforementioned comparison effect: the probability
of the consumer buying the good at some price is negatively affected by the comparison
of this price to lower prices in the distribution. Therefore, just like our principal
lumps together wages despite possibly negative incentive effects in order to avoid the
unfavorable comparison of some relatively low wage with higher wages, the monopolist
has an incentive to lump together prices even though this means foregoing the benefit
from differentiating production according to cost. In a similar vein, Heidhues and
Ko˝szegi (2008) provide an answer to the question why nonidentical competitors charge
identical prices for differentiated products.
7. Closing Discussion
In this paper, we explore the implications of loss aversion a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2007) on contract design in the presence of moral hazard. With a stochastic reference
31Put differently, due to first-order risk aversion Holmstro¨m’s informativeness principle is violated.
32De Meza and Webb (2007) find conditions under which a bonus contract is optimal. For this to
be the case, however, they assume that the reference point is exogenously given and that all wage
payments are in the loss region, where the agent is assumed to be risk loving.
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point component, increasing the number of different wages increases the agent’s gain-
loss disutility significantly without necessarily supplying strong additional incentives.
The most drastic implication is the use of binary payment schemes even in situations
where the principal has access to an arbitrarily rich performance measure and the
optimal contract thus would be fully contingent under the standard notion of risk
aversion. Moreover, we find that under reasonable conditions the optimal contract
needs to specify only a cut-off performance, e.g., a sales quota. Thus, loss aversion
provides a theoretical rationale for bonus contracts, the wide application of which is
hard to reconcile with obvious drawbacks—such as seasonality effects—that come along
with this particular contractual form. In the aforementioned sense loss aversion leads
to simpler contracts than predicted by orthodox theory. Reduced complexity of the
contract, however, is not a general prediction of loss aversion. We derived circumstances
under which the optimal contract consists of stochastic payments if the agent is loss
averse but does not include randomization if the agent is risk averse in the usual sense.
We adopted the concept of choice-acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE). Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006, 2007) provide another concept, called unacclimating personal equi-
librium (UPE). The major difference is the timing of expectation formation and actual
decision making.33 Under UPE a decision maker first forms his expectations, which
determine his reference point, and thereafter, given these expectations, chooses his
preferred action. To guarantee internal consistency, UPE requires that individuals can
only make plans that they will follow through. With expectations being met on the
equilibrium path under UPE, the expected utility takes the same form under both con-
cepts. Since the optimality of bonus schemes is rooted in the agent’s dislike of being
exposed ex ante to numerous outcomes, we would expect bonus contracts to be optimal
also under UPE.
Throughout the analysis we ignored diminishing sensitivity of the gain-loss function.
A more general gain-loss function complicates the analysis because neither the incentive
constraint nor the participation constraint are linear functions in the intrinsic utility
levels any longer. Nevertheless, we expect that a reduction of the pay-performance
sensitivity will benefit the principal in this case as well. Diminishing sensitivity implies
that the sum of two net losses of two monetary outcomes exceeds the net loss of the sum
of these two monetary outcomes. Therefore, in addition to the effects discussed in the
paper, under diminishing sensitivity there is another channel through which melting
two bonus payments into one “big” bonus affects, and in tendency reduces, the agent’s
expected net loss. There is, however, an argument running counter to this intuition.
33A dynamic model of reference-dependent preferences which allows for changes in beliefs about
outcomes is developed in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2009).
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As we have shown, loss aversion may help the principal to create incentives. Therefore,
setting many different wage payments, and thereby—in a sense—creating many kinks,
may have favorable incentive effects.
Last, while several notions of loss aversion proposed in the literature are forward
looking in the sense that the reference point is determined by the decision maker’s
rational expectations, our findings depend on the mixed-feelings approach embodied in
the concept of Ko˝szegi and Rabin. With the exact way of how expectations enter the
process of reference point formation being an understudied question, this issue clearly
warrants further investigation.
III. On Horns and Halos:
Confirmation Bias and Job
Rotation
Confirmation bias, which refers to unintentional and unknowing
selectivity in the use of evidence, belongs to the major problems
faced by organizations. In this chapter, we discuss job rotation
as a natural solution to this problem. In a nutshell, adopting job
rotation provides an organization that is plagued by confirmation
bias with a more reliable informational footing upon which to base
its decisions. Job rotation, however, also comes with a cost, e.g.
a loss of productivity or a disruption of work flows. We study
this trade-off and identify conditions under which job rotation
and specialization are each optimal.
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1. Introduction
“If one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect of human reasoning that de-
serves attention above all others, the confirmation bias would have to be among the candidates
for consideration.”
– Raymond S. Nickerson
Confirmation bias refers to unintentional and unknowing selectivity in the acquisi-
tion and use of evidence. Ample empirical evidence supports the view that once one
has come to believe in a position on an issue, one’s primary purpose becomes that
of justifying or defending that position.1 In consequence, regardless of whether treat-
ment of evidence was evenhanded before the position was taken, it can become highly
biased afterward. Though confirmation bias is considered as one of the most widely
accepted notions of inferential errors, as suggested by the above quote by Nickerson
(1999), its implications for organizational design have not been subject of thorough
formal investigation.2 This is surprising because in organizations there seems to be
ample room for confirmation bias to arise and in consequence to adversely affect intra-
organizational decision processes and organizational performance. In this paper, we
aim at making a first step toward drawing out potential responses of organizational
design to confirmation bias and its effects.
One aspect of organizational life where confirmation bias has major impact imme-
diately comes to mind: performance appraisal.3 Many, if not most performance mea-
sures regarding a firm’s employees are subjective rather than objective in nature.4 This
makes performance appraisal a process by which humans judge other humans, thereby
opening the door for behavioral biases and inferential errors to enter and – more im-
portantly – to distort this process. Raters’ bias in performance appraisal is considered
a severe problem in practice. According to Brian Davis, executive vice president of
1See Nickerson (1999) for an excellent survey.
2Other behavioral biases have been considered in the literature on organizational theory: leniency,
favoritism, or centrality bias on the side of supervisors, reference-dependent preferences, inequity
aversion, or violation of procedure-neutrality on the side of employees, just to name a few. Surveys
regarding the former and the latter kind of biases in the context of organizations are found in
Prendergast and Topel (1993) and Camerer and Malmendier (2009), respectively.
3In the community practicing performance appraisal, confirmation bias is also referred to as the
horns-and-halo effect, which refers to supervisors’ tendency to judge employees as either good
or bad, and then to seek evidence that supports that opinion. This, in turn, is one possible
explanation for the so-called Matthew effect, which suggests that no matter how hard an employee
strives, their past appraisal records will prejudice their future attempts to improve. For more on
this, see http://www.performance-appraisal.com/bias.htm.
4For papers emphasizing this point, see, for example, Prendergast (1999) and MacLeod (2003).
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Personnel Decisions International, “[t]he problem with rater-bias is that it takes away
the organization’s ability to objectively use data from performance evaluations with
any validity. [...] [Y]ou can’t count on the objectivity or accuracy of a performance
assessment, and you have no differentiating data that allows you to make confident
decisions about promotions, training, or leadership development.”5 In consequence,
with bad promotion decisions having dire consequences, the biggest of which are lower
employee morale, decreased productivity, and lost customer share, organizations have
a vested interest in identifying the right person for a job because the cost of getting it
wrong is high.6
In this paper we argue that organizational design provides a tool which is capable of
thwarting confirmation bias not only in performance appraisal but also in other situa-
tions: job rotation.7 Under confirmation bias the outcome of a judgment process often
is determined by early pieces of evidence which color all subsequently received pieces
of information, i.e., first impressions matter. By its very nature, in many situations
job rotation creates “multiple first impressions” – and thus unbiased evaluations – by
regularly breaking up the matches of the judging person and the situation to be judged.
The work practice of job rotation, however, commonly is acknowledged to be associated
with some sort of cost, e.g. a serious loss of productivity caused by a disruption of work
flows or the sacrifice of job-specific human capital. We show that, when organizational
members are subject to confirmation bias, incuring this cost for implementing job ro-
tation may well be worthwhile for an organization in order to obtain a more accurate
probability assessment upon which to base its decisions.
In Section 2, we briefly review some of the many forms that confirmation bias can
take, survey some (mostly psychological) evidence for these phenomena, and finally
5See http://www.management-issues.com/2007/6/7/research/bias-blights-performance-reviews.asp.
Further information about Personnel Decisions International (PDI), a Minneapolis-based consul-
tancy firm, can be found at http://www.personneldecisions.com/.
6According to a survey of 444 organizations throughout North America conducted by Right Man-
agement, a globally operating career transition and organizational consulting firm, the average
cost of coping with an employee who does not work out is 2.5 times his salary. According
to Rick Smith, Senior Vice President of Right Management, “[t]here is a smaller margin for
error today in selection and promoting people into key positions, and a greater need to tar-
get development efforts to ensure that they really make a difference.” For the corresponding
press release from 04/11/2006, see http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=65255&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=849080&highlight=.
7Job rotation refers to a job practice which assigns an employee not to a single specific task but to a
set of several tasks (associated with a meaningful change in job content) among which he rotates
with some frequency. For evidence on job rotation being used by a significant and increasing
number of companies in the United States and other OECD countries, see Osterman (1994, 2000),
Gittleman et al. (1998), and OECD (1999).
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present the model of confirmation bias proposed by Rabin and Schrag (1999), which
we are going to apply throughout the paper.
Inspired by the anecdotal evidence presented above, in Section 3 we turn to the most
immediate situation one can think of when pondering where confirmation bias might
take effect in organizations: promotion decisions based on the evaluation of workers
by their supervisors. We present a simple model in which, with different types of jobs
being available, the efficient allocation of a worker depends on his ability, which is
assumed to be commonly unknown. If the firm wants to base these decisions on a more
solid informational footing by gathering additional information, due to an exogenously
given need to delegate some tasks, it has to rely on supervisors to do so. Since under the
assumptions we impose no incentive-compatibility or truthful-revelation complications
arise, supervisors are happy to truthfully report their observations to the firm. The only
friction that we allow for is that supervisors are subject to confirmation bias. The firm
can choose between two types of work design, specialization or job rotation. If the firm
opts for specializing the worker, he remains in one and the same division which leads to
an increase in his productivity in this field of activity. Under specialization, however,
the worker is evaluated by this division’s supervisor exclusively. When supervisors
succumb to confirmation bias, this leads to later evaluations being biased due to earlier
established beliefs. If the firm decides to implement job rotation, on the other hand, the
worker is placed in various of the firm’s divisions and becomes a generalist who is less
productive than a specialist. Under job rotation, however, the firm regularly breaks up
the matches of supervisors and their subordinates, thereby creating multiple unbiased
evaluations of many supervisors regarding one particular employee. We show that
preventing confirmation bias from affecting supervisors’ judgment can indeed outweigh
the loss of productivity due to implementing job rotation. Moreover, we show that job
rotation is more likely to be the optimal form of work design the stronger the degree
of supervisors’ confirmation bias is.
After discussing our modeling assumptions in Section 4, in Section 5 we provide
an alternative interpretation of our model in order to emphasize its applicability to
situations different from supervisor-worker relationships. We consider an employee
who has to evaluate where a productive asset might be put to use most profitably.
In contrast to the supervisor-worker setting, here job rotation does not sever the link
between the judging person and the situation to be judged. In consequence an unbiased
evaluation in this case probably is not to be obtained. Nevertheless, empirical evidence
documents that preferential treatment of information supporting existing beliefs as well
as overconfidence in one’s own judgment can be reduced by forcing people to evaluate
their own views, especially when that includes providing reasons against their current
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opinion.8 By placing them in various positions, by its very nature job rotation forces
employees to look at their field of activity from different perspectives, thereby most
likely broadening their view and making them less susceptible for one-sided treatment
of evidence. By showing that there is scope for the firm to benefit from the resulting
more reliable probability assessment even when confirmation bias is merely reduced
but not fully eliminated, we provide an explanation for the often found statement that
firms prefer “well-rounded employees”, which neither relies on the folk wisdom that
future managers should be equipped with a broad view of the entire firm, nor on the
need of multi-skilled workers in order to cope efficiently with technological change.9
Section 6 concludes by briefly summarizing our results, relating our findings to al-
ternative theories of job rotation, and drawing out potential implications for empirical
analysis.
Related Literature When it comes to naming potential costs of implementing job
rotation, there almost seems to be unanimity in the theoretical literature: Transferring
individuals to new jobs sacrifices job-specific human capital, and frequent job rotation
may in consequence entail a serious loss of productivity. With regard to benefits of this
particular kind of work design, on the other hand, over the years many explanations
have been put forth why it may be worthwhile to incur the afore-mentioned loss in
productivity. One of these explanations, formalized in Cosgel and Miceli (1999), posits
that workers dislike monotonous jobs. In consequence, regular job transfers increase
employees’ motivation and overall satisfaction by reducing their boredom and keeping
them interested in their jobs, which in turn allows firms to economize on wages. A
large part of the theoretical literature, however, focuses on the effects of job rotation
on firm learning by placing firms and their employees on very unequal informational
footing, with the firm being in a disadvantageous position. In a framework where the
firm can neither observe workers’ effort nor the productivity of the jobs the workers are
placed in (which subsequently is observed by the respective workers), both Ickes and
Samuelson (1987) and Arya and Mittendorf (2004) show that job transfers alleviate the
ratchet effect.10,11 Abstracting from any moral hazard problems, Ortega (2001) finds
8See Perkins et al. (1991), Fischhoff (1977), Hoch (1984, 1985), Koriat et al. (1980), Tetlock and
Kim (1987).
9See, for example, Schaeffer (1983) and Koike (1993) on the former argument, and Carmichael and
MacLeod (1993) on the latter.
10 The ratchet effect refers to workers’ shirking in order to disguise the productivity of their jobs and
to prevent an increase in performance standards.
11Arguing that under the tie-breaking rule used by Ickes and Samuleson (1987) there exists a second
equilibrium in which both agents shirk in the productive job and thus are overall better off, Ma
(1988) proposes an alternative compensation mechanism which uniquely implements the second-
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that a firm can benefit from implementing job rotation in order to optimally match
employees to jobs when there is uncertainty about both the profitability of different
jobs and the productivity of different persons at different jobs. Eguchi (2005) considers
a multi-task situation where, next to regular work activities, the worker can engage
in influence activities which become more profitable for the worker the longer he is in
his current position. It is shown that when the firm is harmed by this rent-seeking
behavior of its employees but cannot use incentive payment schemes effectively due
to difficulties in measuring workers’ performance, frequent job transfers are useful to
limit these influence activities. Finally, when the firm faces workers of different but
unobservable ability, Arya and Mittendorf (2006) argue that implementing optional job
rotation programs can help firms to better match pay to an employee’s true worth by
achieving a self-selection of the workers: When undertaking different tasks is costly for
workers but less costly for highly talented employees than for employees of low talent,
the former opt for the job transfer program in order to prove their versatility, whereas
the latter refrain from doing so because it is too costly.
We see this paper as complementing the existing theoretical literature on job rotation
in the following sense: We abstract from any hidden action problems (e.g. hidden gam-
ing by supervisors or shirking and influence abilities by workers) and we also remove any
informational disadvantage in the afore-mentioned sense, which organizational mem-
bers might profitably exploit (e.g. private information of workers with respect to their
own ability or workplace productivity). Moreover, the preferences of the organizational
members are completely standard with no inherent taste for diversity in their field of
activity. The only friction that we allow for is that organizational members are sub-
ject to confirmation bias. We show that – even in the absence of any informational
asymmetries – the firm may benefit from incuring the cost for implementing job ro-
tation in order to obtain a more accurate probability assessment upon which to base
its decisions. This observation adds a new item, which is based upon psychological
foundations, to the list of benefits associated with job rotation as work design.
2. Confirmation Bias
Empirical Evidence Confirmation bias, which refers to unwitting selectivity in both
the acquisition and evaluation of evidence, comes along in many guises. When seek-
ing or interpreting information, people display the tendency to give greater weight
to evidence that is supportive to beliefs they hold dear than to information that is
counter indicative of those established opinions. Empirical evidence for this prefer-
best identified by Ickes and Samuleson.
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ential treatment of evidence, also referred to as my-side bias, is provided by Baron
(1991, 1995), Perkins et al. (1983), Perkins et al. (1991), and Kuhn (1989).12 An-
other well-documented phenomenon is the primacy effect, which refers to the finding
that when information is gathered and integrated over time, evidence acquired in the
early stages is likely to carry more weight than evidence acquired later in the process.
In consequence, opinions are formed early in the process and subsequently acquired
information evaluated in a way that is partial to that opinion.13 The primacy effect,
which can be seen as possible manifestation of belief persistence,14 can also lead to a
biased evaluation and interpretation of evidence that is subsequently acquired: people
tend to question conflicting information more willingly than information supportive of
preexisting beliefs (Ross and Anderson, 1982), to see ambiguous evidence more likely
as supporting rather than disconfirming an established opinion (Lord et al., 1979; Dar-
ley and Gross, 1983), to explain away events that are inconsistent with a held position
(Henrion and Fischhoff, 1986), and even to interpret evidence that should count against
a hypothesis as counting in favor of it (Pitz et al., 1967).
The explanations that have been put forth to account for confirmation bias are
numerous, ranging from“the desire to believe” over pragmatism and error avoidance to
educational effects. At this point, however, we take the occurrence of this phenomenon
as given.
A Formal Model In order to formally draw out the implications of confirmation bias
for organizational design, we adopt the model of confirmation bias and belief formation
proposed by Rabin and Schrag (1999). There are two exhaustive and mutually exclusive
states of the world, θ ∈ {θL, θH}. A priori, an individual considers both states of
the world equiprobable, i.e., prob(θ = θL) = prob(θ = θH) = 0.5. In every period
t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} the person receives a signal, st ∈ {L,H}, that is correlated with the
true state of the world. Signals received over time are independently and identically
distributed with prob(st = L|θ = θL) = prob(st = H|θ = θH) = µ, where µ ∈ (0.5, 1).
When subject to confirmation bias, the person may misinterpret a received signal
that contradicts her current belief about the true state of the world, which is based on
the sequence of signals she perceived so far. More precisely, with probability q ∈ (0, 1)
12Even if there is no “my side”, i.e., even when people have no vested interest in the truth of a
particular hypothesis, they appear to seek confirmatory information regarding this hypothesis.
See, for example, Maynatt et al. (1977), Schwartz (1982), Zuckerman et al. (1995).
13See, for example, Nisbett and Ross (1980), Lingle and Ostrom (1981), Sherman et al. (1983).
14Belief persistence refers to the resistance of once established opinions to change even when faced
with compelling disconforming evidence. See, for example, Ross et al. (1975), Ross (1977), Ross
and Lepper (1980).
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the individual misreads a signal st that conflicts with her current belief as actually
supportive of her current opinion. Signals that are supportive of the currently held
belief, on the other hand, are always interpreted correctly. Let the individual’s (possibly
erroneous) perception of signal st be denoted by σt ∈ {h, l} for t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}. Given
her perception of the information she is receiving, the individual each period updates
her beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule.
As an illustration of this process of signal perception and belief formation, suppose
that the true state of the world is θL, but that the person currently believes that θH
is more likely, i.e., prob(θ = θH |σ1, . . . , σt−1) > 0.5. With probability 1− µ the person
receives a signal st = H, which she interprets as σt = h with certainty because it is
supportive of the currently held belief. With probability µ, on the other hand, the
person receives a disconfirming signal st = L. While this signal is interpreted correctly
as a disconfirming signal σt = l with probability 1− q, with probability q this signal is
misread as a supportive signal σt = h. At the end of the period, given her perception of
the information she has received, the individual updates her beliefs according to Bayes’
Rule. Figure III.1 summarizes this example.
µ 1− µ
σt = l σt = h
st = L st = H
q1− q
θ = θL
prob(θ = θH |σ1, . . . , σt−1) > 0.5
Figure III.1.: Perception of signals.
In order to summarize the distribution of a person’s perceived signal σt more concisely,
let µ∗(q) denote the probability that the person perceives a signal confirming her belief
that one state is more likely when in fact the other state is the true state of the
world. Analogously, let µ∗∗(q) denote the probability that the person perceives a signal
confirming her belief that one state is more likely when in fact it is the true state of
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the world. Formally,
µ∗(q) = prob (σt = h | prob(θ = θH |σt−1) > 0.5, θ = θL)
= prob (σt = l | prob(θ = θL |σt−1) > 0.5, θ = θH)
= (1− µ) + qµ
and
µ∗∗(q) = prob (σt = h | prob(θ = θH |σt−1) > 0.5, θ = θH)
= prob (σt = l | prob(θ = θL |σt−1) > 0.5, θ = θL)
= µ+ q(1− µ).
Note that µ∗∗(q) > µ∗(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1) and µ ∈ (0.5, 1).
3. Supervision and Job Allocation
Suppose a firm hires a worker who has two periods of active work life. Both the firm and
the worker are assumed to be risk neutral. The firm’s objective is to maximize overall
output over the two periods. The worker’s ability is either high or low, θ ∈ {θL, θH}
with θH > 0. In the first period, neither the firm nor the worker know the worker’s
ability. It is common knowledge, however, that both types of workers are equally likely
among the overall population, prob(θ = θH) = 0.5.
The firm comprises of two divisions. At the outset, the firm commits to one of
two possible types of job design, specialization or job rotation. If the firm opts for
specialization of the new worker, he is placed in one of these divisions and stays there
for at least the first period. If the firm implements job rotation, the worker spends the
first half of the first period in one division and the second half of the first period in the
other division. Thus, under job rotation the worker becomes a generalist in the sense
that he learns as much about one division as he learns about the other. Let r ∈ {1, 2}
denote the number of divisions that the worker is placed in during the first period, i.e.,
r = 1 corresponds to specialization and r = 2 to job rotation.15
We abstract from any moral hazard problems: presence of the worker is enough for
the firm to benefit from his input, i.e., no costly effort from the worker is needed. In
his first period with the firm, the worker has to be trained and has to learn work flows,
organizational design, and communication channels. Since each new worker faces these
basic tasks regardless of his talent or his work place, first-period output is assumed to be
15The assumption that the worker switches divisions only once under job rotation is shared with most
contributions to the extant theoretical literature on job rotation, e.g. Ickes and Samuelson (1987),
Cosgel and Miceli (1999), Ortega (2001), and Arya and Mittendorf (2004).
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independent of both his ability and the division he is placed in. Moreover, first-period
output is independent of the type of work design, job rotation or specialization. We
normalize first-period output to zero. The worker’s second-period output, on the other
hand, depends on both his ability and the type of job he is allocated to in the following
way: There are two types of jobs for the worker, j ∈ {A,B}, that the firm can install
in the second period in any division the worker visited during the first period. Let yj
denote the worker’s second-period output in job j. Output in job A is independent of
the worker’s ability, yA = y¯ > 0. In job B, on the other hand, output depends on the
worker’s ability as follows:
yB =
{
y¯ + k(r)θH for θ = θH
0 for θ = θL
,
where 0 < k(2) < k(1) = 1. More vividly spoken, job A might be thought of as a back-
office job where the worker has to do (possibly tedious but nevertheless straightforward)
paperwork. Job B, on the other hand, could be that of a product designer or marketing
manager, where skills like creativity or analytical thinking are important for success.
With the impact of high talent on output being decreasing in the degree of rotation,
1 − k(2) represents the benefits of specialization. Let θH < y¯, which implies that the
firm would place the worker in job A even under specialization if it had to rely on its
prior beliefs when allocating the worker to a job in period 2.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that once the worker starts working for the firm,
he stays with that firm for both periods. Thus, all the firm has to do is to compensate
the worker for his (discounted lifetime) reservation utility, which we assume to be zero.
Under these assumptions the only remaining decision the firm has to take is in what
type of job to place the worker at the beginning of period 2. With θH ∈ (0, y¯), in
order to allow for a meaningful analysis, the firm must be able to gather information
about the worker’s ability. Due to some exogenously given need for delegation, the firm
itself cannot observe this information about the worker’s ability, but has to rely on the
divisions’ supervisors for doing so. We assume that over his first period with the firm,
there are two evaluation periods of equal length in each of which the worker is evaluated
by the supervisor of the division in which he is currently placed.16 Under specialization
the worker is evaluated twice in one and the same division by this division’s supervisor,
whereas under job rotation he is evaluated exactly once in each division he is placed in
and thus by two different supervisors. In each evaluation period, the current supervisor
of the worker receives a signal st ∈ {L,H}, t = 1, 2, about the worker’s ability. This
signal represents, for example, the realization of some set of (at least to some extent)
16The (admittedly) ad hoc restriction to only two evaluation periods will be discussed at length in
the following section.
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subjective performance measures. Let µ = prob(st = H|θ = θH) = prob(st = L|θ =
θL) ∈ (0.5, 1).
Supervisors are risk neutral and we abstract from any incentives for supervisors to
lie about the signals they perceive, e.g. disutility from handing out bad evaluations.
Moreover, we assume that supervisors costlessly observe signals and that the informa-
tiveness of the signals is independent of any costly effort of the supervisors. Under these
assumptions, an arbitrarily small incentive to identify the true ability of the worker,
e.g. an arbitrarily small stake in the firm’s profits, will lead to the supervisors reporting
truthfully. The only friction we allow for is that supervisors are subject to confirma-
tion bias. As described in the previous section, with probability q ∈ (0, 1) a supervisor
misinterprets signals that contradict her current hypothesis about the worker’s ability
as supporting her hypothesis. Let the supervisor’s perception of signal st ∈ {L,H}
be denoted by σt ∈ {l, h}. We assume that all supervisors share the same (common
knowledge) prior about the worker being of high talent, prob(θ = θH) = 0.5, and that
there is no communication among supervisors. In consequence, confirmation bias will
only affect a supervisor’s judgment under specialization when she receives subsequent
signals about the same worker. Last, we assume that the firm is aware of the super-
visors being subject to confirmation bias. If this was not the case, there would be no
reason for the firm to implement anything else but specialization.
With regard to information transmission, at the end of each evaluation period, a
supervisor reports her perceived signal immediately to the firm, where this information
is stored. Thus, at the end of period 1, the firm is faced with a tuple of reports,
(σ1, σ2) ∈ {(h, h), (h, l), (l, h), (l, l)} ≡ M. We assume that both the content and the
date of reception of these reports are verifiable, and that in consequence, when choosing
the type of job design at the outset, the firm can commit to an allocation rule based on
the content and the order of the supervisors’ reports.17 For a given job design which
places the worker in r ∈ {1, 2} divisions during the first period, this allocation rule Br
prescribes for which pairs of reports the worker is allocated to job B. Formally, either
Br ⊆ M or Br = ∅, where the latter refers to the worker being allocated to job A no
matter what.18 Clearly, the optimal allocation rule depends on the updated posterior
belief of the worker being of high talent, which in turn depends on the type of job
design implemented. The timing of events is summarized in Figure III.2.
17This assumption allows us to sidestep the issue whether the firm itself is subject to confirmation
bias. We will comment on this assumption in the next section.
18More precisely, an allocation rule for a job design with r ∈ {1, 2} is a mapping Br :M→ {A,B},
which prescribes for each pair of possible reports (σ1, σ2) ∈ M in which job the worker is placed
in period 2. The above “operationalization” of such an allocation rule, however, will turn out to
be quite convenient.
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In a first-best situation, i.e., when the worker’s ability is known to the firm, the firm
would place the worker in job A when θ = θL and in job B when θ = θH , where in the
latter case the worker stays in one and the same division over the first period in order
to capitalize on the benefits of specialization. When the worker’s talent is unknown to
the firm, it has to rely on the reports of the supervisors when allocating the worker to
a job in period 2.
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
Firm commits to Supervisor Supervisor Allocation of the worker
job design r ∈ {1, 2} receives s1 receives s2 to job j ∈ {A,B},
and allocation rule Br . and reports σ1. and reports σ2. realization of yj .
Figure III.2.: Timing of events.
Allocation under Specialization First, suppose the firm decides to reap the ben-
efits of specialization and does not implement job rotation. Under specialization, after
two evaluation periods the worker will be allocated to job B if and only if, given the
updated posterior belief that the worker is highly talented, the expected output in job
B exceeds the ability-independent output in job A, or equivalently, if and only if the
firm’s posterior belief about the worker being of high talent exceeds
p¯ :=
y¯
y¯ + θH
.
Note that p¯ ∈ (0.5, 1) due to our assumptions that θH ∈ (0, y¯). With supervisors
being subject to confirmation bias, if a supervisor receives in the second evaluation
period a signal which contradicts her current opinion about the worker’s ability, with
probability q ∈ (0, 1) she misinterprets that signal as supporting her current opinion.
When forming its updated posterior belief based on the supervisor’s report at the
end of the first period, the firm has to take into account the supervisor’s possible
misperception of the signals she received. In consequence, the order in which signals
are received, or more precisely perceived, is important. Suppose, for example, the
supervisor reports that she has observed two h signals. The firm now has to take into
account that the supervisor, after having received an H signal in the first evaluation
period, at the beginning of the second evaluation period considered the agent more
likely to be of high ability than of low ability. Therefore, since with probability q she
misinterprets an L signal as supporting her opinion, the probability that the supervisor
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perceived a second h signal is higher than the probability that she actually received a
second H signal.19 Let p(σ1, σ2; q) := Prob(θ = θH |σ1, σ2; q) denote the firm’s posterior
believe about the worker being of high ability after the supervisor reports (σ1, σ2) ∈M
under specialization. Then, according to Bayes’ rule,
p(h, h; q) =
µµ∗∗(q)
µµ∗∗(q) + (1− µ)µ∗(q) .
Analogously we obtain p(h, l; q) = p(l, h; q) = 0.5, and p(l, l; q) = (1 − µ)µ∗(q)/[(1 −
µ)µ∗(q) + µµ∗∗(q)]. It is readily verified that µ > 0.5 implies p(l, l; q) < 0.5 < p(h, h; q)
for all q ∈ (0, 1). From above we know that the firm will allocate the worker to job B
only if the ex post belief about the worker being of high ability exceeds p¯ > 0.5. Thus,
under specialization, the worker will be placed in job B only if the supervisor reports
two h signals and p(h, h; q) ≥ p¯.
Lemma III.1: If p(h, h; q) ≥ p¯, then B1 = {(h, h)}. Otherwise, B1 = ∅.
Allocation under Job Rotation Under our assumptions on intra-organizational
information transmission, job rotation helps the firm to get rid of the supervisors’
confirmation bias. Each evaluation period the worker is evaluated by a different su-
pervisor, and each of these supervisors shares the common prior about the worker’s
ability since she encounters the worker for the first time. Thus, job rotation creates
multiple unbiased “first impressions”, which in turn allows the firm to derive a more
accurate probability assessment about the worker’s talent. Clearly, in this situation the
order in which signals are observed is of no importance for the updated posterior belief.
Formally, let p(nh, nl) = Prob(θ = θH |nh, nl) denote the firm’s updated posterior belief
about the agent being highly talented, where nh and nl are the overall number of h
signals and l signals, respectively, reported by the supervisors over the two evaluation
periods. According to Bayes’ rule we have
p(2, 0) =
µ2
µ2 + (1− µ)2 .
Analogously, we obtain p(0, 2) = (1−µ)2/[µ2+(1−µ)2] and p(1, 1) = 0.5. Since µ > 1/2,
we have p(0, 2) < 0.5 < p(2, 0). Removing the distortion due to confirmation bias,
however, comes at the cost of sacrificing the benefits of specialization since k(2) < 1.
Under job rotation, the worker will be placed in job B only if the posterior belief about
19While the probability of receiving a second H signal when θ = θH is µ, the probability that the
supervisor perceives a second h signal is µ∗∗(q) > µ. Analogously, while the probability of receiving
a second H signal when θ = θL is 1− µ, the probability that the supervisor perceives a second h
signal is µ∗(q) > 1− µ.
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the worker being of high talent exceeds
p¯ :=
y¯
y¯ + k(2)θH
.
Since k(2) ∈ (0, 1), we have 0.5 < p¯ < p¯ < 1. Thus, under job rotation, the worker will
be allocated to job B if and only if two h signals have been reported and p(2, 0) ≥ p¯.
Lemma III.2: If p(2, 0) ≥ p¯, then B2 = {(h, h)}. Otherwise, B2 = ∅.
Comparison of Job Designs The question of interest is whether job allocation
under job rotation can outperform job allocation under specialization in terms of ex-
ante expected output. So far we know that the allocation rule under specialization
depends on whether or not p(h, h; q) exceeds p¯, whereas under job rotation it depends on
whether or not p(2, 0) exceeds p¯. Since µ > 0.5 and q > 0, we have p(h, h; q) < p(2, 0),
which reflects that the firm is more confident that the worker is highly talented after
two h signals being reported under job rotation than under specialization due to a more
accurate probability assessment. With k(2) < k(1) = 1, on the other hand, we have
p¯ < p¯, which accounts for the loss of productivity under job rotation. Thus, we have
to distinguish the following cases:
(a) p¯ ≤ p(h, h; q) and p¯ ≤ p(2, 0);
(b) p¯ ≤ p(h, h; q) and p(2, 0) < p¯;
(c) p(h, h; q) < p¯ and p¯ ≤ p(2, 0);
(d) p(h, h; q) < p¯ and p(2, 0) < p¯.
Obviously, case (d) is of little interest since under both forms of job design the worker
will always be allocated to job A, B1 = B2 = ∅, which yields output y¯ with certainty.
In case (a), the allocation rule is identical under both types of job design, since the
worker is allocated to job B whenever two h signals are reported, and to job A oth-
erwise, B1 = B2 = {(h, h)}; ex-ante expected output, however, may differ under both
types of job design due to a different probability assessment on the one hand, and
the benefit of specialization on the other hand. Cases (b) and (c) obviously give rise
to different allocation rules: In case (b), while the worker is always placed in job A
under job rotation, B2 = ∅, he is allocated to job B if two h signals are reported under
specialization, B1 = {(h, h)}. In case (c), allocation rules are vice versa.
In order to compare job designs in cases (a)-(c), we first characterize these cases
in terms of the underlying model parameters µ and k(2) for given values y¯, θH and
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q ∈ (0, 1).20 It is readily verified that p(2, 0) ≥ p¯ if and only if k(2) ≥ k¯, where
k¯ :=
(1− µ)2
µ2
y¯
θH
.
Since k(2) < 1, for k(2) ≥ k¯ to be possible we must have k¯ < 1. Regarding k¯ as a
function of µ, we find that k¯ < 1 if and only if µ > µ¯, where
µ¯ :=
√
y¯√
y¯ +
√
θH
.
By the assumption that θH ∈ (0, y¯) we have µ¯ ∈ (0.5, 1). Next, note that p(h, h; q) < p¯
if and only if µ < µ¯(q), where
µ¯(q) :=
2y¯ − q(y¯ − θH)−
√
q2(y¯ − θH)2 + 4y¯θH
2(1− q)(y¯ − θH) .
In the appendix we show that limq→0 µ¯(q) = µ¯ and that, for all q ∈ (0, 1), dµ¯(q)/dq > 0
and µ¯(q) < 1, which implies that µ¯(q) ∈ (µ¯, 1) for q ∈ (0, 1). The fact that µ¯(q)
is increasing in q reflects that if the distortion through confirmation bias becomes
stronger, for the firm to be willing to allocate the worker to the ability-dependent job
B under specialization the signal itself must become more reliable. Taken together,
these observations allow us to establish the following lemma.
Lemma III.3: Given y¯, θH , and q ∈ (0, 1), we have
(a) p¯ ≤ p(h, h; q), p¯ ≤ p(2, 0) iff µ ∈ [µ¯(q), 1) and k(2) ≥ k¯;
(b) p¯ ≤ p(h, h; q) < p(2, 0) < p¯ iff µ ∈ [µ¯(q), 1) and k(2) < k¯;
(c) p(h, h; q) < p¯ < p¯ ≤ p(2, 0) iff µ ∈ (µ¯, µ¯(q)) and k(2) ≥ k¯.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that µ has to be sufficiently large (µ > µ¯) to allow for the possibility of job
rotation being the optimal choice of work design. Intuitively, if the correlation of the
(unbiased) signal with the true state of the world is too low per se, it does not pay off
for the firm to incur the cost of job rotation in order to prevent this bad signal from
becoming somewhat more distorted.
To compare job rotation and specialization in terms of ex-ante expected output, we
introduce one further piece of notation. Let P (r) denote the probability of two h signals
being reported when the number of divisions the worker is placed in equals r. Then
P (1) = (1/2)(µµ∗∗(q) + (1− µ)µ∗(q)) and P (2) = (1/2)(µ2 + (1− µ)2). Moreover, let
E[y|r] denote the ex-ante expected output under a job design with r ∈ {1, 2}.
20For details, see the proof of Lemma III.3 in the Appendix.
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Case (a): Under both specialization and job rotation the same allocation rule is
implemented, B1 = B2 = {(h, h)}. Thus, E[y|2] > E[y|1] if and only if
P (2)p(2, 0)(y¯ + k(2)θH) + (1− P (2))y¯ > P (1)p(h, h; q)(y¯ + θH) + (1− P (1))y¯,
or equivalently, if and only if k(2) > k¯(q), where
k¯(q) := 1− 1− µ
µ
q
[
y¯
θH
− 1
]
.
First, note that k¯(q) < 1 for all q ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, it is readily verified that k¯(q) ≥ k¯
if and only if µ ≥ µ¯(q). Thus, in case (a), we have 0 < k¯ ≤ k¯(q) < 1.
Case (b): While the allocation rule under job rotation is B2 = ∅, under specializa-
tion we have B1 = {(h, h)}. Thus, E[y|2] ≤ E[y|1] if and only if
y¯ ≤ P (1)p(h, h; q)(y¯ + θH) + (1− P (1))y¯,
or equivalently, if and only if µ ≥ µ¯(q). Since this last inequality is satisfied in case
(b), specialization unconditionally outperforms job rotation. This result follows more
immediately from the fact that under specialization the firm prefers to implement
allocation rule B1 = {(h, h)} instead of B1 = ∅.
Case (c): Under specialization the allocation rule is B1 = ∅, whereas under job
rotation we have B2 = {(h, h)}. Thus, E[y|2] > E[y|1] if and only if
P (2)p(2, 0)(y¯ + k(2)θH) + (1− P (2))y¯ > y¯,
or equivalently, if and only if k(2) > k¯. Since this last inequality is satisfied in case (c),
job rotation unconditionally outperforms specialization. This result follows more im-
mediately from the fact that under job rotation the firm prefers to implement allocation
rule B2 = {(h, h)} instead of B2 = ∅.
We summarize the above observations in the following proposition.
Proposition III.1: Given y¯, θH , q ∈ (0, 1), job rotation strictly outperforms spe-
cialization, E[y|2] > E[y|1], if and only if (i) µ ∈ [µ¯(q), 1) and k(2) > k¯(q), or (ii)
µ ∈ (µ¯, µ¯(q)) and k(2) > k¯.
Thus, given that the benefits of specialization are sufficiently small, there are two
reasons for job rotation being superior compared to specialization. First, in case (c),
there are different allocation rules implemented under the different types of job design.
Under specialization, confirmation bias is so strong that the worker will always be
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placed in the ability-independent job A because the firm is (justifiedly) pessimistic –
even if two h signals are reported – about the worker’s talent.21 Under job rotation, in
contrast, with an unbiased probability assessment, the firm dares to place the worker
in job B when two h signals are reported, which ex ante generates higher expected
profits. Secondly, in case (a), both types of job design nominally implement the same
allocation rule, i.e., the worker is allocated to job B if two h signals are reported and to
job A otherwise. Under job rotation, however, due to unbiased reports, the probability
of actually facing a highly-talented worker is higher than under specialization, which,
again, leads to ex ante higher expected profits.
Having characterized the circumstances where job rotation outperforms specializa-
tion and vice versa, allows us to establish the following comparative static result.
Proposition III.2: Given y¯, θH , µ, and q such that µ ∈ [µ¯(q), 1) and k(2) ∈ [k¯, k¯(q)].
An increase in the degree of confirmation bias from q to q′ > q makes it more likely
that job rotation strictly outperforms specialization.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. In the original situation, a subcase of
case (a) in Lemma III.3, under both types of job design the worker is allocated to job
B if two h signals are reported and to job A otherwise. According to Proposition III.1,
however, specialization outperforms job rotation in terms of ex ante expected output
because the benefits of specialization are large. Under specialization, an increase in
the degree of confirmation bias, q, reduces the posterior belief about the worker being
highly talented after two h signals have been reported. The posterior belief under job
rotation, in contrast, is unaffected by an increase in q. There are two reasons why
this might lead to job rotation becoming the optimal form of job design. First, if
the posterior belief under specialization is lowered sufficiently, the firm will adopt a
different allocation rule under specialization and place the worker in job A no matter
what, in which case job rotation unconditionally becomes superior. Formally, the
increase in q raises µ¯(q). Letting q < q′, if µ¯(q) ≤ µ < µ¯(q′), then the shift from q
to q′ leads to a transition from case (a) to case (c) in Lemma III.3. Secondly, even if
the firm sticks to the original allocation rule, since the reliability of the supervisor’s
report decreases under specialization, the threshold which the cost of implementing job
rotation must not exceed in order for job rotation to be optimal, becomes less stringent,
k¯(q′) < k¯(q). If k¯(q′) < k(2) ≤ k¯(q), job rotation becomes the optimal form of job
design. Thus, when confirmation bias becomes a more severe problem, the stronger
distortion of the supervisor’s reports under specialization is more likely to outweigh the
loss in productivity that comes along with job rotation.
21Formally, given y¯, θH , and µ, q is sufficiently large such that µ < µ¯(q), and in turn, p(h, h; q) < p¯.
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Before we move on to a discussion of our modeling assumptions, we want to relate
the above analysis to a statement found in Ickes and Samuelson (1987). There we read
that “ [w]hile uncertainty about employee productivity may be important, job transfers
can optimally arise only if there is also uncertainty about the productivity of the job.
Allowing uncertainty about employee characteristics [...] cannot serve as an alternative
explanation for job transfers.” As we have seen, however, when we allow for another
type of friction in form of confirmation bias of supervisors, job rotation may be the
optimal form of work design even if there is no uncertainty regarding job characteristics
but only regarding employee characteristics.
4. Discussion
Multiple periods While we stripped our model bare of hidden action and hidden
information problems on purpose, the restriction to two evaluation periods is not that
voluntarily but imposed by Rabin and Schrag (1999)’s model of confirmation bias. To
illustrate, suppose the firm comprises of three divisions, implements three evaluation
periods, and rotates the worker three times when opting for job rotation. The allocation
rule under specialization depends on how the firm’s posterior belief compares to p¯,
whereas the allocation rule under job rotation depends on how the firm’s posterior
belief compares to p¯ = y¯/(y¯ − k(3)θH), where k(3) < 1 represents the cost of rotating
the worker three times compared to specialization. Under both types of work design,
with 0.5 < p¯ < p¯, a necessary condition for the worker to be placed in the ability-
dependent job B is that the firm’s posterior belief about the worker being of high
talent exceeds 0.5. Application of Bayes’ rule and straightforward calculations reveal
that the firm’s posterior belief exceeds 0.5 if and only if at least two H signals have
been reported. More precisely, p(3, 0) > p(h, h, h; q) > p(2, 1) = p(h, l, h; q) =
p(l, h, h; q) = µ > p(h, h, l; q) > 0.5. Thus, in order to compare specialization and
job rotation in terms of expected output, we have to distinguish ten different cases, as
illustrated in Table 1.
While dealing with that many cases clearly would be tedious enough, we run into further
problems when characterizing these cases in terms of the underlying model parameter
µ. For example, in order to determine the values of µ for which p(h, h, h; q) < p¯, we
have to figure out when
µ(µ+ q(1− µ))2
µ(µ+ q(1− µ))2 + (1− µ)((1− µ) + qµ)2 <
y¯
y¯ − θH ,
which basically boils down to finding the zeros of a polynomial of third order. With both
the number of cases to consider and the degree of the polynomials characterizing the
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B1 B2
p(h, h, h; q) < p¯, p(3, 0) < p¯ ∅ ∅
µ < p¯ ≤ p(h, h, h; q), p(3, 0) < p¯ {(h, h, h)} ∅
p(h, h, l; q) < p¯ ≤ µ, p(3, 0) < p¯ {(h, l, h), (l, h, h), (h, h, h)} ∅
0.5 < p¯ ≤ p(h, h, l; q), p(3, 0) < p¯ {(h, h, l), (h, l, h), (l, h, h), (h, h, h)} ∅
p(h, h, h; q) < p¯, µ < p¯ ≤ p(3, 0) ∅ {(h, h, h)}
µ < p¯ ≤ p(h, h, h; q), µ < p¯ ≤ p(3, 0) {(h, h, h)} {(h, h, h)}
p(h, h, l; q) < p¯ ≤ µ, µ < p¯ ≤ p(3, 0) {(h, l, h), (l, h, h), (h, h, h)} {(h, h, h)}
0.5 < p¯ ≤ p(h, h, l; q), µ < p¯ ≤ p(3, 0) {(h, h, l), (h, l, h), (l, h, h), (h, h, h)} {(h, h, h)}
p(h, h, l; q) < p¯ ≤ µ, 0.5 < p¯ ≤ µ {(h, l, h), (l, h, h), (h, h, h)} {(h, h, l), (h, l, h), (l, h, h), (h, h, h)}
0.5 < p¯ ≤ p(h, h, l; q), 0.5 < p¯ ≤ µ {(h, h, l), (h, l, h), (l, h, h), (h, h, h)} {(h, h, l), (h, l, h), (l, h, h), (h, h, h)}
Table III.1.: Allocation rules for three evaluation periods.
threshold levels for µ increasing in the number of evaluations, the necessary calculations
soon become infeasible. Thus, in order to inquire into interesting questions of optimal
rotation intervals or the optimal number of evaluation periods a more tractable model
of confirmation bias is needed.
Commitment to an allocation rule The assumption that the firm can commit to
an allocation rule at the outset can be dropped when the firm itself is not subject to
confirmation bias when making the allocation decision based on the reports it received.
With the firm’s perception being unbiased, its updated posterior from report (σ1, σ2)
is the same irrespective of whether it is calculated ex ante, before actually receiving
this report, or ex post, i.e., after having received (and thus after having evaluated) this
report. Therefore, if commitment to an allocation rule is not possible, after receiving
the reports there is no incentive for the firm to deviate from the allocation rule which
is optimal if commitment is possible before receiving the reports.22
The assumption that the head of the firm is not subject to confirmation bias does
not seem that far-fetched. As we already mentioned in Section 2, for confirmation bias
to arise, pieces of evidence have to be received and evaluated subsequently, and there
also often needs to be some degree of vagueness that leaves room for misinterpretation.
Both can be imagined not to be the case for the head of the organization: First, when
deciding in which job to place a worker, the head of the firm refers to the reports
and recommendations of the supervisors that evaluated this worker. With forced dis-
22The firm’s updated posterior beliefs ex ante and ex post, however, would not coincide if the firm
also succumbs to confirmation bias when evaluating the reports it received. In this case, the ability
to commit to an allocation rule clearly makes a difference.
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tribution rankings or specified evaluation schemes often being used in practice, there
probably is less room for arbitrariness in interpretation of these reports than in the
original evaluation of the worker by his supervisor(s). Secondly, with bosses and CEOs
almost always having got their hands full, the head of the firm will not spend days over
days in advance pondering where to place the worker, but more likely he will focus
on the decision shortly before it is due with most (all) relevant information available.
Though only one evaluation report or memo can be read at a time, for the head of the
firm this removes the sequential character of information acquisition at least to some
degree. Third, while probably only one supervisor at a time is responsible for evaluation
of the worker, when making the allocation decision, the head of the organization most
likely comprises of several actors, like the personnel manager, the managers in whose
division the worker might be placed in, and so on. One might imagine that preferential
treatment of evidence might be less likely to occur when discussing pros and cons of
a decision with other equally skilled people. Last, the assumption of a rational head
of the organization also is in line with the largest part of the literature on behavioral
industrial organization, where rational firms/principals interact with behaviorally bi-
ased consumers/agents: while the former know about the biases of the latter, the latter
often are assumed to be naive and do not know about their own bias.23
5. An Alternative Interpretation
In this section we want to emphasize applicability of the above analysis to situations
different from supervisor-worker relationships. In order to do so, we provide an alter-
native interpretation of our model. Apart from very few exceptions, we basically just
relabel variables. Therefore, as long as there is no danger of confusion, we will make
use of notation and definitions introduced before without explicitly saying so.
Suppose a risk neutral firm, which comprises of several divisions, e.g. production
and marketing, faces two opportunities where to deploy an asset in the second period,
project A or project B. For example, the asset might be a machine used in production,
and the two projects represent the production of different products. While the return
of project A is assumed to be riskless, RA = R¯ > 0, the return of project B depends
on the true state of the world, θ ∈ {θL, θH}, as follows:
RB =
{
R¯ +∆ for θ = θH
0 for θ = θL
,
23 See, for example, Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Gilpatric (2008),
and Gabaix and Laibson (2006). For a survey on bounded rationality in industrial organization,
see Ellison (2006).
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where ∆ ∈ (0, R¯). Thus, in the above example, we can think of project A as the
production of a product which is already established in the market and for which
the firm is familiar with the production process. Project B, on the other hand, can
be thought of as the production of a newly developed product, the success of which
depends on factors like market acceptance or whether there will be complications in
the production process. In this sense, θH can be interpreted as a situation, i.e., a
constellation of market characteristics and technological circumstances, in which the
launch of the new product will be successful, whereas it will be a failure if the state is
θL. A priori, the two states are equally likely. Thus, without any further information,
the firm allocates the asset to project A.
In order to obtain further information about the true state of the world, the firm
can hire a risk neutral worker in period 1, who lives and stays with the firm for two
periods. The worker’s (discounted lifetime) reservation utility equals zero. Once again,
we abstract from hidden information or hidden action problems: there is no uncertainty
about the worker’s talent, and the worker’s output is (for expositional purposes only)
equal to zero in both periods. The only meaningful task the firm can assign to the
worker is to gather information about the true state of the world in order to improve
the decision where to place the productive asset.
Over the first period, the worker costlessly receives two subsequent signals about
the true state of the world, st ∈ {L,H} with t = 1, 2. These signals are identically
and independently distributed according to µ ∈ (0.5, 1). Due to confirmation bias,
however, the signal the worker receives may differ from the signal he actually perceives:
once he comes to believe that one state of the world is more likely than the other,
with probability q ∈ (0, 1) the agent misinterprets a signal which contradicts this
hypothesis as actually supporting this hypothesis. Let the worker’s perception of signal
st ∈ {L,H} be denoted by σt ∈ {l, h}. We assume that the firm itself does not receive
the signals, and therefore has to rely on the reports of the worker. The firm, however,
is aware of the worker’s confirmation bias. With the gathering of information being
costless and the worker being risk neutral, an arbitrarily small incentive to identify the
true state of the world, e.g. an arbitrarily small stake in the return of the second-period
project, will lead to the worker reporting truthfully what signals he has perceived. Both
the content and the order of these reports, which we can identify with the worker’s
perceived signals (σ1, σ2) ∈M, are verifiable.
At the outset, the firm can commit to a particular type of job design, specialization
or job rotation. Letting r ∈ {1, 2} denote the number of divisions the worker is placed
in during the first period, r = 1 corresponds to specialization and r = 2 to job rotation.
If the firm opts for implementing job rotation and makes the worker switch divisions
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during his first period with the firm, it incurs a cost c > 0.24 Moreover, the firm can
commit to an allocation rule, which prescribes for which reports of the worker the asset
is placed in project B. Thus, for a job design with r ∈ {1, 2}, this allocation rule is
either Br = ∅ or Br ⊆M.
We do not believe it to be too far-fetched to assume that job rotation will reduce
confirmation bias in this scenario as well. Suppose the firm opts for specialization and
worker is placed in the production division throughout his first period with the firm.
Though he might be able to get all the relevant information from the marketing division,
it is easy to imagine that he will see all bits of information he gathers through the eyes of
a production engineer, thus attaching too much weight to technological aspects and too
little weight to market related data.25 If the firm implements job rotation, on the other
hand, during the first period the worker switches from production into marketing, and
thus basically is forced to open his eyes more widely with respect to the market-related
data as well. Thus, while the agent already holds some belief about the true state of the
world when being placed in the marketing division, the new perspective from which he
now has to assess the problem might make him more willing to let go of this hypothesis.
However, since one and the same worker evaluates one and the same problem, it is likely
that confirmation bias will merely be reduced by job rotation but not fully eliminated.
Thus, letting qr denote the probability that the agent misinterprets a contradicting
signal under a job design which places the worker in r ∈ {1, 2} divisions during the
first period, we assume 0 < q2 < q1 < 1.
Defining
c¯ :=
µ(1− µ)(q1 − q2)(R¯−∆)
2
and
c¯ =:
µ(µ+ q2(1− µ))∆− (1− µ)((1− µ) + q2µ)R¯
2
,
and following the lines of the analysis in Section 3, we obtain the following result.
24Basically c > 0 may reflect any cost possibly associated with job rotation. Campion et al. (1994), for
example, identify productivity losses and disruption of work flows for both the department gaining
a rotating employee and the department losing the employee as potential costs of job rotation,
resulting from training requirements in the first case and from having a vacancy in the second
case. Also Burke and Moore (2000) draw attention to reverberating negative effects of job rotation
on nonrotaters’ perception of organizational justice.
25Evidence for experts being more confident than justified when making judgments in their own areas
of expertise is provided by Kidd (1970), Loftus and Wagenaar (1988), Oskamp (1965) regarding
engineers, attorneys, and psychologists, respectively.
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Proposition III.3: Given R¯, ∆, q1, q2, job rotation strictly outperforms specializa-
tion, E[R|2] > E[R|1] if and only if (i) µ ∈ [µ¯(q1), 1) and c < c¯, or (ii) µ ∈ (µ¯(q2), µ¯(q1))
and c < c¯.
Proof: See Appendix.
The above result is familiar by now: if the benefit of specialization is sufficiently
small, job rotation may be superior to specialization for two reasons. First, in case
(ii), with confirmation bias being strong under specialization, the firm implements a
very conservative allocation rule under specialization which places the asset always in
project A, whereas under job rotation the asset is placed in project B if two h signals are
reported and in project A otherwise. This more “daring”allocation rule, which is based
on a more reliable probability assessment, yields higher expected profits. In case (i),
on the other hand, even though allocation rules are identical under both types of work
design, under job rotation, due to unbiased reports, the probability of the worker being
of high talent after two h signals have been reported is higher than under specialization,
which yields higher expected profits. Moreover, if the degree of confirmation bias under
specialization increases or job rotation becomes more efficient in reducing the employees
degree of confirmation bias, i.e., if q1 increases or q2 decreases, it becomes more likely
that job rotation is the optimal form of work design. This follows from the fact that
the threshold which the cost of implementing job rotation must not exceed in order for
job rotation to be optimal becomes less stringent, dc¯/q2 = −dc¯/q1 < 0 and dc¯/dq2 < 0.
As we briefly mentioned in the introduction, the literature on management develop-
ment and employee learning recommends job rotation in order to endow the managers-
to-be with a deeper understanding of more aspects of business, which they will need
as they move up to broader jobs, or to help employees to cope better with uncertainty
and technological change. The above analysis suggests, however, that a firm may have
an incentive to provide its employees with a broader view of the organization even
in the absence of such considerations: if knowledge of different organizational aspects
makes employees less susceptible to confirmation bias, and if the firm has to base some
of its decisions on its employees’ judgments, job rotation may help to provide a more
profound informational footing for the firm’s decisions.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we examined a setting in which an organization is faced with its members
being subject to confirmation bias, i.e., the tendency to treat subsequent information
partially after an initial position has been taken. Given that job rotation is able (i)
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to sever the link between the judge and the situation to be judged, or (ii) to force
the judge to be more open-minded for contradicting evidence, we have shown that
implementing this particular form of job design may be profitable for the organization,
even if it comes along with certain costs. The reason is that job rotation leads to
a more reliable informational footing for the organization’s decision making. We do
not, however, obtain a call for a universal mandate for job rotation, but we find that
optimality of job rotation is circumstance specific. In particular, the higher the degree
of confirmation bias and the lower the cost associated with the implementation of job
rotation, the more likely it is that job rotation is superior to specialization.
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, there are three major approaches to explain
why work place organization may take the particular form of job rotation: employee
motivation, employee learning, and employer learning. The employee motivation the-
ory posits that job rotation helps to make work more interesting, thereby in particular
providing motivation for so-called “plateaued” employees, i.e., employees with limited
promotion prospects. The employee learning theory, on the other hand, contents that
job rotation is an effective way to develop employees’ abilities and to improve organiza-
tional knowledge in order to help prepare junior employees to become top managers or
to better cope with uncertainty. Last, according to the employer learning theory, job
rotation improves job assignments by providing the employer with information about
the employee’s abilities, both general and job-specific, and also job-specific factors un-
related to the employee. Though we do not see an immediate connection to the first of
these approaches, the two tales told in this paper suggest that the presence of confir-
mation bias in organizations might interact with the two latter explanations, employee
and employer learning. As for employer learning, our model about employees’ eval-
uation by supervisors indicates that job rotation may become an even more valuable
learning device for the firm when confirmation bias is an issue because it may prevent
distortion of the signal that the employer receives. The alternative interpretation of
our model, on the other hand, in a sense links employer and employee learning theory:
though the ultimate goal of the employer is to learn where best to deploy the asset,
when confirmation bias is present this may be achieved most profitably by making the
employee learn to know the different building blocks of the organization in order to
broaden his view and make him less susceptible for partial treatment of information.
In particular this last observation might be relevant for empirical analysis. In a rig-
orous test of the afore-mentioned explanations for the practice of job rotation, Eriksson
and Ortega (2006) find“only very limited support for the employee motivation hypothe-
sis, [but that] statistical evidence is more amenable to the employee learning hypothesis
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and employer learning hypothesis.”26 This is correct in the sense that a number of the
hypothesized relationships between job rotation and the set of relevant variables were
found to be in the predicted direction at a statistically significant level, e.g. a positive
correlation between the use of job rotation and firm size or the number of hierarchical
levels, which is consistent with both employee and employer learning theory. Regard-
ing hypotheses for which the two learning theories predict different directions, however,
there is no clear-cut result which theory better explains the data. For example, the
finding that firms that spend more to train their employees are more likely to use job
rotation schemes is favorable to the employee learning hypothesis but contradicts the
employer learning hypothesis. Tenure in the industry not having a statistically signif-
icant effect on rotation, on the other hand, is consistent with the employer learning
theory but contradicts the employee learning theory. In the light of our second story, we
believe that these two theories sometimes cannot be treated separately but have to be
seen as interwoven with each other. Therefore, in order to obtain even sharper predic-
tions, it might be insightful to differentiate cases where the ultimate goal of employee
learning is firm learning from cases of pure employee learning.
Last, we want to point out a more directly testable implication of this paper. We have
seen that the stronger the degree of confirmation bias, the more likely is job rotation the
optimal form of workplace design. In consequence, we should expect to find rotation
arrangements more often in firms where there is more scope for confirmation bias to
arise. While the degree of confirmation bias might be quite difficult to measure per
se, there might be several ways to operationalize its measurement. For example, based
on the observation that for confirmation bias to arise there needs to be some room
for misinterpretation of evidence, the extent to which evaluation of employees is based
upon subjective performance measures, which (by their very nature) are more vague
and thus more susceptible to misinterpretation than objective performance measures,
might serve as an indicator for the presence and strength of confirmation bias.
26 Arguing that a satisfactory test of the three major theories of job rotation should combine a rep-
resentative sample of establishments with data on employee characteristics, Eriksson and Ortega
(2006) merge a representative survey of Danish firms with the employer-employee linked panel con-
structed by Statistics Denmark, which provides data on each employee at the sampled firms. The
resulting database is richer than most surveys of establishments and provides more representative
evidence than do single-firm case studies.
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IV. Price Discrimination in Input
Markets: Downstream Entry
and Welfare
The extant theory on price discrimination in input markets takes
the structure of the intermediate industry as exogenously given.
This paper endogenizes the structure of the intermediate industry
by allowing for costly entry and examines the effects of banning
third-degree price discrimination on market structure and welfare.
We identify situations where banning price discrimination leads
to either higher or lower prices for all downstream firms. These
findings are driven by the fact that upstream profits are discon-
tinuous due to entry being costly. Moreover, permitting price dis-
crimination fosters entry which in many cases improves welfare.
Nevertheless, entry can also reduce welfare because it may lead to
a severe inefficiency in production.
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1. Introduction
“There are several ways in which the [upstream] manufacturer may influence the number of
[downstream] retailers. [...] [T]he manufacturer may indirectly control the number of dealers
through his pricing policy [...] .”
— Michael L. Katz (1989)
An ubiquitous assumption in the extant theory on third-degree price discrimination
in input markets is that the structure of the intermediate industry is rigid. Abstract-
ing from entry into the intermediate industry ignores the fact that pricing decisions of
the upstream supplier are a major determinant of the resulting industry structure and
market outcome. These pricing decisions in turn are determined by the pricing instru-
ments available to the upstream supplier, in particular whether price discrimination is
feasible or not. In this paper, we endogenize the structure of the intermediate industry
and examine the effects of banning price discrimination in input markets on industry
structure and welfare.
Our modeling assumptions are shared by a large part of the extant literature: a
monopolistic upstream firm supplies an input that is used by firms in an intermediate
industry to produce a final product. The upstream supplier makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to each of the downstream firms, specifying a per-unit wholesale price at which
that firm can procure any desired quantity of the input. The new feature in our model
is that one of the downstream firms has yet to decide whether to incur a strictly positive
entry cost in order to become active in the intermediate industry.
If downstream firms operate in separate markets and if the entry cost imposes a
binding restriction on the choice of wholesale prices under either regime, then, de-
pending on the relative efficiency of the potential entrant, price discrimination can
lead to lower or higher wholesale prices for all downstream firms compared to uniform
pricing. This immediately translates into price discrimination being strictly welfare
enhancing or welfare reducing, respectively. Irrespective of whether downstream firms
operate in separate markets or compete in the same market, price discrimination fos-
ters entry. With separate downstream markets, opening of a new market under price
discrimination but not under uniform pricing is a sufficient condition for a ban on
price discrimination to be welfare harming. If downstream firms compete a` la Cournot,
then entry alleviates the distortion arising from double marginalization. Under dis-
criminatory wholesale pricing, however, this beneficial effect of entry can be offset by
entry being costly and an allocative inefficiency in production induced by the upstream
supplier’s discrimination against the more efficient firm.
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The theoretical debate about the welfare effects of banning third-degree price dis-
crimination in intermediate-goods markets was initiated by Katz (1987). His seminal
paper considers a vertically related industry where the upstream market is monopo-
lized and the downstream industry consists of a large chain that competes in several
downstream markets with a small local store. Katz shows that permitting price dis-
crimination reduces welfare unless it prevents inefficient backward integration by the
chain of stores. The finding of Katz is generalized by DeGraba (1990) to a long-run
analysis where downstream firms can invest in cost reduction. Here, a ban on price
discrimination does not only increase welfare in the short run, but also is beneficial in
the long run. The reason is that the more efficient downstream firm is charged a higher
wholesale price under price discrimination than under uniform pricing. Thus, under
price discrimination the benefit of lower production costs is partially offset by a higher
wholesale price, which reduces a firm’s investment incentives. Yoshida (2000) extends
the previous models to the case where downstream firms operate with Leontief-type
technologies.1
More recent contributions relax the assumption that the upstream firm has all the
bargaining power. Inderst and Valetti (2009) posit that downstream firms have access
to an alternative source of input supply. In their model the more efficient firm receives
a discount. In consequence, price discrimination provides higher incentives to invest in
cost reduction and thus—at least for linear demand—can result in higher welfare than
uniform pricing. While Inderst and Valetti still assume that the upstream firm makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer, O’Brien (forthcoming) assumes that the wholesale prices are
determined by Nash bargaining. This also gives rise to circumstances where banning
price discrimination is socially harmful.
Last, O’Brien and Shaffer (1994) and Inderst and Shaffer (2009) relax the assumption
that the upstream supplier is restricted to linear wholesale prices and allow for two-
part tariffs. In O’Brien and Shaffer, while a ban on price discrimination may benefit
downstream firms, it always does so at the expense of consumers and total welfare.2 In
the setting of Inderst and Shaffer (2009), optimal wholesale prices are shown to amplify
differences in downstream firms’ competitiveness. A ban on price discrimination in
consequence reduces allocative efficiency and may lead to higher wholesale prices for
all downstream firms, resulting in lower welfare.
All the aforementioned papers take the structure of the intermediate industry as ex-
ogenously given. This paper, in contrast, endogenizes the structure of the intermediate
1Valetti (2003) generalizes the results obtained in Yoshida (2000) beyond the case of linear demand.
2Analyzing a similar model but assuming that the upstream firm competes against a fringe, Caprice
(2006) shows that banning price discrimination may cause welfare to increase.
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industry by allowing for costly entry, and derives implications of banning price discrim-
ination for industry structure, consumers’ surplus, and welfare.3 As was first reasoned
by Bork (1978), allowing a final-good monopolist to price discriminate can lead to more
markets being served, which in turn improves welfare.4 This entry-promoting and in
turn welfare-improving effect of price discrimination is also operative in our model.
But even when all markets are served under either pricing regime, we derive circum-
stances where price discrimination leads to either overall higher or overall lower prices
than uniform pricing. These cases arise from entry being costly and do not crucially
rely on any assumptions on the demand function. Thus, in a nutshell, the established
welfare implications of banning third-degree price discrimination with an endogenous
market structure for final-good markets do not extend to the case of intermediate-good
markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our model
with downstream firms operating in separate markets. This model is analyzed for the
cases of a less efficient entrant and a more efficient entrant in Section 3 and Section
4, respectively. Section 5 introduces Cournot competition between downstream firms.
We conclude in Section 6.
2. A Model of Separate Markets
Consider a vertically related industry where the upstream market is monopolized by
firm U . The upstream monopolist produces an essential input that is supplied to a
downstream sector. For simplicity we assume that U produces without costs. There
are potentially two downstream firms, i ∈ {I, E}, that transform one unit of input
into one unit of a final good. While firm I, the incumbent, is already active in the
downstream industry, firm E, the entrant, has to expend an entry cost F > 0 to become
active in the downstream industry. Downstream firm i produces at constant marginal
cost ki ∈ {0, k}, k > 0, and without fixed cost.
The sequence of events is as follows: First, U can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
each downstream firm.5 Under price discrimination, U offers each downstream firm
3 In a linear demand model, Haucap and Wey (2007) also consider endogeneity of market structure
in intermediate good markets. Abstracting from any real entry decision in the sense of incuring
an entry cost, their findings, in contrast to our results, closely parallel the established findings for
final-good markets.
4This finding is formally established by Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988).
5The assumption of the upstream supplier having all the bargaining power, “which arguably can
be justified on the grounds that for antitrust purposes the considerations of price discrimination
in intermediate-goods markets is primarily relevant if the supplier enjoys a dominant position”
(Inderst and Shaffer, 2009, p.4) is common in the extant literature. Exceptions are O’Brien and
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a possibly different wholesale price wi, whereas under uniform pricing the same price
wi = w applies to both firms.
6 Thus, upon accepting U ’s offer, downstream firm i’s
effective marginal cost is ci = wi+ki. In stage two, after observing the contracts offered
by U , firm E decides whether or not to enter the downstream industry at cost F > 0.
In stage three, all active firms in the downstream industry purchase a nonnegative
quantity of the input from U , transform this input into the final good, and sell the
produced output to consumers. We abstract from any commitment problems and
assume that U can credibly commit to the prices quoted in this first stage.7
First, we focus on the case where the downstream firms serve independent markets.
We assume that both markets are symmetric and thus characterized by the same in-
verse demand function P (q). The inverse demand function is assumed to be strictly
decreasing and thrice differentiable where P > 0. Moreover, we impose the standard as-
sumption P ′(q) < min{0,−qP ′′(q)} where P > 0.8 The equilibrium concept employed
is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
We impose an additional assumption that ensures that U ’s maximization problem is
well-behaved under either pricing regime.
Assumption (A1): Downstream marginal revenue is concave, 3P ′′(q) + qP ′′′(q) ≤ 0,
whenever P > 0.
Next to technical issues, there is another reason for this assumption: as was shown
by Katz (1987), if downstream firms engage in Cournot competition, then under price
discrimination the downstream firm with the lower marginal cost will be charged a
higher wholesale price than the downstream firm with the higher marginal cost.9 The
firm with lower own marginal cost has the more inelastic demand for the input, which
causes the supplier to charge this firm a higher price. While the peculiarity of Cournot
Shaffer (1994) and O’Brien (forthcoming).
6In restricting the upstream supplier to linear wholesale contracts we follow Katz (1987), DeGraba
(1990), Yoshida (2000), O’Brien (forthcoming), and Inderst and Valetti (2009, forthcoming).
Though obviously restrictive, this assumption “can be defended on grounds of possible realism”,
as argued in Inderst and Valetti (2009, forthcoming). From a theoretical perspective, Iyer and
Villas-Boas (2003) and Milliou et al. (2004) provide some support for the use of linear whole-
sale contracts. Both these papers show that linear wholesale contracts can emerge as equilibrium
outcome when upstream and downstream firms can bargain over the form of their contractual
arrangement.
7At a later point we make clear, which of our results are driven by this assumption.
8 See, for example, Vives (1999).
9This result, which is also obtained by DeGraba (1990) and Yoshida (2000), holds as long as there are
no additional restrictions on the input supplier’s price setting, such as backward integration into the
production process by downstream firms considered by Katz (1987) or demand-side substitution
considered by Inderst and Valetti (2009, forthcoming).
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competition that total output only depends on the sum of effective marginal cost allows
Katz (1987) to obtain this result in considerable generality, this is not possible in the
case of separate markets. Here, Assumption (A1) provides a sufficient condition for the
demand of the more efficient downstream firm being less elastic, which in turn implies
that price discrimination results in a higher wholesale price for the more efficient firm.
Thus, next to reasons of analytical convenience, we impose this assumption in order to
maintain comparability to the earlier models of price discrimination in input markets.
In order to state our results as concise as possible, we restrict attention to situations
where U considers it optimal to serve both firms under uniform pricing at least for
sufficiently small entry cost. A sufficient condition for this is that the less efficient firm
is not too inefficient in the sense that it demands a strictly positive quantity when
charged the optimal discriminatory wholesale price wd(0) for the more efficient firm.
Formally, letting the optimal quantity produced by an active downstream firm i be
denoted by q(ci) := argmaxq {q[P (q)− ci]}, we impose the following assumption:
Assumption (A2): Marginal cost k is such that q(wd(0) + k) > 0.
As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that U serves only the incumbent market when
indifferent between the two possible structures the intermediate industry can take.
3. The Analysis
In this section, it is assumed that the potential entrant is less efficient than the in-
cumbent, i.e., 0 = kI < kE = k. As a preliminary consideration, note that an active
downstream firm in stage 3 realizes gross profits pi(ci) := q(ci)[P (q(ci))− ci], and that
both q(ci) and pi(ci) are strictly decreasing in effective marginal cost ci where q > 0.
Firm E will enter the intermediate industry if and only if its profits in stage 3 exceed
the entry cost, i.e., iff pi(wE + k) ≥ F . In all that follows, we focus on the case where
F is not too high,
F < pi(k) =: F˜ (k), (IV.1)
such that there are positive gains from trade to be realized between U and firm E.
Nevertheless, the entry constraint may impose a restriction on U in its setting of
wholesale prices.
3.1. Optimal Wholesale Pricing
First, suppose that F is sufficiently low such that the entry constraint is not binding.
If price discrimination is permitted, the optimal wholesale price for U to charge from
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firm i is
wd(ki) := argmax
w
{wq(w + ki)}. (IV.2)
Under uniform pricing, U chooses the common wholesale price
wu(k) := argmax
w
{wq(w + k) + wq(w)}. (IV.3)
We now can establish the following result: if U is unrestricted in its choice of wholesale
prices under both regimes, then the optimal uniform wholesale price is bracketed by
the two discriminatory prices. More precicely, under discrimination the less efficient
firm receives a discount compared to uniform pricing. This discount, however, does not
outweigh its cost disadvantage.
Lemma IV.1: Given (A1) and (A2), then wd(k) < wu(k) < wd(0) < wd(k) + k.
Under either pricing regime, if the entry fee is high, then charging the optimal
unrestricted wholesale price(s) leads to a violation of firm E’s entry constraint. Letting
F¯ j(k) denote the highest value the entry fee can take such that U is not restricted in
its price setting under pricing regime j ∈ {d, u}, we have
F¯ u(k) := pi(wu(k) + k) and F¯ d(k) := pi(wd(k) + k). (IV.4)
From Lemma IV.1 and (IV.1) it follows immediately that F¯ u(k) < F¯ d(k) < F˜ (k).
In order to induce entry, U optimally charges firm E wholesale price wR at which
firm E is indifferent between entering and staying out of the intermediate industry.
Wholesale price wR is implicitly defined by
pi(wR + k) ≡ F. (IV.5)
Obviously, wR = wR(F ; k) is strictly decreasing in F .
Under price discrimination it is optimal to offer wholesale price wR to firm E as
long as positive gains from trade are to be realized between U and firm E, i.e., for
F < F˜ (k). When restricted to a uniform wholesale price, U has to pass-through this
discount price wR also to firm I. If the entry fee only slightly exceeds F¯ u(k), it remains
optimal for U to serve both downstream firms just as in the case where the entry fee
does not restrict wholesale pricing. Since wR is strictly decreasing in F , if the entry
fee exceeds some critical threshold Fˆ , U prefers serving only firm I at wholesale price
wd(0). Formally, Fˆ is implicitly defined by
wR(Fˆ ; k)[q(wR(Fˆ ; k) + k) + q(wR(Fˆ ; k))] = wd(0)q(wd(0)). (IV.6)
Obviously, Fˆ = Fˆ (k). From wR(F¯ u(k); k) ≡ wu(k) together with wR(F ; k) tending to
zero as F tends to F˜ (k), it follows that F¯ u(k) < Fˆ (k) < F˜ (k).
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Letting wholesale prices in equilibrium be denoted by {wdE, wdI} and wu under price
discrimination and uniform pricing, respectively, we summarize the above discussion
as follows:
Observation 1: In equilibrium, the optimal wholesale price(s)
(i) under price discrimination are wdE = w
d(k) for 0 < F ≤ F¯ d(k), wdE = wR(F ; k)
for F¯ d(k) < F < F˜ (k), and wdI = w
d(0).
(ii) under uniform pricing is wu = wu(k) for 0 < F ≤ F¯ u(k), wu = wR(F ; k) for
F¯ u(k) < F < Fˆ (k), and wu = wd(0) for Fˆ (k) ≤ F < F˜ (k).
3.2. Welfare Implications of Banning Price Discrimination
The measure of total welfare applied in this paper is the unweighted sum of consumer
and producer surplus. We express changes in economic variables due to a regime shift
from uniform pricing to price discrimination using symbol ∆. If both firms are active
in the downstream industry, then the change in total welfare due to a regime shift
amounts to
∆W ≡
∫ q(wdE+k)
q(wu+k)
P (x)dx−
∫ q(wu)
q(wdI )
P (x)dx− k[q(wdE + k)− q(wu + k)]. (IV.7)
To compare the two pricing regimes one needs a complete ordering of the entry
cost’s critical threshold levels. With the relationship between F¯ d(k) and Fˆ (k) being
undetermined in general, there are two possible orderings of the thresholds as depicted
in Figure IV.1.
F¯ u
F¯ u
F¯ d
F¯ d
Fˆ
Fˆ
F˜
F˜
∆Q ≤ 0⇒ ∆W < 0
∆Q ≤ 0⇒ ∆W < 0 ∆W < 0
∆W > 0
∆W > 0
∆W = 0
∆W = 0
F
F
Figure IV.1.: Welfare comparison with separate markets and a less efficient entrant.
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It is important to note that ceteris paribus entry into the downstream industry is
always beneficial from a welfare point of view, since E enters only if it generates a
surplus that exceeds the entry cost. Letting Qr denote the total quantity sold under
pricing regime r ∈ {d, u}, the following welfare implications are readily obtained.
Proposition IV.1: Given (A1) and (A2), if
(i) F < min{Fˆ (k), F¯ d(k)}, then ∆Q ≤ 0 implies ∆W < 0;
(ii) F¯ d(k) ≤ F < Fˆ (k), then ∆W < 0;
(iii) Fˆ (k) ≤ F < F˜ (k), then ∆W > 0.
Proposition IV.1 is illustrated in Figure IV.1. Since a situation with downstream
firms operating in independent markets has a flavor of a final-good monopoly, we
next relate our findings to the existant literature on monopolistic third-degree price
discrimination in final-good markets.
For low values of the entry fee, in case (i), entry occurs under both pricing regimes.
With the uniform wholesale price lying strictly between the two discriminatory whole-
sale prices, a clear welfare result is not to obtain. Nevertheless, we can derive a sufficient
condition for permitting price discrimination to reduce welfare: if total output under
price discrimination is not higher than total outout under uniform pricing, then welfare
under price discrimination is strictly lower than welfare under uniform pricing. This
finding clearly paralells Schmalensee’s (1981) result on third-degree price discrimina-
tion in final-good markets: while in general price discrimination may be both welfare
increasing as well as welfare decreasing, a necessary condition for price discrimination
to improve welfare is that it leads to an expansion of aggregate output.10
For high values of the entry fee, i.e., in case (iii), price discrimination fosters entry
which in turn improves welfare. With entry occuring only if discriminatory pricing is
permitted, the market outcome and thus welfare in the incumbent market is indepen-
dent of the pricing regime, whereas welfare in the entrant’s market is strictly positive
only under price discrimination. This obviously is the intermediate-market analogue
to Hausman and MacKie-Mason’s (1988) finding on third-degree price discrimination
in final-good markets: here, with opening of a market assumed to be costless, price
discrimination yields a better welfare outcome if it results in opening of a new market
while uniform pricing does not.
Case (ii), on the other hand, embodies a novelty with regard to the extant liter-
ature on monopolistic third-degree price-discrimination in final-good markets, which
10A series of papers elaborates on Schmalensee’s basic insight, see Varian (1981), Schwartz (1990),
and Malueg (1993).
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abstracts from opening of new markets being costly. For intermediate values of the
entry fee both downstream firms are served under either pricing regime. With the
upstream supplier being restricted in its price setting under both pricing regimes, the
entrant receives wholesale price wR irrespectively of the regime. This low wholesale
price is passed on to the incumbent firm only under uniform pricing but not under
price discrimination. In consequence, welfare in the entrant’s market is unchanged
when permitting price discrimination but welfare in the incumbent’s market is strictly
reduced. Thus, even though market-opening occurs under both pricing regimes, price
discrimination is unambiguously found to be detrimental for welfare.11
We are fairly optimistic that results analogous to Proposition IV.1—as well as Propo-
sition IV.2 in the next section—can also be derived in a model of monopolistic third-
degree price discrimination in final-good markets. Note, however, that for the effect
in case (ii) of Proposition IV.1 to arise it must not be the final-good monopolist who
bears the cost of becoming active in a new market but the consumers of this poten-
tially opened market. To the best of our knowledge, such a situation has not been
considered in the existant literature on third-degree price discrimination in final-good
markets.12 Nevertheless, we refrain from framing our analysis in terms of a final-good
monopoly for at least two reasons. First, while it is natural to imagine a downstream
firm to bear the cost of opening a new market in the form of purchasing a franchise fee
or setting up a production site, most stories one could tell for a final consumers seem
somewhat contrieved.13 Second, with most of the principal legislations regarding price
discrimination—like the Robinson-Patman Act in the US and Article 82 of the Eu-
ropean Treaty—being primarily concerned about input price discrimination, inquiring
into the welfare effects of price discrimination in intermediate-good markets seems of
greater practical relevance. As was already pointed out by Katz (1987), welfare results
regarding price discrimination obtained in final-good markets do not necessarily carry
over to intermediate-good markets due to different market characteristics. Though
most likely of little loss in the above situation with independent downstream markets,
11Note that case (ii) exists only if F¯ d(k) < Fˆ (k). The effect arising in case (ii) depends on the
upstream supplier’s ability to commit to its offers. If commitment is not possible and the entry
decision is made before wholesale prices are set, then for F > F¯ d(k) entry occurs under neither
pricing regime.
12 For extensive overviews on price discrimination in final-good markets, see Armstrong (2007) and
Stole (2007).
13 For example, one might think of a monopolistic seller of dvds who faces two groups of distinguishable
consumers, students and elderly people. While students most likely possess a dvd player in one
form or the other—regular dvd player, home computer, laptop, Playstation 3—eldery people can
easily be imagined not to possess these devices. In this sense, in order for the market consisting
of elderly people to be opened, each senior has to incur the fixed cost of purchasing a dvd player.
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at the latest when downstream competition is considered, as we do in Section 5, cau-
tion should be exercised when infering validity of welfare statements from final-good
markets in intermediate-good markets. Therefore, we place our analysis in the realms
of intermediate-good market price discrimination right away from the beginning.
A Linear Demand Application: Suppose P (q) = max{1 − q, 0}, which satisfies
(A1), and 0 < k < 1, which relaxes (A2). The profit of an active downstream firm is
pi(ci) = (1− ci)2/4. If U is unrestricted by the entry constraint, the optimal wholesale
prices are wd(ki) = (1 − ki)/2 and wu(k) = (2 − k)/4 under price discrimination and
under uniform pricing, respectively. The wholesale price that makes firm E indifferent
between entering and staying out is wR = 1− k − 2√F . It can be shown that Fˆ (k) >
F¯ d(k) if and only if k > 1/2, where Fˆ (k) = (1/64)[2− 3k+ 4√k2 − 4k + 2]2. Since we
have not imposed (A2) there exists a critical marginal cost k¯ such that under uniform
pricing U optimally serves only firm I if k > k¯ even for F = 0.
Figure IV.2 depicts the critical thresholds for firm E’s marginal cost k and the
entry cost F , where for illustrative purposes we rephrased the thresholds in terms
of
√
F . As is well-known, with linear demand total output is the same under price
discrimination and uniform pricing, given that the entry constraint does not impose a
binding restriction. Hence, according to Proposition IV.1(i), for low values of F banning
price discrimination improves welfare. This case corresponds to the white area on the
left bottom of Figure IV.2. The dark gray shaded area of Figure IV.2 corresponds
to case (ii) of Proposition IV.1. Here, permitting price discrimination is harmful for
total welfare. On the other hand, in the light gray shaded area price discrimination
encourages entry which in turn supports welfare, case (iii) of Proposition IV.1.
4. More Efficient Entrant
Suppose the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, 0 = kE < kI = k. Otherwise
the model is the same as before: in particular (A1) and (A2) hold and F < pi(0) =:
F˜ (0). Lemma IV.1 immediately implies that the unrestricted uniform wholesale price is
bracketed by the two unrestricted discriminatory wholesale prices, with the less efficient
firm I receiving a discount under price discrimination.
If discriminatory offers are allowed, U charges wholesale price wd(k) from firm I.
The wholesale price offered to firm E depends on whether the entry constraint imposes
a binding restriction. If the entry constraint is slack, U sets wdE = w
d(0). If the entry
fee exceeds F¯ d(0) := pi(wd(0)), the entry constraint becomes binding and U charges
wdE = w
R(F ; 0) implicitely defined by pi(wR(F ; 0)) = F .
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Figure IV.2.: Welfare comparison with separate markets and linear demand.
The optimal uniform wholesale price is wu(k) if the entry cost is low. If the entry
cost exceeds F¯ u(k) := pi(wu(k)), then U is restricted when choosing a uniform whole-
sale price. Note that F¯ d(0) < F¯ u(k). For intermediate values of the entry fee the
optimal uniform wholesale price is wR(F ; 0) which makes firm E just willing to enter
the industry. For sufficiently high entry cost, F ≥ ˆˆF , U prefers to serve only firm I at
price wd(k). The critical entry fee
ˆˆ
F is implicitly defined by
wR(
ˆˆ
F ; 0)
[
q(wR(
ˆˆ
F ; 0) + k) + q(wR(
ˆˆ
F ; 0))
]
≡ wd(k)q(wd(k) + k), (IV.8)
where
ˆˆ
F =
ˆˆ
F (k) < F˜ (0).
There exists an additional threshold for the entry cost that turns out to be impor-
tant to characterize the welfare implications of banning price discrimination. Since
firm I receives a discount under price discrimination, there exists an entry cost Fˇ (k) ∈
(F¯ u(k),
ˆˆ
F (k)), at which the restricted wholesale price equals the discriminatory whole-
sale price of firm I, i.e., wR(Fˇ (k); 0) ≡ wd(k).14 For entry costs slightly below Fˇ (k),
14Note that F¯u(k) < Fˇ (k) follows immediately from wR(Fˇ (k); 0) = wd(k) < wu(k) = wR(F¯u(k); 0).
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price discrimination leads to (weakly) lower wholesale prices for both firms compared to
uniform pricing. For F slightly above Fˇ (k), on the other hand, the uniform wholesale
price is (weakly) below both discriminatory prices.
From the above observations, the following welfare implications follow immediately.
Proposition IV.2: Suppose 0 = kE < kI = k. Given (A1) and (A2), if
(i) F < F¯ u(k), then ∆Q ≤ 0 implies ∆W < 0;
(ii) F¯ u(k) ≤ F < Fˇ (k), then ∆W > 0;
(iii) Fˇ (k) < F <
ˆˆ
F (k), then ∆W < 0;
(iv)
ˆˆ
F (k) ≤ F < F˜ (k), then ∆W > 0.
Cases (i), (iii), and (iv) are basically known from the previous analysis of a less
efficient entrant. For very low values of the entry cost, in case (i), with the uniform
wholesale price being bracketed by the two discriminatory wholesale prices, a clear
welfare result is intricate to obtain. Nevertheless, if price discrimination does not lead
to an expansion of total output, then permitting price discrimination is harmful for so-
cial welfare. For high-intermediate values of the entry cost, in case (iii), banning price
discrimination unambiguously improves welfare. Under both pricing regimes, the up-
stream supplier serves both firms. The low restricted wholesale price which is necessary
to induce entry is passed on to the incumbent only under uniform pricing, however. In
case (iv), if entry is very costly, only price discrimination leads to the opening of the
new market. Thus, for high values of the entry cost the known entry-promoting and
in turn welfare-improving effect of permitting price discrimination prevails.
An interesting novelty is found in case (ii). Here, for low-intermediate values of the
entry cost, under both pricing regimes the upstream supplier is restricted in its price
setting but nevertheless induces entry. Surprisingly, a discriminatory pricing regime
leads to (weakly) lower wholesale prices for both downstream firms. In consequence,
permitting price discrimination strictly increases welfare, even though it does not lead
to more markets being served than under a ban of price discrimination.
5. Downstream Competition
In this section, we inquire into the implications of downstream competition for the
welfare effects associated with a ban of discriminatory wholesale pricing.15 We now
Fˇ (k) <
ˆˆ
F (k), on the other hand, follows from the fact that it is profitable to serve both downstream
firms at a price only slightly below wd(k) instead of serving only firm I at price wd(k).
15 A detailed account of the following discussion is found in Appendix B.
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assume that active downstream firms produce a homogeneous final good and compete
in quantities. Thus, if firm E, which is assumed to be the less efficient downstream
firm, becomes active in the downstream industry, this is not associated with opening
of a new market but with entry into firm I’s market. Except for firms competing
a` la Cournot in stage 3, we stick to the sequence of events introduced in Section
2. Without further assumptions on the demand function welfare results are hard to
obtain with downstream competition. Therefore, we focus on linear demand, i.e.,
P (q) = max{1 − q, 0}. Moreover, we assume 0 < k < 1/2 and focus on the case
where 0 <
√
F < 1/3 − (2/3)k =: f˜(k). While the first assumption guarantees that
both downstream firms produce positive quantities at the optimal unrestricted uniform
wholesale price, the latter rules out the case where U prefers to serve only firm I under
both pricing regimes.
Before proceeding with the analysis, a remark regarding the upstream supplier’s
incentives to serve the inefficient entrant next to the incumbent is in order: being
restricted to linear wholesale contracts, the manufacturer’s interest in inducing entry
and thereby promoting downstream competition arises from the desire to reduce double
marginalization. If the input supplier nevertheless prefers to serve only one downstream
firm in equilibrium, then this is always the incumbent firm at wholesale price wM = 1/2.
Suppose both downstream firms are active in equilibrium. Given the rival’s effective
marginal cost cj, downstream firm i with effective marginal cost ci demands quantity
q(ci, cj) = (1/3)(1− 2ci − cj) and realizes gross profits pi(ci, cj) = (1/9)(1− 2ci − cj)2.
Similar as before, for low values of the entry cost, firm E’s entry constraint does
not impose a binding restriction on U ’s choice of wholesale prices. In this case, the
optimal wholesale prices under uniform pricing and under price discrimination are
wu(k) = (1/4)(2 − k) and wd(ki) = (1/2)(1 − ki), respectively. In consequence, the
entry constraint does not impose a binding restriction under uniform pricing and under
price discrimination if
pi(wu(k) + k, wu(k)) ≥ F ⇐⇒
√
F ≤ 1
6
− 7
12
k =: f¯u(k) (IV.9)
and
pi(wd(k) + k, wd(0)) ≥ F ⇐⇒
√
F ≤ 1
6
− 1
3
k =: f¯d(k), (IV.10)
respectively. Note that f¯u(k) < f¯d(k), i.e., the entry constraint imposes a stronger
restriction on U under uniform pricing than under price discrimination since the less
efficient firm receives a discount if price discrimination is permitted.
For higher values of the entry cost,
√
F > f¯ r(k) with r ∈ {d, u}, to make firm E
enter the downstream market U needs to offer a discount wholesale price such that firm
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E can just recover its fixed cost. With competition firm E’s profit does not only depend
on its own wholesale price but also on firm I’s wholesale price. Thus, in contrast to the
case with separate downstream markets, the restricted wholesale price is not necessarily
identical under the two pricing regimes. The restricted uniform wholesale price, wRu, is
defined by pi(wRu + k, wRu) ≡ F , or equivalently, wRu(√F ; k) = 1− 2k− 3√F . Under
price discrimination, on the other hand, U chooses two wholesale prices, and thus the
restricted wholesale price is not pinned down by firm E’s binding entry constraint alone.
Here, U optimally offers wholesale price wRI = 1/2 and w
R
E(
√
F ; k) = 3/4−k−(3/2)√F
to firm I and firm E, respectively.
Is it always in U ’s interest to serve both downstream firms? Under discriminatory
pricing it can be shown that U prefers to implement a downstream duopoly if
√
F <
f˜(k). If U is forced to offer a uniform wholesale price, it prefers that firm I monopolizes
the downstream market when firm E is very inefficient or when entry costs are too high.
Formally, U optimally serves both downstream firms if
√
F < fˆ(k), where
fˆ(k) :=
{
(1/12)[2− 7k +√1− 4k + k2] , for k < 2−√3
0 , for k ≥ 2−√3 . (IV.11)
Note that fˆ(k) < f˜(k). Hence, there exists a range of entry costs where entry occurs
under price discrimination but not under uniform pricing, i.e., price discrimination
promotes entry also when downstream firms compete. The thresholds characterized
above are depicted in Figure IV.3.
Welfare Comparisons In order to compare welfare under the two pricing regimes,
we distinguish five cases with respect to the resulting downstream market structure, as
illustrated in Figure IV.3. We label these cases with Roman numerals, I - V.
In cases I - III, both pricing regimes lead to implementation of a downstream duopoly.
Moreover, in these three cases allowing for discriminatory wholesale prices lowers wel-
fare. This is most obvious in case I, where both the entry fee and the entrant’s marginal
cost of production are sufficiently low such that the input supplier is not constrained
in its choice of wholesale prices under either pricing regime.16 While total output is
unaffected by the pricing regime, which is a direct result of linear demand, under price
discrimination the upstream supplier “subsidizes” the less efficient firm by charging a
higher wholesale price to the more efficient firm, thereby (at least partly) removing the
incumbent firm’s cost advantage. In consequence, under price discrimination output
is shifted from the low-cost firm to the high-cost firm, which raises the total cost of
production and thus reduces welfare. This negative effect of price discrimination on
16This situation exactly corresponds to the short-run analysis in DeGraba (1990).
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Figure IV.3.: Downstream market structure with competition.
the allocation of producing the final output is even more severe if the upstream firm is
restricted by firm E’s entry decision, since this increases the discount the less efficient
entrant receives. If the entry constraint imposes a restriction under uniform pricing,
on the other hand, the lowered wholesale price applies for all downstream firms, such
that no such misallocation in production shares occurs.17
The more interesting cases are IV and V . Here, the downstream market is monop-
olized under uniform pricing while under price discrimination both downstream firms
compete for final customers. The reason is that the relatively high entry fee and/or
the relatively high marginal cost of the entrant render the concession in the uniform
wholesale price necessary to induce entry unprofitable for the upstream monopolist.
Price discrimination, on the other hand, provides the input supplier with a tool to
profitably implement a downstream duopoly even in these cases.
With separate markets, entry into the intermediate industry taking place only under
a discriminatory pricing regime but not under uniform pricing is a sufficient condition
17Moreover, due to a lower input price, total output is increased, which in turn improves welfare
compared to the situation where the upstream firm is unrestricted under uniform pricing.
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Figure IV.4.: Welfare comparison with downstream competition.
for welfare to be higher under price discrimination, see Proposition IV.1. For moderate
values of the entry cost and a not too inefficient entrant—represented by the dark-gray
shaded area in Figure IV.4—this result carries over to the case of downstream compe-
tition: here, society benefits from output being produced inefficiently rather than not
being produced at all. If, however, the entry fee is high and/or the entrant is very
inefficient—represented by the light-gray shaded area in Figure IV.4—entry becomes
undesirable from a social perspective: while entry into the downstream market alle-
viates the quantity distortion arising under downstream monopoly, thereby increasing
upstream profits and benefiting consumers through higher quantity and lower final-
good prices, the increase in aggregate output comes at the cost of a reduction in the
efficient downstream firm’s output brought about by competition in the downstream
market. Thus, the increase in consumer surplus and the upstream supplier’s profits is
gained at the price of burdening society with the cost of entry and higher production
costs. In consequence, since the major effect of the discriminatory pricing policy is not
the creation of value but shifting rents away from the incumbent firm to the upstream
supplier, here price discrimination leads to a strictly inferior welfare result even though
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market entry is promoted.
With regard to a formal welfare result, we define
fW (k) :=


1/3− (8/9)k , for k ≤ 3/10√
(23/72)k2 − (5/18)k + 17/288 , for 3/10 < k ≤ 17/46
0 , for k > 17/46
. (IV.12)
With this notation we are prepared summarize the above discussion as follows:
Proposition IV.3: For the case with linear demand and downstream Cournot com-
petition; (i) ∆W > 0 if fˆ(k) ≤ √F < fW (k) and (ii) ∆W < 0 if either √F < fˆ(k) or
fW (k) <
√
F < f˜(k).
We refrain from an analysis of downstream competition with a more efficient entrant.
In this case, if entry occurs under price discrimination but not under uniform pricing,
production shares are shifted from the less efficient to the more efficient downstream
firm, i.e., in tendency overall production becomes less costly. Therefore, in these cases,
we would expect a discriminatory pricing regime to be welfare improving more often,
because one major inefficiency identified in the analysis of a less efficient entrant does
not arise.
6. Conclusion
This paper attempts to provide answers to the following two questions: First, how
does potential entry into the downstream industry affect wholesale prices set by an
upstream monopolist? Second, under what circumstances is banning third-degree price
discrimination beneficial for welfare and consumer surplus if there is potential entry
into the downstream sector?
Compared to a situation with a rigid structure of the intermediate industry, the
optimal uniform wholesale price as well as the optimal discriminatory wholesale price
charged from the potential entrant may be lower if costly entry is possible. The op-
timal wholesale price charged from incumbent firms, in contrast, does not depend on
whether entry into the intermediate industry is possible or not. As a consequence,
when downstream firms operate in distinct markets, there are situations—in terms of
the entrant’s efficiency in production and the cost of entry—where price discrimination
may lead to either higher or lower prices for all downstream firms than uniform pric-
ing. In these cases, with wholesale prices being clearly favorable under one of the two
pricing regimes, we obtain unambiguous implications of banning price discrimination
regarding welfare and consumer surplus. If downstream firms are Cournot competitors,
permitting price discrimination has the beneficial effect that it supports entry which in
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turn reduces double marginalization. This beneficial effect, however, can be outweighed
by entry being costly and an allocative inefficiency in production induced by discrimi-
nation against the more efficient firm. With costly entry being possible in our model,
these results are novel to the extant literature on third-degree price discrimination in
intermediate-good markets.
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A. Appendices
1. Appendix to Chapter I
1.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition I.1: As mentioned in Footnote 14, in order to establish the
proposition, we follow a different but nevertheless equivalent way than proposed in the
paper. In period 1, a naive agent believes that he is time-consistent in period 2. Thus,
we first analyze what effort a TC chooses in period 2, given an arbitrary effort level of
the first period, eˆ1. This effort choice, which maximizes U
TC
2 = −c(e2) + g(eˆ1 + e2),
obviously is a function of the first-period effort. Thus, eTC2 (eˆ1) is characterized by the
corresponding first-order condition,
g′(eˆ1 + e
TC
2 (eˆ1)) = c
′(eTC2 (eˆ1)) . (A.1)
Differentiating (A.1) with respect to e1 yields de
TC
2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0). With UN1 =
−c(e1) − βc(eTC2 (e1)) + βg(e1 + eTC2 (e1)) being a strictly concave function of e1, the
effort level that a naive agent invests in the first period, eN1 , is implicitly characterized
by the following first-order condition:
βg′
(
eN1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 )
)
= c′(eN1 ) . (A.2)
The actual problem of a naive agent in period 2 is to maximize UN2 = −c(e2)+βg(eN1 +
e2) over his second-period effort choice. The optimal second-period effort, e
N
2 , satisfies
βg′
(
eN1 + e
N
2
)
= c′(eN2 ) . (A.3)
Comparison of (A.1)-(A.3) allows to establish the proposition. We prove each part of
the proposition in turn.
(iii) Comparison of (A.1) and (A.3) immediately yields eN2 < e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ) = e
TC
2 .
(i) Suppose, in contradiction, that eN1 ≥ eN2 . Then c′(eN1 ) ≥ c′(eN2 ), which in turn
implies βg′(eN1 +e
TC
2 (e
N
1 )) ≥ βg′(eN1 +eN2 ). But since eN2 < eTC2 (eN1 ) and g′′(·) < 0
we have βg′(eN1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 )) < βg
′(eN1 + e
N
2 ), a contradiction.
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(ii) From our considerations of the TC we know that g′(eˆ1 + e
TC
2 (eˆ1)) = c
′(eTC2 (eˆ1))
for all eˆ1. Hence, c
′(eTC) = c′(eTC2 (e
TC)) = g′(eTC + eTC2 (e
TC)) > βg′(eTC +
eTC2 (e
TC)). For eN1 we must have c
′(eN1 ) = βg
′(eN1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 )). Since de
TC
2 /de1 ∈
(−1, 0), g′′(·) < 0 and c′′(·) > 0, we immediately obtain that eN1 < eTC . Now it
immediately follows that eN1 + e
N
2 < e
N
1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ) < e
TC + eTC2 (e
TC) = 2eTC ,
where the first inequality holds by (i) and the second inequality holds because
eN1 < e
TC and deTC2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0).
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition I.2: First we prove that the effort choice in the first period of a
sophisticated agent is characterized by a first-order condition. We can rule out corner
solutions to be optimal: With c(e) −→ ∞ as e −→ ∞, e1 = ∞ is not a candidate
for the agent’s first-period effort. Next we show that e1 = 0 also is not optimal. The
derivative of US1 with respect to e1 can be rewritten as follows:
dUS1
de1
=
[
deS2 (e1)
de1
(1− β) + 1
]
c′(eS2 (e1))− c′(e1),
where we used twice the fact that βg′
(
e1 + e
S
2 (e1)
)
= c′(eS2 (e1)). Since e
S
2 (0) > 0 and
deS2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0), we have dUS1 /de1|e1=0 > 0. Note that US1 is a differentiable and
hence continuous function, which establishes the desired result.
Next, we prove each part of the proposition in turn.
(i) From (I.5) and (I.6) it follows immediately that βg′
(
eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 )
) − c′(eS1 ) > 0,
which in turn implies that c′(eS2 (e
S
1 )) = βg
′(eS1 +e
S
2 (e
S
1 )) > c
′(eS1 ). Thus, e
S
2 (e
S
1 ) >
eS1 .
(ii) Suppose, in contradiction, that eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ) ≥ 2eTC . We know that βg′(eS1 +
eS2 (e
S
1 ))−c′(eS1 ) > 0 = g′(eTC+eTC)−c′(eTC). With g′′(·) < 0 and c′′(·) > 0, eS1 +
eS2 (e
S
1 ) ≥ 2eTC immediately implies eS1 < eTC . Furthermore, βg′(eS1 + eS2 (eS1 )) −
c′(eS2 (e
S
1 )) = 0 = g
′(eTC + eTC) − c′(eTC), which under the above functional
assumptions implies that c′(eS2 (e
S
1 )) < c
′(eTC). But this means that eS2 (e
S
1 ) < e
TC ,
which leads to a contradiction to the assumption that eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ) ≥ 2eTC .
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma I.1: For a given first-period effort e1, both the naive agent and the
sophisticated agent face the same maximization problem in period 2. This allows us to
write eN2 = e
S
2 (e
N
1 ). For i, j ∈ {S,N} and i 6= j, together with deS2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0),
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this observation immediately yields that ei1 > e
j
1 implies e
i
2 = e
S
2 (e
i
1) < e
S
2 (e
j
1) = e
j
2
and ei1 + e
i
2 > e
j
1 + e
j
2. It remains to show that e
i
1 > e
j
1 implies U
i
0 = −c(ei1) −
c(eS2 (e
i
1)) + g(e
i
1 + e
S
2 (e
i
1)) ≥ −c(ej1)− c(eS2 (ej1)) + g(ej1 + eS2 (ej1)) = U j0 . Define H(e1) ≡
−c(e1)− c(eS2 (e1)) + g(e1 + eS2 (e1)). In order to establish the desired result, it suffices
to show that
dH(e1)
de1
= g′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))− c′(e1) +
deS2 (e1)
de1
[
g′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))− c′(eS2 (e1))
]
> 0
for all e1 ∈ [0, ei1]. Since, by Propositions I.1 and I.2, ei1 < ei2 = eS2 (ei1) for i ∈ {S,N},
and moreover deS2 (e1)/de1 < 0, we have e1 < e
S
2 (e1) for all e1 < e
i
1. This in turn
implies g′(e1+e
S
2 (e1))−c′(e1) > g′(e1+eS2 (e1))−c′(eS2 (e1)) > 0, where the last inequal-
ity follows from (I.5). Together with deS2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0), the desired result follows.
Proof of Lemma I.2: By the revealed preference argument, for the first-period effort
choices of a naive and a sophisticated agent, eN1 and e
S
1 , the following two inequalities
have to hold:
− c(eN1 )− βc(eTC2 (eN1 )) + βg(eN1 + eTC2 (eN1 ))
≥ −c(eS1 )− βc(eTC2 (eS1 )) + βg(eS1 + eTC2 (eS1 ))
and
− c(eS1 )− βc(eS2 (eS1 )) + βg(eS1 + eS2 (eS1 ))
≥ −c(eN1 )− βc(eS2 (eN1 )) + βg(eN1 + eS2 (eN1 ))
Taken together these two inequalities imply
[
g(eN1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ))− c(eTC2 (eN1 ))
]− [g(eN1 + eS2 (eN1 ))− c(eS2 (eN1 ))]
≥ [g(eS1 + eTC2 (eS1 ))− c(eTC2 (eS1 ))]− [g(eS1 + eS2 (eS1 ))− c(eS2 (eS1 ))] . (A.4)
Define F (e1) ≡
[
g(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1))− c(eTC2 (e1))
] − [g(e1 + eS2 (e1))− c(eS2 (e1))]. Since
both sides of (A.4) have the same structure, a sufficient condition for eS1 ≥ eN1 to hold
is dF (e1)/de1 < 0. From (A.1) and (I.5) we know that g
′(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1)) = c
′(eTC2 (e1))
and βg′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1)) = c
′(eS2 (e1)). Hence,
dF (e1)
de1
=
[
g′(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1))− g′(e1 + eS2 (e1))
]−(1−β)g′(e1+eS2 (e1))deS2 (e1)de1 . (A.5)
For β = 0 we have dF (e1)/de1 =
[
g′(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1))− g′(e1 + eS2 (e1))
]
< 0 since deS2 (e1)/de1 =
0 in this case. For β = 1 we have eTC2 (e1) = e
S
2 (e1) for all e1, and hence dF (e1)/de1 = 0.
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Thus, d
dβ
(dF (e1)/de1) > 0 is a sufficient condition for dF (e1)/de1 < 0 for all β ∈ (0, 1).
Tackling this derivative by brute force yields
d
dβ
[
dF (e1)
de1
]
= −g′′(·)de
S
2
dβ
−
[
−g′(·)de
S
2
de1
+ (1− β)g′′(·)de
S
2
dβ
deS2
de1
+ (1− β)g′(·)d(de
S
2 /de1)
dβ
]
= (1− β)−2g
′(·)g′′(·)c′′(eS2 ) + de
S
2
dβ
βg′(·) [g′′(·)c′′′(eS2 )− g′′′(·)c′′(eS2 )]
[βg′′(·)− c′′(eS2 )]2
,
where we made use of the fact that
deS2
dβ
= − g
′(·)
βg′′(·)− c′′(eS2 )
.
and
d{deS2 /de1}
dβ
=
c′′(eS2 )[g
′′(·) + βg′′′(·){deS2 /dβ}]− βg′′(·)c′′′(eS2 )
[βg′′(·)− c′′(eS2 )]2
.
Under the imposed functional assumptions, a sufficient condition for d
dβ
(dF (e1)/de1)
> 0 for all β ∈ (0, 1) is c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0. Together with the above observation
that dF (e1)/de1 < 0 for β = 0 and dF (e1)/de1 = 0 for β = 1, this implies that
dF (e1)/de1 < 0 for all β ∈ [0, 1). This allows us to conclude that eN1 ≤ eS1 when
c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0.
Next, we will show that eN1 6= eS1 for c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0, which completes the
proof. Suppose in contradiction that eN1 = e
S
1 . The first-order condition of the utility
maximization problem of the first-period sohisticate can be written as follows:
βg′(eS1 + e
TC
2 (e
S
1 ))− c′(eS1 ) + β
[
g′(eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ))− g′(eS1 + eTC2 (eS1 ))
]
+
deS2 (e1)
de1
β
[
g′(eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ))− c′(eS2 (eS1 ))
]
= 0 .
Setting eN1 = e
S
1 in the above equation yields
[
g′(eN1 + e
S
2 (e
N
1 ))− g′(eN1 + eTC2 (eN1 ))
]− (1− β)g′(eN1 + eS2 (eN1 ))deS2 (e1)de1 = 0. (A.6)
Note that the left-hand side of (A.6) is dF (e1)/de1|e1=eN1 . For c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0,
however, we have just shown that dF (e1)/de1 < 0 for β ∈ [0, 1), a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition I.3: Follows immediately from Lemmas I.1 and I.2.
Proof of Proposition I.4: The proof consists of three major parts. First, we formally
derive the behavior of a sophisticated agent when facing no deadline. Next we show
that when facing a deadline, the utility maximization problem of a sophisticated agent
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in the first period indeed is solved by a first-period effort pair (eA, eB1) with eA > 0
and eB1 = 0. Last, we prove each of the results explicitely stated in the proposition.
Part 1: Consider a sophisticated agent who faces no deadline. With the reward
functions for the two tasks being strictly increasing and strictly concave, given any
first-period efforts eˆA1 and eˆB1, a sophisticate will allocate second-period effort in a way
such that overall effort is allocated as evenly as possible among the two tasks. Thus,
there is the following fundamental distinction to draw for second-period behavior: for a
given first-period effort and allocation choice, effort smoothing over tasks in the second
period is either optimal or not optimal. Effort smoothing over tasks is not optimal for
the second-period self if the the total second-period effort needed to achieve this is too
costly. Starting out from this observation, we proceed in two steps: First, we show that
it is never optimal for a sophisticate in period 1 to choose effort levels eA1 and eB1 such
that effort smoothing over tasks is not optimal in period 2. Second, given that effort
smoothing over tasks is optimal in period 2, we show that when facing no deadline, a
sophisticated agent increases effort over time.
Step 1: Let α1 ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of the overall first-period effort e1 which is
dedicated to task A, i.e., eA1 = α1e1 and eB1 = (1 − α1)e1. Further, let eS2 (e1, α1)
denote the optimal overall effort for the second-period self of a sophisticate given e1
and α1. To prove that it is never optimal for a sophisticate to choose an allocation
of first-period effort such that effort smoothing over tasks is not optimal in period 2,
assume the opposite: Suppose in period 1 the sophisticate chooses e1 and α1 such that
(w.l.o.g.) eA < eB. First, note that for given e1 and α1, a necessary condition for effort
smoothing over tasks not being optimal in period 2 is that overall second-period effort
is lower than overall first-period effort, e1 > e
S
2 (e1, α1). Moreover, as argued above, the
second-period self will allocate all his effort e2 to task A in order to make the overall
effort allocation over tasks as even as possible, i.e.,
max
e2
−c(e2) + βg(α1e1 + e2) + βg((1− α1)e1),
with the optimal effort choice eS2 (e1, α1) being characterized by
βg′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1)) = c
′(eS2 (e1, α1)) . (A.7)
Differentiation with respect to e1 yields
deS2
de1
= −α1 βg
′′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1))
βg′′(α1e1 + eS2 (e1, α1))− c′′(eS2 (e1, α1))
∈ (−α1, 0).
In the first period, the sophisticate chooses an effort allocation (e1, α1) in order to
maximize
U1(e1, α1) = −c(e1)− βc(eS2 (e1, α1)) + βg(α1e1 + eS2 (e1, α1)) + βg((1− α1)e1).
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If the optimal first-period effort allocation is an interior solution, i.e., e1 ∈ (0,∞)
and α1 ∈ (0, 1), then it has to satisfy the necessary first-order conditions for op-
timality, ∂U1(e1, α1)/∂e1 = 0 and ∂U1(e1, α1)/∂α1 = 0. Together with (A.7) and
deS2 (e1, α1)/de1 < 0,
∂U1(e1, α1)
∂e1
= 0 ⇐⇒ −c′(e1) + α1βg′(α1e1 + eS2 (e1, α1))
+ (1−α1)βg′((1−α1)e1)+ de
S
2 (e1, α1)
de1
[
βg′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1))− βc′(eS2 (e1, α1))
]
= 0
implies
−c′(e1) + α1βg′(α1e1 + eS2 (e1, α1)) + (1− α1)βg′((1− α1)e1) > 0 . (A.8)
Combining (A.7) and (A.8) yields
c′(eS2 (e1, α1))− c′(e1)− (1− α1)β
[
g′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1))− g′((1− α1)e1)
]
> 0 . (A.9)
As noted above, with effort smoothing over tasks not being optimal we have e1 >
eS2 (e1, α1). Moreover, α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1) = eA < eB = (1 − α1)e1 by assumption. But
then c′′(·) > 0 and g′′(·) < 0 imply that (A.9) cannot be satisfied, which in turn
implies that the optimal first-period allocation (e1, α1) cannot be interior. Note that
α1 = 1 is not possible bacause eA < eB and effort smoothing over tasks is not possible
by assumption. Since e1 = ∞ and e1 = 0 can be ruled out as optimal (note that
∂U1(e1, α1)/∂e1|e1=0 > 0), we are left with e1 ∈ (0,∞) and α1 = 0. For α1 = 0,
second-period behavior is characterized by
βg′(e2) = c
′(e2). (A.10)
Thus, for α1 = 0, second-period effort does not depend on first-period effort, e
S
2 (e1, 0) =
eS2 . In period 1, e1 then is chosen to maximize
U1(e1, 0) = −c(e1)− βc(eS2 ) + βg(eS2 ) + βg(e1),
and thus is characterized by
βg′(e1) = c
′(e1) . (A.11)
Taken together, (A.10) and (A.11) contradict the assumption that effort smoothing
over tasks is not optimal in period 2, which requires that first-period effort strictly
exceeds second-period effort. This concludes Step 1.
Step 2: From Step 1, we know that in period 2 the agent will allocate effort in a way such
that overall effort is spread evenly among the two tasks, i.e., eA = eB = (1/2)(e1+ e2).
Thus, given eˆ1, e2 is chosen in order to maximize
US
ND
2 = −c(e2) + 2βg((1/2)(eˆ1 + e2)).
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The optimal second-period effort as a function of the first-period effort, eS
ND
2 (eˆ1), sat-
isfies (I.8), i.e.,
c′(eS
ND
2 (eˆ1)) = βg
′((1/2)(eˆ1 + e
SND
2 (eˆ1))).
Differentiation of (I.8) yields
deS
ND
2 (e1)
de1
= −
1
2
βg′′(1
2
(e1 + e
SND
2 (e1)))
1
2
βg′′(1
2
(e1 + eS
ND
2 (e1)))− c′′(eSND2 (e1))
∈ (−1, 0).
In period 1 a sophisticated agent then chooses his effort level in order to maximize the
intertemporal utility of his first-period self,
US
ND
1 = −c(e1)− βc(eS
ND
2 (e1)) + 2βg((1/2)(e1 + e
SND
2 (e1))) .
According to the same reasoning as in the single-task case, the optimal first-period
effort, eS
ND
1 , is characterized by the first-order condition given by (I.9),
βg′((1/2)(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))− c′(eS
ND
1 )
+
deS
ND
2 (e1)
de1
β
[
g′((1/2)(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))− c′(eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 ))
]
= 0 .
From (I.8) we know that βg′(1
2
(eˆ1 + e
SND
2 (eˆ1))) − c′(eSND2 (eˆ1)) = 0 for all eˆ1, and in
particular for eˆ1 = e
SND
1 . Since de
SND
2 (e1)/de1 < 0, in combination with (I.9) this
implies that βg′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )) − c′(eSND1 ) > 0. Taken together these two
observations yield c′(eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 )) = βg
′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ))) > c
′(eS
ND
1 ). Since
c′′(·) > 0, it follows that when facing no deadline, a sophisticated agent increases effort
over time, that is, eS
ND
1 < e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ).
Part 2: Next, we provide the proof that when facing a deadline, the utility maximiza-
tion problem of a sophisticated agent in the first period is solved by a first-period effort
pair (eA, eB1) with eA > 0 and eB1 = 0. To prove this result, we proceed in three steps.
First, we show that we cannot have an interior solution 0 < eA, eB1 < ∞. Second, we
rule out solutions in which the agent chooses an infinite amount of effort for at least
one task, and also the solution that the agent does not exhibit any effort at all in the
first period. Third, we show that an effort pair (eA, eB1) with eB1 > 0 = eA is not a
solution.
Step 1: Suppose, in contradiction, that there is an interior solution. This solution then
would be characterized by the following first-order conditions:
∂US
D
1
∂eA
= 0 ⇐⇒ βg′(eA)− c′(eA + eB1) = 0 , (A.12)
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∂US
D
1
∂eB1
= 0 ⇐⇒ βg′(eB1 + eSDB2 (eB1))− c′(eA + eB1)
+
deS
D
B2 (eB1)
deB1
β
[
g′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− c′(eS
D
B2 (eB1))
]
= 0 . (A.13)
Combining (A.12) and (A.13) yields
βg′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− βg′(eA)
= −de
SD
B2 (eB1)
deB1
β
[
g′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− c′(eS
D
B2 (eB1))
]
> 0,
where the inequality follows from (I.10). This last inequality implies that eB1 +
eS
D
B2 (eB1) < eA. From (A.12) it follows that eA decreases as eB1 increases. Com-
paring (I.10) and (A.12) yields that for eB1 = 0 we have eA = e
SD
B2 (0). Since d(eB1 +
eS
D
B2 (eB1))/deB1 > 0 it follows that eB1+e
SD
B2 (eB1) ≥ eA for all eB1 ≥ 0, a contradiction.
Hence, the utility maximization problem of a sophisticated agent in the first period
cannot have an interior solution.
Step 2: Obviously we can rule out effort choices where the agent invests an infinite
high effort in one or both tasks since this would lead to an intertemporal utility of
minus infinity. To see that it is not optimal to exert no positive effort at all in the
first period, let α1 ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of e1 which is dedicated to task B,
that is, eA1 = (1 − α1)e1 and eB1 = α1e1. For each α1, by (I.10) the optimal second-
period effort satisfies βg′(α1e1 + e
SD
B2 (α1e1)) = c
′(eS
D
B2 (α1e1)). With this notation, the
intertemporal utility in the first period is given by US
D
1 = −c(e1) − βc(eSDB2 (α1e1)) +
βg((1− α1)e1) + βg(α1e1 + eSDB2 (α1e1)). Differentiating with respect to e1, taking into
account that βg′(α1e1 + e
SD
B2 (α1e1)) = c
′(eS
D
B2 (α1e1)), and rearranging yields
dUS
D
1
de1
= β(1− α1)g′((1− α1)e1)− c′(e1) + α1c′(eSDB2 (α1e1))
[
1 + (1− β)de
SD
B2 (eB1)
deB1
]
.
Evaluated at e1 = 0 we have dU
SD
1 /de1|e1=0 = β(1 − α1)g′(0) + α1c′(eSDB2 (0))[1 + (1 −
β)(deS
D
B2 (eB1)/deB1)] > 0, for all α1 ∈ [0, 1].
Step 3: We are left with two possible candidates for the corner solution: (i) eA = 0
and eB1 > 0, or (ii) eA > 0 and eB1 = 0. To see that (i) can be ruled out, suppose that
eA = 0 and eB1 > 0. For eA = 0 to be optimal it must hold that
βg′(0)− c′(eB1) ≤ 0, (A.14)
otherwise it would be optimal to invest some positive effort in task A. Since eB1 is
assumed to be strictly positive, the following first-order condition has to hold:
βg′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− c′(eB1) +
deS
D
B2 (eB1)
eB1
β
[
g′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− c′(eS
D
B2 (eB1))
]
= 0.
Essays in Applied Microeconomics and Management 119
The last term of the left-hand side of the above equation is negative, which implies that
βg′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1)) − c′(eB1) > 0. Taken together with (A.14) this yields βg′(eB1 +
eS
D
B2 (eB1)) > g
′(0). This in turn implies eB1+ e
SD
B2 (eB1) < 0, which is not possible. This
establishes the desired result.
Part 3: Having shown that an effort pair (eA, eB1) with eA > 0 and eB1 = 0 solves the
utility maximization problem of a sophisticated agent in the first period, we now prove
each part of the proposition. First we show that a sophisticate exhibits a higher first-
period effort when facing deadlines. Suppose, in contradiction, that eS
ND
1 ≥ eSD . From
(I.8) and (I.12) we know, respectively, that c′(eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 )) = βg
′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 +e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))
and c′(eS
D
) = βg′(1
2
(eS
D
+ eS
D
)). Since deS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 )/de1 ∈ (−1, 0), eSND1 ≥ eSD im-
plies that eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 ) ≤ eSD , which in turn in implies eSND1 + eSND2 (eSND1 ) ≥ 2eSD .
From (I.9), however, we know that βg′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ))) − c′(eSND1 ) > 0. To-
gether with (I.12) this implies that βg′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))− βg′(12(eS
D
+ eS
D
)) >
c′(eS
ND
1 ) − c′(eSD) ≥ 0, where the last inequality holds by our initial assumption
that eS
ND
1 ≥ eSD . With g′(·) being strictly decreasing, this last expression implies
eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 < 2e
SD , a contradiction. Therefore we must have eS
ND
1 < e
SD . Together
with eS
ND
2 (e
SD) = eS
D
, which follows from (I.8) in combination with (I.11) or (I.12),
and deS
ND
2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0), eSND1 < eSD immediately implies eSND1 + eSND2 (eSND1 ) <
2eS
D
. It remains to show that a sophisticate indeed is better off under a deadline
from a long-run perspective, i.e., US
D
0 > U
SND
0 . Let α and γ denote the alloca-
tion of some level of total effort eTotal over tasks and time, respectively. Since time-
consistent agents and sophisticated agents, both under a deadline and under no dead-
line, divide effort evenly among tasks, fix α = 1
2
. Long-run utility then is given by
U0(e
Total, γ) = −c(γeTotal) − c((1 − γ)eTotal) + 2g(1
2
eTotal). Fixing γ = 1
2
, it is readily
verified that U0(e
Total, 1
2
) is a strictly concave function of eTotal which obtains its max-
imum for eTotal = 2eTC . Hence, with eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ) < 2e
SD < 2eTC
ND
we have
US
D
0 = U0(2e
SD , 1
2
) > U0(e
SND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ),
1
2
). Next, fixing an arbitrary level of total
effort eTotal > 0, U0(e
Total, γ) is a strictly concave function with its maximum obtained
at γ = 1
2
. Hence, US
ND
0 < U0(e
SND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ),
1
2
), which establishes the desired
result.
Proof of Proposition I.5: First consider a naive agent who faces no deadline.
Since he predicts his own future behavior to be time-consistent, a first-period naif
makes a plan that he believes to follow through in period 2. In the first period, he
chooses e1 and plans to choose e2 tomorrow. Moreover, he plans to allocate α(e1 + e2)
to task A and (1−α)(e1+ e2) to task B. It is important to note, that the allocation of
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first-period effort respectively second-period effort to a specific task is not important
from the perspective of period 1. First-period utility of a naif is
UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α) = −c(e1)− βc(e2) + βg(α(e1 + e2)) + βg((1− α)(e1 + e2)).
Obviously, UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α) is maximized by an interior solution, (e
NND
1 , e
TCND
2 , α
NND),
which is characterized by the following first-order conditions:
∂UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α)
∂e1
= 0 ⇐⇒ −c′(eNND1 ) + βg′(αN
ND
(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 ))α
NND
+ βg′((1− αNND)(eNND1 + eTC
ND
2 ))(1− αN
ND
) = 0 , (A.15)
∂UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α)
∂e2
= 0 ⇐⇒ −βc′(eTCND2 ) + βg′(αN
ND
(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 ))α
NND
+ βg′((1− αNND)(eNND1 + eTC
ND
2 ))(1− αN
ND
) = 0 , (A.16)
∂UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α)
∂α
= 0 ⇐⇒
βg′(αN
ND
(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 )) = βg
′((1− αNND)(eNND1 + eTC
ND
2 )). (A.17)
From (A.17) it follows that αN
ND
= 1/2. With αN
ND
= 1/2, eN
ND
1 and e
TCND
2 are
characterized by
βg′((1/2)(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 )) = c
′(eN
ND
1 ) , (A.18)
g′((1/2)(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 )) = c
′(eTC
ND
2 ) , (A.19)
which immediately implies that eN
ND
1 < e
TCND
2 .
Next, we show that given eN
ND
1 the naif will indeed achieve effort smoothing over
tasks in the second period. Suppose the opposite, i.e., assume (w.l.o.g.) that in period
1 the naif invested that much more effort in task B than in task A such that even
if he invested all second-period effort in task A, effort smoothing is not achieved,
eN
ND
A1 + e2 < eB1. Since in period 2 the agent prefers an effort allocaation as even as
possible, all second-period effort is invested in task A and therefore is characterized by
βg′(eN
ND
A1 + e
NND
2 ) = c
′(eN
ND
2 ) . (A.20)
From (A.18), we know that
βg′((1/2)(eN
ND
A1 + e
NND
B1 + e
TCND
2 )) = c
′(eN
ND
A1 + e
NND
B1 ) . (A.21)
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Equations (A.20) and (A.21) together with the assumption that effort smoothing
is not optimal, which implies eN
ND
2 < e
NND
A1 + e
NND
B1 , yields βg
′(eN
ND
A1 + e
NND
2 ) <
βg′((1/2)(eN
ND
A1 +e
NND
B1 +e
TCND
2 )). This last inequality implies 2e
NND
2 > e
NND
B1 −eNNDA1 +
eTC
ND
2 , which cannot hold since e
TCND
2 > e
NND
1 > e
NND
2 and e
NND
B1 − eNNDA1 > eNND2 by
the initial assumption that effort smoothing over tasks is not achieved. Thus, first-
period effort will always be chosen such that effort smoothing over tasks is achieved in
period 2.
Taking into account that effort will be split evenly among tasks, the utility of a
second-period naif is
UN
ND
2 = −c(e2) + β2g((1/2)(eN
ND
1 + e
2)) .
The optimal second-period effort, eN
ND
2 , is characterized by the following first-order
condition:
βg′((1/2)(eN
ND
1 + e
NND
2 ) = c
′(eN
ND
2 ), (A.22)
Comparing (A.19) and (A.22) yields eN
ND
2 < e
TCND
2 , which in combination with (A.18)
and (A.22) implies eN
ND
1 < e
NND
2 .
Next, consider the case where a naive agent faces a deadline, formally, eA1 = eA,
eA2 = 0, and eB2 = e2. The utility of a naive agent in the first period is given by
UN
D
1 = −c(eA + eB1)− βc(eTC2 (eB1)) + βg(eA) + βg(eB1 + eTC2 (eB1)) ,
where eTC2 (eB1) is characterized by
g′(eB1 + e
TC
2 (eB1)) = c
′(eTC2 (eB1)). (A.23)
The first-order conditions of utility maximization take the following form:
∂UN
D
1
∂eA
= 0 ⇐⇒ βg′(eA)− c′(eA + eB1) = 0 (A.24)
∂UN
D
1
∂eB1
= 0 ⇐⇒ βg′(eB1 + eTC2 (eB1))− c′(eA + eB1) = 0 (A.25)
If the above maximization problem has interior solutions, eA > 0 and eB1 > 0, then
these solutions are characterized by (A.24) and (A.25). When both first-order condi-
tions are satisfied, we have g′(eA) = g
′(eB1 + e
TC
2 (eB1)), that is, at an interior solution
we must have eA = eB1 + e
TC
2 (eB1). By (A.24), however, it is immediate that eA is
decreasing in eB1. Moreover, comparing (A.23) and (A.24) reveals that e
TC
2 (eB1) > eA
for eB1 = 0. Together with de
TC
2 (eB1)/deB1 ∈ (−1, 0), these last two observations imply
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that eA < eB1+e
TC
2 (eB1) for all eB1 ≥ 0, a contradiction. Hence, the naive agent’s first-
period utility maximization problem has a corner solution. Similar reasoning as in the
case of the sophisticate allows us to restrict attention to the following two candidates
for this corner solution: (i) eN
D
A > 0 and e
ND
B1 = 0 or (ii) e
ND
A = 0 and e
ND
B1 > 0. For (ii)
to be the solution to the naive agent’s first-period problem, the following conditions
have to hold:
βg′(0)− c′(eNDB1 ) ≤ 0 (A.26)
βg′(eN
D
B1 + e
TC
B2 (e
ND
B1 ))− c′(eN
D
B1 ) = 0 (A.27)
Obviously, for (A.26) and (A.27) to hold simultaneously it is required that eN
D
B1 +
eTC2 (e
ND
B1 ) ≤ 0, which can never be the case. Therefore we are left with eNDA > 0 and
eN
D
B1 = 0, that is, in the first period the agents invests only in task A. This first-period
effort is characterized by
βg′(eN
D
A ) = c
′(eN
D
A ). (A.28)
The second-period utility of a naive agent under a regime with a deadline takes the
following form:
UN
D
2 = −c(eB2) + βg(eN
D
) + βg(eB2) .
The optimal second-period effort then satisfies
βg′(eN
D
B2 ) = c
′(eN
D
B2 ). (A.29)
Comparing (A.28) and (A.29) yields eN
D
A = e
ND
B2 , that is, when facing a deadline a
naive agent equates effort over tasks and smoothes effort over time. Let the effort level
that is chosen by a naive agent under a regime of deadlines per period and per task be
denoted by eN
D
.
To show that a naive agent chooses a higher effort level in the first period when
facing a deadline, suppose, in contradiction, that eN
ND
1 ≥ eND . Then βg′(eND) =
c′(eN
D
) ≤ c′(eNND1 ) = βg′(12(eN
ND
1 + e
TC
2 (e
NND
1 )), where the first equality holds by
(A.28) and the second equality holds by (A.18). But with g′′(·) < 0, this implies eND ≥
1
2
(eN
ND
1 + e
TC
2 (e
NND
1 )) > e
NND
1 , a contradiction. Hence we must have e
NND
1 < e
ND . Let
eNND2 (e1) be characterized by βg
′((1/2)(e1 + e
NND
2 (e1))) = c
′(eN
ND
2 (e1)). Note that
eN
ND
2 (e
ND) = eN
D
, which in combination with (A.28) and deN
ND
2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0),
eN
ND
1 < e
ND implies eN
ND
1 + e
NND
2 < 2e
ND . That is, when facing a deadline, a naive
agent exhibits a higher total effort level than under regime without a deadline.
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To see that UN
D
0 > U
NND
0 the same reasoning applies as in the case of the sophisti-
cate. For a formal argument we refer to the proof of Proposition I.4. Intuitively, under
deadlines a naive chooses a more desirable total effort level than under no deadlines,
which moreover is allocated more efficiently over the two periods.
1.2. Partial Naivete´
In this section of the appendix we analyze the behavior of a partially naive agent in
the sense of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001b). A partially naive person is aware that
he has future self-control problems, but he underestimates their magnitude. Formally,
let βˆ ∈ (β, 1) be the person’s belief about what his taste for immediate gratification
will be in the future. Thus, in the single task model a partially naive agent believes in
period 1 that his future self will maximize −c(e2)+ βˆg(eˆ1+e2), whereas he will actually
choose e2 to maximize −c(e2) + βg(eˆ1 + e2). Note that the extreme cases βˆ = 1 and
βˆ = β correspond to the cases analyzed in the main body of the paper, (total) naivete´
and (full) sophistication, respectively.
Single Task Model Here, we investigate the behavior of a partially naive agent in
the single task model with two periods for working on that task.
Definition A.1: A perception-perfect strategy for a partially naive agent is given by
(eP1 , e
P
2 (eˆ1)) such that (i) ∀ eˆ1 ≥ 0, eP2 (eˆ1) ∈ argmaxe2{−c(e2) + βg(eˆ1 + e2)}, and (ii)
eP1 ∈ argmaxe1{−c(e1)−c(eB2 (e1))+βg(e1+eB2 (e1))} where eB2 (eˆ1) ∈ argmaxe2{−c(e2)+
βˆg(eˆ1 + e2)}. Let eP2 = eP2 (eP1 ).
In the first period the partially naive agent believes that his second-period effort, eB2 (eˆ1),
is characterized by the following first-order condition
βˆg′(eˆ1 + e
B
2 (eˆ1)) = c
′(eB2 (eˆ1)) . (A.30)
Differentiating (A.30) with respect to e1 and rearranging yields
deB2 (e1)
de1
= − βˆg
′′(e1 + e
B
2 (e1))
βˆg′′(e1 + eSB(e1))− c′′(eB2 (e1))
∈ (−1, 0) .
The utility of a partially naive agent in the the first period, taking his believed second-
period reaction into account, is
−c(e1)− βc(eB2 (e1)) + βg(e1 + eB2 (e1)) . (A.31)
The corresponding first-order condition for optimality is given by
−c′(eP1 ) + βg′
(
eP1 + e
B
2 (e
P
1 )
)
+
deB2 (e
P
1 )
de1
β
[
g′
(
eP1 + e
B
2 (e
P
1 )
)− c′(eB2 (eP1 ))] = 0.(A.32)
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The first-order condition is necessary and sufficient for optimality by similar reasonings
as in the case of a sophisticated agent. Finally, actual second-period effort, eP2 , is
characterized by
βg′(eP1 + e
P
2 ) = c
′(eP2 ) . (A.33)
A comparison of (A.30) and (A.33) directly reveals that eB2 (e
P
1 ) > e
P
2 . A partially naive
agent is overly optimistic when predicting his future self’s willingness to work. From
equations (A.30) and (A.32) it follows that−c′(eP1 )+βg′(eP1 +eB2 (eP1 )) > 0, which implies
that c′(eP1 ) < βg
′(eP1 + e
B
2 (e
P
1 )) < βg
′(eP1 + e
P
2 ) = c
′(eP2 ). Thus, e
P
1 < e
P
2 . Put verbally,
a partially naive agent increases his effort over time. As last result for the single task
case we show that a partially naive agent works less in total than a time-consistent
agent, i.e., eP1 + e
P
2 < 2e
TC . Suppose, in contradiction, that eP1 + e
P
2 ≥ 2eTC . We know
that βg′(eP1 +e
B
2 (e
P
1 ))−c′(eP1 ) > 0 = g′(eTC+eTC)−c′(eTC). Note that eP1 +eP2 ≥ 2eTC
implies that eP1 + e
B
2 (e
P
1 ) ≥ 2eTC . Since g′′(·) < 0 and c′′(·) > 0 the above inequality
implies that eP1 < e
TC . Furthermore, βg′(eP1 +e
P
2 )−c′(eP2 ) = 0 = g′(eTC+eTC)−c′(eTC).
But this means that eP2 < e
TC which leads to a contradiction to our a priori assumption
that eP1 +e
P
2 ≥ 2eTC . Now we have established the following result, which is the analog
to Propositions I.1 and I.2 for the case of a partially naive agent.
Proposition A.1: (i) A partially naive agent invests more effort in period 2 than in
period 1, i.e., eP1 < e
P
2 . (ii) The total effort a partially naive agent invests is lower
than the total effort of a time-consistent person, i.e., eP1 + e
P
2 < 2e
TC. (iii) A partially
naive agent overestimates his future effort, i.e., eP2 < e
B
2 (e
P
1 ).
Two Task Model This subsection analyzes the two task model introduced in Section
5 for the case of a partially naive agent. Let us first consider the no deadline regime,
that is, the agent can work in periods 1 and 2 on both tasks, A and B. In principle,
the agent chooses in each period t ∈ {1, 2} an effort level et and an allocation αt, with
eAt = αtet and eBt = (1−αt)et. Obviously, ex post it is optimal that the agent invests
the same amount in task A as in task B. Ex ante, however, it is not clear that the
agent will choose in the first period (e1, α1) such that his second-period self considers
it optimal to choose (e2, α2) such that eA = eB. Fortunately, by applying the same line
of arguments as in the proof of Proposition I.4 one can show that it is never optimal
for a first-period partially naive agent to choose (e1, α1) such that neither his believed
second-period behavior nor his actual second-period behavior will not lead to effort
smoothing over tasks. Roughly, the intuition is that e1 has to be very high and α1 has
to be close to zero or one such that the total effort needed in the second period to set
eA = eB is too costly for the second-period self. We know from the single task case
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that the first-period self prefers to work less today and more tomorrow. This can only
be achieved by a tupel (e1, α1) such that effort smoothing over tasks is a best response
for both the actual and the believed second-period self. This observation allows us
to focus on the agent’s effort choice over time. With effort being spread out evenly
among the two tasks, the believed second-period effort as a function of first-period
effort, eB
ND
2 (eˆ1), is characterized by
c′(eB
ND
2 (eˆ1)) = βˆg
′((1/2)(eˆ1 + e
BND
2 (eˆ1))). (A.34)
The effort level chosen by a partially naive agent in the first period is determined by
the following first-order condition,1
βg′
(
(1/2)(eB
ND
1 + e
BND
2 (e
BND
1 ))
)
− c′(eBND1 )
+
deB
ND
2 (e1)
de1
β
[
g′
(
(1/2)(eB
ND
1 + e
BND
2 (e
BND
1 ))
)
− c′(eBND2 (eB
ND
1 ))
]
= 0 . (A.35)
The actual second-period effort, eP
ND
2 , is characterized by
c′(eP
ND
2 ) = βˆg
′((1/2)(eP
ND
1 + e
PND
2 )). (A.36)
Comparing the above equations reveals that eP
ND
1 < e
PND
2 and e
PND
A = e
PND
B =
(1/2)(eP
ND
1 + e
PND
2 ). Put verbally, when not facing a deadline, a partially naive agent
equates effort over tasks but does not achieve effort smoothing over time.
Next, the situation where the partially naive agent faces a deadline after the first
period for task A is analyzed. Thus, the agent chooses (eA, eB1) in the first period and
eB2 in the second period. When facing this interim deadline, a partially naive agent
considers it optimal to work exclusively on task A in the first period, i.e., eP
D
B1 = 0.
This statement can be verified by the same line of arguments as used to show the
corresponding result for the sophisticated agent. Hence, the effort levels which are
chosen strictly positive, eP
D
A and e
PD
B2 , are characterized as follows:
c′(eP
D
A ) = βg
′(eP
D
A ) (A.37)
c′(eP
D
B2 ) = βg
′(eP
D
B2 ) (A.38)
When facing a deadline, a partially naive agent smoothes effort over time and equates
effort over tasks. Let eP
D
= eP
D
A = e
PD
1 and e
PD = eP
D
B2 = e
PD
B = e
PD
2 . Now, we can
state the analog result to Proposition I.4 (respectively I.5) for the case of a partially
naive agent.
1The first-order approach is valid according to the same reasoning as in the single-task case.
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Proposition A.2: When facing a deadline, a partially naive agent chooses a higher
effort level in the first period and a higher total effort level than under a regime without
a deadline, i.e., eP
ND
1 < e
PD and eP
ND
1 + e
PND
2 < 2e
PD . Moreover, the partially naive
agent is strictly better off from a long-run perspective when facing a deadline, i.e.,
UP
D
0 > U
PND
0 .
The statements of the proposition that do not follow from the above analysis can be
shown by applying the corresponding parts of the proof of Proposition I.4.
2. Appendix to Chapter II
2.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma II.1:
Suppose that signals are ordered according to their likelihood ratio, that is, s > s′ if
and only if γHs /γ
L
s > γ
H
s′ /γ
L
s′ . Consider a contract of the form
us =
{
u if s < sˆ
u+ b if s ≥ sˆ ,
where b > 0 and 1 < sˆ ≤ S. Under this contractual form and given that the first-order
approach is valid, (IC) can be rewritten as
b
{[
S∑
s=sˆ
(γHs − γLs )
](
1− (λ− 1)
sˆ−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)
)
− (λ− 1)
(
sˆ−1∑
s=1
(γHs − γLs )
)(
S∑
s=sˆ
γs(aˆ)
)}
= c′(aˆ).
Since signals are ordered according to their likelihood ratio, we have
∑S
s=sˆ(γ
H
s −γLs ) > 0
and
∑sˆ−1
s=1(γ
H
s −γLs ) < 0 for all 1 < sˆ ≤ S. This implies that the term in curly brackets
is strictly positive for λ ≤ 2. Hence, with c′(aˆ) > 0, b can alway be chosen such that
(IC) is met. Rearranging the participation constraint,
u ≥ u¯+ c(aˆ)− b
(
S∑
s=sˆ
γs(aˆ)
)[
1− (λ− 1)
(
sˆ−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)
)]
,
reveals that (IR) can be satisfied for any b by choosing u appropriately. This concludes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition II.1:
It is readily verified that Assumptions 1-3 from Grossman and Hart (1983) are sat-
isfied. Thus, the cost-minimization problem is well defined, in the sense that for each
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action a ∈ (0, 1) there exists a second-best incentive scheme. Suppose the principal
wants to implement action aˆ ∈ (0, 1) at minimum cost. Since the agent’s action is not
observable, the principal’s problem is given by
min
{us}Ss=1
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h(us) (MR)
subject to
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)us − c(aˆ) ≥ u¯ , (IRR)
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γLs )us − c′(aˆ) = 0 . (ICR)
where the first constraint is the individual rationality constraint and the second is the
incentive compatibility constraint. Note that the first-order approach is valid, since
the agent’s expected utility is a strictly concave function of his effort. The Lagrangian
to the resulting problem is
L =
S∑
s=1
γs(a)h(us)−µ0
{
S∑
s=1
γs(a)us − c(a)− u¯
}
−µ1
{
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γLs )us − c′(a)
}
,
where µ0 and µ1 denote the Lagrange multipliers of the individual rationality constraint
and the incentive compatibility constraint, respectively. Setting the partial derivative
of L with respect to us equal to zero yields
∂L
∂us
= 0 ⇐⇒ h′(us) = µ0 + µ1γ
H
s − γLs
γs(aˆ)
, ∀s ∈ S. (A.39)
Irrespective of the value of µ0, if µ1 > 0, convexity of h(·) implies that us > us′
if and only if (γHs − γLs )/γs(aˆ) > (γHs′ − γLs′)/γs′(aˆ), which in turn is equivalent to
γHs /γ
L
s > γ
H
s′ /γ
L
s′ . Thus it remains to show that µ1 is strictly positive. Suppose, in
contradiction, that µ1 ≤ 0. Consider the case µ1 = 0 first. From (A.39) it follows
that us = u
f for all s ∈ S, where uf satisfies h′(uf ) = µ0. This, however, violates
(ICR), a contradiction. Next, consider µ1 < 0. From (A.39) it follows that us < us′
if and only if (γHs − γLs )/γs(aˆ) > (γHs′ − γLs′)/γt(aˆ). Let S+ ≡
{
s|γHs − γLs > 0
}
, S− ≡{
s|γHs − γLs < 0
}
, and uˆ ≡ min{us|s ∈ S−}. Since uˆ > us for all s ∈ S+, we have
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γLs )us =
∑
S−
(γHs − γLs )us +
∑
S+
(γHs − γLs )us
<
∑
S−
(γHs − γLs )uˆ+
∑
S+
(γHs − γLs )uˆ
= uˆ
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γLs )
= 0,
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again a contradiction to (ICR). Hence, µ1 > 0 and the desired result follows.
Proof of Proposition II.2:
The problem of finding the optimal contract u∗ to implement action aˆ ∈ (0, 1) is
decomposed into two subproblems. First, for a given incentive feasible ordering of
signals, we derive the optimal nondecreasing incentive scheme that implements action
aˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, in a second step, we choose the ordering of signals for which the
ordering specific cost of implementation is lowest.
Step 1: Remember that the ordering of signals is incentive feasible if βs(·) > 0 for at
least one signal s. For a given incentive feasible ordering of signals, in this first step we
solve Program ML. First, note that it is optimal to set bs = 0 if βs(·) < 0. To see this,
suppose, in contradiction, that in the optimum (IC′) holds and bs > 0 for some signal
s with βs(·) ≤ 0. If βs(·) = 0, then setting bs = 0 leaves (IC′) unchanged, but leads to
a lower value of the objective function of Program ML, contradicting that the original
contract is optimal. If βs(·) < 0, then setting bs = 0 not only reduces the value of the
objective function, but also relaxes (IC′), which in turn allows to lower other bonus
payments, thereby lowering the value of the objective function even further. Again,
a contradiction to the original contract being optimal. Let Sβ ≡ {s ∈ S|βs(·) > 0}
denote the set of signals for which βs(·) is strictly positive under the considered ordering
of signals, and let Sβ denote the number of elements in this set. Thus, Program ML
can be rewritten as
Program ML+:
min
(bs)s∈Sβ
∑
s∈Sβ
bsρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
subject to (i)
∑
s∈Sβ
bsβs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c
′(aˆ) (IC+)
(ii) bs ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ Sβ .
Program ML+ is a linear programming problem. It is well-known that if a linear
programming problem has a solution, it must have a solution at an extreme point
of the constraint set. Generically, there is a unique solution and this solution is
an extreme point. Since the constraint set of Program ML+, M ≡ {(bs)s∈Sβ ∈
R
Sβ
+ |
∑
s∈Sβ
bsβs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c
′(aˆ)}, is closed and bounded, Program ML+ has a solu-
tion. Hence, generically
∑
s∈Sβ
bsρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) achieves its greatest lower bound at one of
the extreme points of M. (We comment on genericity below.) With M describing a
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hyperplane in R
Sβ
+ , all extreme points of M are characterized by the following prop-
erty: bs > 0 for exactly one signal s ∈ Sβ and bt = 0 for all t ∈ Sβ, t 6= s. It remains
to determine for which signal the bonus is set strictly positive. The size of the bonus
payment, which is set strictly positive, is uniquely determined by (IC+):
bsβs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c
′(aˆ) ⇐⇒ bs = c
′(aˆ)
βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
. (A.40)
Therefore, from the objective function of Program ML+ it follows that, for the signal
ordering under consideration, the optimal signal for which the bonus is set strictly
positive, sˆ, is characterized by
sˆ ∈ argmin
s∈Sβ
c′(aˆ)
βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
ρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ).
Step 2: From all incentive feasible signal orders, the principal chooses the one which
minimizes her cost of implementation. With the number of incentive feasible signal
orders being finite, this problem clearly has a solution. Let s∗ denote the resulting
cutoff, i.e.,
u∗s =
{
u∗ if s < s∗
u∗ + b∗ if s ≥ s∗ ,
where b∗ = c′(aˆ)/βs∗(γˆ, λ, aˆ) and u
∗ = u¯+c(aˆ)−b∗
[∑S
τ=s∗ γτ (aˆ)− ρs∗(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
]
. Letting
u∗L = u
∗, u∗H = u
∗ + b∗, and B∗ = {s ∈ S|s ≥ s∗} establishes the desired result.
On genericity: We claimed that, for any given feasible ordering of signals, generi-
cally Program ML+ has a unique solution at one of the extreme points of the constraint
set. To see this, note that a necessary condition for the existence of multiple solutions
is βs/βs′ = ρs/ρs′ for some s, s
′ ∈ Sβ, s 6= s′. This condition is characterized by the
action to be implemented, aˆ, the structure of the performance measure,
{
(γHs , γ
L
s )
}S
s=1
,
and the agent’s degree of loss aversion, λ. Now, fix aˆ and
{
(γHs , γ
L
s )
}S
s=1
. With both
βs > 0 and ρs > 0 for all s ∈ Sβ, it is readily verified, that exactly one value of λ
equates βs/βs′ with ρs/ρs′ . Since λ is drawn from the interval (1, 2], and with the num-
ber of signals being finite, this necessary condition for Program ML+ having multiple
solutions for a given feasible ordering of signals generically will not hold. With the
number of feasible orderings being finite, generic optimality of a corner solution carries
over to the overall problem.
Proof of Proposition II.3:
B∗ maximizes X(B) := [∑s∈B(γHs − γLs )]× Y (PB), where
Y (PB) :=
1
(λ− 1)PB(1− PB) −
1
PB
+
1
1− PB .
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Suppose for the moment that PB is a continuous decision variable. Accordingly,
dY (PB)
dPB
=
1
P 2B(1− PB)2
[
2P 2B +
2− λ
λ− 1(2PB − 1)
]
. (A.41)
It is readily verified that dY (PB)/dPB < 0 for 0 < PB < P¯ (λ) and dY (PB)/dPB > 0
for P¯ (λ) < PB < 1, where
P¯ (λ) ≡ λ− 2 +
√
λ(2− λ)
2(λ− 1) .
Note that for λ ≤ 2 the critical value P¯ (λ) ∈ [0, 1/2). Hence, excluding a signal of
B increases Y (PB) if PB < P¯ (λ), whereas including a signal to B increases Y (PB) if
PB ≥ P¯ (λ). With these insights the next two implications follow immediately.
(i) PB∗ < P¯ (λ) =⇒ B∗ ⊆ S+
(ii) PB∗ ≥ P¯ (λ) =⇒ S+ ⊆ B∗
We prove both statements in turn by contradiction. (i) Suppose PB∗ < P¯ (λ) and
that there exists a signal sˆ ∈ S− which is also contained in B∗, i.e., sˆ ∈ B∗. Clearly,∑
s∈B∗(γ
H
s − γLs ) <
∑
s∈B∗\{sˆ}(γ
H
s − γLs ) because sˆ is a bad signal. Moreover, Y (B∗) <
Y (B∗\{sˆ}) because Y (·) increases when signals are excluded of B∗. Thus X(B∗) <
X(B∗\{sˆ}), a contradiction to the assumption that B∗ is the optimal partition. (ii)
Suppose PB∗ ≥ P¯ (λ) and that there exists a signal s˜ ∈ S+ that is not contained in B∗,
i.e., B∗ ∩ {s˜} = ∅. Since sˆ is a good signal ∑s∈B∗(γHs − γLs ) < ∑s∈B∗∪{sˆ}(γHs − γLs ).
PB∗ ≥ P¯ (λ) implies that Y (B∗ ∪ {s˜}) > Y (B∗). Thus, X(B∗) < X(B∗ ∪ {s˜}) a contra-
diction to the assumption that B∗ maximizes X(B∗). Finally, since for any B∗ we are
either in case (i) or in case (ii), the desired result follows.
Proof of Proposition II.4:
Suppose, in contradiction, that in the optimum there are signals s, t ∈ S such that
s ∈ B∗, t /∈ B∗ and (γHs − γLs )/γs(aˆ) < (γHt − γLt )/γt(aˆ). We derive a contradiction by
showing that exchanging signal s for signal t reduces the principal’s cost, which implies
that the original contract cannot be optimal. Let B¯ ≡ (B∗ \ {s}) ∪ {t}.
(∑
j∈B∗
(γHj − γLj ) + (γHt − γLt )− (γHs − γLs )
)[
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
>
(∑
j∈B∗
(γHj − γLj )
)[
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB∗)
(λ− 1)PB∗(1− PB∗)
]
.
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Rearranging yields
[
(γHt − γLt )− (γHs − γLs )
] [1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
>(∑
j∈B∗
(γHj − γLj )
)[
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB∗)
(λ− 1)PB∗(1− PB∗) −
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
. (A.42)
With Y (PB) being defined as in the proof of Proposition II.3, we have to consider two
cases, (i) dY (PB∗)/PB ≥ 0, and (ii) dY (PB∗)/PB < 0.
Case (i): Since γs(aˆ)−γt(aˆ) ≤ κ, we have PB∗ ≤ PB¯+κ. With Y (PB) being (weakly)
increasing at PB∗ , inequality (A.42) is least likely to hold for PB∗ = PB¯ + κ. Inserting
PB∗ = PB¯ + κ into (A.42) yields
[
(γHt − γLt )− (γHs − γLs )
] [1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
>(∑
j∈B∗
(γHj − γLj )
)[
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯ − 2κ)
(λ− 1)[PB¯(1− PB¯) + κ(1− 2PB¯)− κ2]
− 1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
.
(A.43)
The right-hand side of (A.43) becomes arbitrarily close to zero for κ → 0, thus it
remains to show that[
(γHt − γLt )− (γHs − γLs )
] [1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
> 0 . (A.44)
For (A.44) to hold, we must have (γHt − γLt ) − (γHs − γLs ) > 0. From the proof of
Proposition II.3 we know that S+ ⊆ B∗ if Y (PB) is increasing at B∗. Since the principal
will end up including all good signals in the set B∗ anyway, the question of interest is
whether she can benefit from swapping two bad signals. Therefore, we consider case
s, t ∈ S−, where S− ≡ {s ∈ S|γHs − γLs < 0}. With s, t ∈ S−, we have[
(γHt − γLt )− (γHs − γLs )
] ≥ γt(aˆ)γs(aˆ) [ 1
γs(aˆ)
γHt − γLt
γt(aˆ)
− 1
γs(aˆ) + κ
γHs − γLs
γs(aˆ)
]
,(A.45)
where the inequality holds because γt(aˆ) − γs(aˆ) ≤ κ. Note that for κ → 0 the right-
hand side of (A.45) becomes strictly positive, thus (γHt −γLt )−(γHs −γLs ) > 0 for κ→ 0.
Hence, for κ sufficiently small, X(B∗) < X(B¯), a contradiction to B∗ being optimal.
Case (ii): Since γt(aˆ) − γs(aˆ) ≤ κ, we have PB∗ ≥ PB¯ − κ. With Y (PB) being
decreasing at PB∗ , inequality (A.42) is least likely to hold for PB∗ = PB¯ − κ. Inserting
PB∗ = PB¯ − κ into (A.42), and running along the lines of case (i) allows us to establish
that, for κ sufficiently small, X(B∗) < X(B¯), a contradiction to B∗ being optimal.
To sum up, for κ sufficiently small we have
max
s∈S\B∗
{(γHs − γLs )/γs(aˆ)} < min
s∈B∗
{(γHs − γLs )/γs(aˆ)} ,
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or equivalently, maxs∈S\B∗{γHs /γLs } < mins∈B∗{γHs /γLs } =: K, which establishes the
result.
Proof of Proposition II.5:
We first prove part (ii). Consider a feasible partition B. The corresponding bonus
to implement aˆ is given by
b =
c′(aˆ)∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γLs )− (λ− 1)
[∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γLs )
]
[1− 2PB]
. (A.46)
Straight-forward differentiation reveals that
db
dλ
=
c′(aˆ)
[∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γLs )
]
[1− 2PB]{∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γLs )− (λ− 1)
[∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γLs )
]
[1− 2PB]
}2 .
Since for a feasible partition
∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γLs ) > 0, the desired result follows.
To prove part (i), let B+ ≡ {B ⊂ S|∑s∈B(γHs − γLs ) > 0}. For any B˜ ∈ B+, let
bB˜ =
c′(aˆ)∑
s∈B˜(γ
H
s − γLs )− (λ− 1)
[∑
s∈B˜(γ
H
s − γLs )
]
[1− 2PB˜]
and
uB˜ = u¯+ c(aˆ)− bB˜PB˜ + (λ− 1)PB˜(1− PB˜)bB˜.
The cost of implementing action aˆ when paying uB˜ for signals in S \ B˜ and uB˜ + bB˜ for
signals in B˜ is given by
CB˜ = uB˜ + bB˜PB˜ = u¯+ c(aˆ) +
c′(aˆ)(λ− 1)PB˜(1− PB˜)[∑
s∈B˜(γ
H
s − γLs )
]
[1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB˜)]
. (A.47)
Differentiation of CB˜ with respect to λ yields
dCB˜
dλ
=
c′(aˆ)PB˜(1− PB˜)[∑
s∈B˜(γ
H
s − γLs )
]
[1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB˜)]2
.
Obviously, dCB/dλ > 0 for all B ∈ B+. Since the optimal partition of S may change
as λ changes, the minimum cost of implementing action aˆ is given by
C(aˆ) = min
B∈B+
CB.
Put differently, C(aˆ) is the lower envelope of all CB for B ∈ B+. With CB being contin-
uous and strictly increasing in λ for all B ∈ B+, it follows that also C(aˆ) is continuous
and strictly increasing in λ. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition II.6:
First consider b ≥ 0. We divide the analysis for b ≥ 0 into three subcases.
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Case 1 (a0 < 0): For the effort level aˆ to be chosen by the agent, this effort level has
to satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint:
aˆ ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
u+ γ(a)b− γ(a)(1− γ(a))b(λ− 1)− k
2
a2. (IC)
For aˆ to be a zero of dEU(a)/da, the bonus has to be chosen according to
b∗(aˆ) =
kaˆ
(γH − γL) [2− λ+ 2γ(aˆ)(λ− 1)] .
Since a0 < 0, b
∗(a) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function with b∗(0) = 0.
Hence, each aˆ ∈ [0, 1] can be made a zero of dEU(a)/da with a nonnegative bonus.
By choosing the bonus according to b∗(aˆ), aˆ satisfies, by construction, the first-order
condition. Inserting b∗(aˆ) into d2EU(a)/da2 shows that expected utility is strictly
concave function if a0 < 0. Hence, with the bonus set equal to b
∗(aˆ), effort level aˆ
satisfies the second-order condition for optimality and therefore is incentive compatible.
Case 2 (a0 = 0): Just like in the case where a0 < 0, each effort level a ∈ [0, 1] turns
out to be implementable with a nonnegative bonus. To see this, consider bonus
b0 =
k
2(γH − γL)2(λ− 1) .
For b < b0, dEU(a)/da < 0 for each a > 0, that is, lowering effort increases expected
utility. Hence, the agent wants to choose an effort level as low as possible and therefore
exerts no effort at all. If, on the other hand, b > b0, then dEU(a)/da > 0. Now,
increasing effort increases expected utility, and the agent wants to choose effort as high
as possible. For b = b0, expected utility is constant over all a ∈ [0, 1], that is, as long
as his participation constraint is satisfied, the agent is indifferent which effort level
to choose. As a tie-breaking rule we assume that, if indifferent between several effort
levels, the agent chooses the effort level that the principal prefers.
Case 3 (a0 > 0): If a0 > 0, the agent either chooses a = 0 or a = 1. To see this,
again consider bonus b0. For b ≤ b0, dEU(a)/da < 0 for each a > 0. Hence, the agent
wants to exert as little effort as possible and chooses a = 0. If, on the other hand,
b > b0, then d
2EU(a)/da2 > 0, that is, expected utility is a strictly convex function
of effort. In order to maximize expected utility, the agent will choose either a = 0 or
a = 1 depending on whether EU(0) exceeds EU(1) or not.
Negative Bonus: b < 0
Let b− < 0 denote the monetary punishment that the agent receives if the good signal
is observed. With a negative bonus, the agent’s expected utility is
EU(a) = u+ γ(a)b− + γ(a)(1− γ(a))λb− + (1− γ(a))γ(a)(−b−)− k
2
a2. (A.48)
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The first derivative with respect to effort,
dEU(a)
da
= (γH − γL)b− [λ− 2γ(a)(λ− 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB−(a)
− ka︸︷︷︸
MC(a)
,
reveals that MB−(a) is a positively sloped function, which is steeper the harsher the
punishment is, that is, the more negative b− is. It is worthwhile to point out that if
bonus and punishment are equal in absolute value, |b−| = b, then also the slopes of
MB−(a) and MB(a) are identical. The intercept of MB−(a) with the horizontal axis,
a−0 again is completely determined by the model parameters:
a−0 =
λ− 2γL(λ− 1)
2(γH − γL)(λ− 1) .
Note that a−0 > 0 for γ
L ≤ 1/2. For γL > 1/2 we have a−0 < 0 if and only if
λ > 2γL/(2γL−1). Proceeding in exactly the same way as in the case of a nonnegative
bonus yields a familiar results: effort level aˆ ∈ [0, 1] is implementable with a strictly
negative bonus if and only if a−0 ≤ 0. Finally, note that a0 < a−0 . Hence a negative
bonus does not improve the scope for implementation.
Proof of Proposition II.7:
Throughout the analysis we restricted attention to nonnegative bonus payment. It
remains to be shown that the principal cannot benefit from offering a negative bonus
payment: implementing action aˆ with a negative bonus is at least as costly as imple-
menting action aˆ with a positive bonus. In what follows, we make use of notation
introduced in the paper as well as in the proof of Proposition II.6. Let a0(p), a
−
0 (p),
b∗(p; aˆ), and u∗(p; aˆ) denote the expressions obtained from a0, a
−
0 , b
∗(aˆ), and u∗(aˆ),
respectively, by replacing γ(aˆ), γL, and γH with γ(p, aˆ), γL(p), and γH(p). From the
proof of Proposition II.6 we know that (i) action aˆ is implementable with a nonnegative
bonus (negative bonus) if and only if a0(p) ≤ 0 (a−0 (p) ≤ 0), and (ii) a−0 (p) ≤ 0 implies
a0(p) < 0. We will show that, for a given value of p, if aˆ is implementable with a
negative bonus then it is less costly to implement aˆ with a nonnegative bonus.
Consider first the case where a−0 (p) < 0. The negative bonus payment satisfying
incentive compatibility is given by
b−(p; aˆ) =
kaˆ
(γH(p)− γL(p)) [λ− 2γ(p, aˆ)(λ− 1)] .
It is easy to verify that the required punishment to implement aˆ is larger in absolute
value than than the respective nonnegative bonus which is needed to implement aˆ, that
is, b∗(p; aˆ) < |b−(p; aˆ)| for all aˆ ∈ (0, 1) and all p ∈ [0, 1). When punishing the agent
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with a negative bonus b−(p; aˆ), u−(p; aˆ) will be chosen to satisfy the corresponding
participation constraint with equality, that is,
u−(p; aˆ) = u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(p, aˆ)b−(p; aˆ) [λ− γ(p, aˆ)(λ− 1)] .
Remember that, if aˆ is implemented with a nonnegative bonus, we have
u∗(p; aˆ) = u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(p, aˆ)b∗(p; aˆ) [2− λ+ γ(p, aˆ)(λ− 1)] .
It follows immediately that the minimum cost of implementing aˆ with a nonnegative
bonus is lower than the minimum implementation cost with a strictly negative bonus:
C−(p; aˆ) = u−(p; aˆ) + γ(p, aˆ)b−(p; aˆ)
= u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(p, aˆ)b−(p; aˆ) [λ− γ(p, aˆ)(λ− 1)− 1]
> u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 + γ(p, aˆ)b∗(p; aˆ) [λ− γ(p, aˆ)(λ− 1)− 1]
= u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(p, aˆ)b∗(p; aˆ) [1− λ+ γ(p, aˆ)(λ− 1)]
= u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(p, aˆ)b∗(p; aˆ) [2− λ+ γ(p, aˆ)(λ− 1)] + γ(p, aˆ)b∗(p; aˆ)
= u∗(p; aˆ) + γ(p, aˆ)b∗(p; aˆ)
= C(p; aˆ).
The same line of argument holds when a−0 = 0: the bonus which satisfies the (IC) is
b−0 (p; aˆ) = −
k
2(γH(p)− γL(p))2(λ− 1) ,
and so b∗(p; aˆ) < |b−0 (p; aˆ)| for all aˆ ∈ (0, 1) and all p ∈ [0, 1).
Proof of Corollary II.1:
Let p ∈ (0, 1). With ζˆ being a convex combination of γˆ and 1 we have (ζH , ζL) =
p(1, 1)+ (1− p)(γH , γL) = (γH + p(1− γH), γL+ p(1− γL)). The desired result follows
immediately from Proposition II.7. Consider λ > 2. Implementation problems are less
likely to be encountered under ζˆ than under γˆ. Moreover, if implementation problems
are not an issue under both performance measures, then implementation of a certain
action is less costly under ζˆ than under γˆ. For λ = 2 implementation problems do not
arise and implementation costs are identical under both performance measures. Last,
if λ < 2, implementation problems are not an issue under either performance measure,
but the cost of implementation is strictly lower under γˆ than under ζˆ.
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2.2. Validity of the First-Order Approach
Lemma A.1: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold, then the incentive constraint in the principal’s
cost minimization problem can be represented as EU ′(aˆ) = 0.
Proof:
Consider a contract (u1, (bs)
S
s=2) with bs ≥ 0 for s = 2, . . . , S. In what follows, we
write βs instead of βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) to cut back on notation. The proof proceeds in two
steps. First, for a given contract with the property bs > 0 only if βs > 0, we show
that all actions that satisfy the first-order condition of the agent’s utility maximization
problem characterize a local maximum of his utility function. Since the utility function
is twice continuously differentiable and all extreme points are local maxima, if there
exists some action that fulfills the first-order condition, this action corresponds to the
unique maximum. In the second step we show that under the optimal contract we
cannot have bs > 0 if βs ≤ 0.
Step 1: The second derivative of the agent’s utility with respect to a is
EU ′′(a) = −2(λ− 1)
S∑
s=2
bsσs − c′′(a) , (A.49)
where σs := (
∑s−1
i=1 (γ
H
i − γLi ))(
∑S
i=s(γ
H
i − γLi )) < 0. Suppose action aˆ satisfies the
first-order condition. Formally
S∑
s=2
bsβs = c
′(aˆ) ⇐⇒
S∑
s=2
bs
βs
aˆ
=
c′(aˆ)
aˆ
. (A.50)
Action aˆ locally maximizes the agent’s utility if
−2(λ− 1)
S∑
s=2
bsσs < c
′′(aˆ) . (A.51)
Under Assumption (A3), we have c′′(aˆ) > c′(aˆ)/aˆ. Therefore, if
S∑
s=2
bs
[−2(λ− 1)σs − βs/aˆ] < 0 , (A.52)
then (A.50) implies (A.51), and each action aˆ satisfying the first-order condition of the
agent’s maximization problem is a local maximum of his expected utility. Inequality
(A.52) obviously is satisfied if each element of the sum is negative. Summand s is
negative if and only if
− 2(λ− 1)
(
s−1∑
i=1
(γHi − γLi )
)(
S∑
i=s
(γHi − γLi )
)
aˆ
−
(
S∑
τ=s
(γHτ − γLτ )
)[
1− (λ− 1)
(
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)]
+(λ−1)
[
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
](
s−1∑
t=1
(γHt − γLt )
)
< 0 .
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Rearranging the above inequality yields
(
S∑
i=s
(γHi − γLi )
){
λ+ 2(λ− 1)
[
aˆ
s−1∑
i=1
(γHi − γLi )−
s−1∑
i=1
γi(aˆ)
]}
> 0
⇐⇒
(
S∑
i=s
(γHi − γLi )
){
λ
(
1−
s−1∑
i=1
γLi
)
+ (2− λ)
s−1∑
i=1
γLi
}
> 0. (A.53)
The term in curly brackets is positive, since λ ≤ 2 and ∑s−1i=1 γLi < 1. Furthermore,
note that
∑S
i=s(γ
H
i − γLi ) > 0 since βs > 0 for all bs > 0. This completes the first step
of the proof.
Step 2: Consider a contract with bs > 0 and βs ≤ 0 for at least one signal s ∈
{2, . . . , S} that implements aˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, under this contract, (IC′) is satisfied and
there exists at least one signal t with βt > 0 and bt > 0. Obviously, the principal can
reduce both bs and bt without violating (IC
′). This reasoning goes through up to the
point where (IC′) is satisfied and bs = 0 for all signals s with βs ≤ 0. From the first step
of the proof we know that the resulting contract implements aˆ incentive compatibly.
Next, we show that reducing any spread, say bk, always reduces the principal’s cost of
implementation.
C(b) =
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h
(
u1(b) +
s∑
t=2
bt
)
, (A.54)
where u1(b) = u¯+ c(aˆ)−
S∑
s=2
bs
[
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)− (λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
)(
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)]
.
The partial derivative of the cost function with respect to an arbitrary bk is
∂C(b)
∂bk
=
k−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h
′
(
u1(b) +
s∑
t=2
bt
)[
∂u1
∂bk
]
+
S∑
s=k
γs(aˆ)h
′
(
u1(b) +
s∑
t=2
bt
)[
∂u1
∂bk
+ 1
]
.
Rearranging yields
∂C(b)
∂bk
=
k−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h
′(us)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)
−
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
S∑
s=k
γs(aˆ)h
′(us)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)
−
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ) + 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (A.55)
Note us ≤ us+1 which implies that h′(us) ≤ h′(us+1). Thus, the following inequality
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holds
∂C(b)
∂bk
≥
k−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h
′(uk)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)
−
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
]
+
S∑
s=k
γs(aˆ)h
′(uk)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)
−
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ) + 1
]
. (A.56)
The above inequality can be rewritten as follows
∂C(b)
∂bk
≥ h′(uk)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)]
> 0 .
Since reducing any bonus lowers the principal’s cost of implementation, it cannot be
optimal to set bs > 0 for βs ≤ 0. This completes the second step of the proof. In
combination with Step 1, this establishes the desired result.
2.3. The General Case: Loss Aversion and Risk Aversion
In this part of the Appendix we provide a thorough discussion of the intermediate case
where the agent is both risk and loss averse. The agent’s intrinsic utility for money
is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function, which implies that h(·) is strictly
increasing and strictly convex. Moreover, the agent is loss averse, i.e., λ > 1. From
Lemma II.1, we know that the constraint set of the principal’s problem is nonempty.
By relabeling signals, each contract can be interpreted as a contract that offers the
agent a (weakly) increasing intrinsic utility profile. This allows us to assess whether
the agent perceives receiving us instead of ut as a gain or a loss. As in the case of pure
loss aversion, we analyze the optimal contract for a given feasible ordering of signals.
The principal’s problem for a given arrangement of the signals is given by
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Program MG:
min
u1,...,uS
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h(us)
subject to
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)us − (λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
γs(aˆ)γt(aˆ)[ut − us]− c(aˆ) = u¯ , (IRG)
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γLs )us−
(λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
[
γs(aˆ)(γ
H
t − γLt ) + γt(aˆ)(γHs − γLs )
]
[ut − us] = c′(aˆ) , (ICG)
uS ≥ uS−1 ≥ . . . ≥ u1 . (OCG)
Since the objective function is strictly convex and the constraints are all linear in
u = {u1, . . . , uS}, the Kuhn-Tucker theorem yields necessary and sufficient conditions
for optimality. Put differently, if there exists a solution to the problem (MG) the
solution is characterized by the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian associated with
(MG) set equal to zero.
Lemma A.2: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold and h′′(·) > 0, then there exists a second-best
optimal incentive scheme for implementing action aˆ ∈ (0, 1), denoted u∗ = (u∗1, . . . , u∗S).
Proof:
We show that program (MG) has a solution, i.e.,
∑S
s=1 γs(aˆ)h(us) achieves its great-
est lower bound. First, from Lemma II.1 we know that the constraint set of program
(MG) is not empty for action aˆ ∈ (0, 1). Next, note that from (IRG) it follows that∑S
s=1 γs(aˆ)us is bounded below. Following the reasoning in the proof of Proposition
1 of Grossman and Hart (1983), we can artificially bound the constraint set—roughly
spoken because unbounded sequences in the constraint set make
∑S
s=1 γs(aˆ)h(us) tend
to infinity by a result from Dimitri Bertsekas (1974). Since the constraint set is closed,
the existence of a minimum follows from Weierstrass’ theorem.
In order to interpret the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian to problem (MG)
it is necessary to know whether the Lagrangian multipliers are positive or negative.
Lemma A.3: The Lagrangian multipliers of program (MG) associated with the incen-
tive compatibility constraint and the individual rationality constraint are both strictly
positive, i.e., µIC > 0 and µIR > 0.
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Proof:
Since (IRG) will always be satisfied with equality due to an appropriate adjustment
of the lowest intrinsic utility level offered, relaxing (IRG) will always lead to strictly
lower costs for the principal. Therefore, the shadow value of relaxing (IRG) is strictly
positive, so µIR > 0.
Next, we show that relaxing (ICG) has a positive shadow value, µIC > 0. We do this
by showing that a decrease in c′(aˆ) leads to a reduction in the principal’s minimum cost
of implementation. Let (u∗s)s∈S be the optimal contract under (the original) Program
MG, and suppose that c′(aˆ) decreases. Now the principal can offer a new contract
(uNs )s∈S of the form
uNs = αu
∗
s + (1− α)
S∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)u
∗
t , (A.57)
where α ∈ (0, 1), which also satisfies (IRG), the relaxed (ICG), and (OCG), but yields
strictly lower costs of implementation than the original contract (u∗s)s∈S .
Clearly, for αˆ ∈ (0, 1), uNs < uNs′ if and only if u∗s < u∗s′ , so (OCG) is also satisfied
under contract (uNs )s∈S .
Next, we check that the relaxed (ICG) holds under (u
N
s )s∈S . To see this, note that for
α = 1 we have (uNs )s∈S ≡ (u∗s)s∈S . Thus, for α = 1, the relaxed (ICG) is oversatisfied
under (uNs )s∈S . For α = 0, on the other hand, the left-hand side of (ICG) is equal to
zero, and the relaxed (ICG) in consequence is not satisfied. Since the left-hand side of
(ICG) is continuous in α under contract (u
N
s )s∈S , by the intermediate-value theorem
there exists αˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that the relaxed (ICG) is satisfied with equality.
Last, consider (IRG). The left-hand side of (IRG) under contract (u
N
s )s∈S with α = αˆ
amounts to
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)u
N
s − (λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
γs(aˆ)γt(aˆ)
[
uNt − uNs
]
=
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)u
∗
s − αˆ(λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
γs(aˆ)γt(aˆ) [u
∗
t − u∗s]
>
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)u
∗
s − (λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
γs(aˆ)γt(aˆ) [u
∗
t − u∗s]
= u¯+ c(aˆ) , (A.58)
where the last equality follows from the fact that (u∗s)s∈S fulfills the (IRG) with equality.
Thus, contract (uNs )s∈S is feasible in the sense that all constraints of program (MG)
are met. It remains to show that the principal’s costs are reduced. Since h(·) is strictly
convex, the principal’s objective function is strictly convex in α, with a minimum at
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α = 0. Hence, the principal’s objective function is strictly increasing in α for α ∈ (0, 1].
Since (uNs )s∈S ≡ (u∗s)s∈S for α = 1, for α = αˆ we have
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h(u
∗
s) >
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h(u
N
s ),
which establishes the desired result.
We now give a heuristic reasoning why pooling of information may well be optimal
in this more general case. For the sake of argument, suppose there is no pooling of
information in the sense that it is optimal to set distinct wages for distinct signals.
In this case all order constraints are slack; formally, if us 6= us′ for all s, s′ ∈ S and
s 6= s′, then µOC,s = 0 for all s ∈ {2, . . . , S}. In this case, the first-order condition of
optimality with respect to us, ∂L(u)/∂us = 0, can be written as follows:
h′(us) =
(
µIR + µIC
γHs − γLs
γs(aˆ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Hs
[
1− (λ− 1)
(
2
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ) + γs(aˆ)− 1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Γs
− µIC(λ− 1)
[
2
s−1∑
t=1
(γHt − γLt ) + (γHs − γLs )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Λs
. (A.59)
For λ = 1 we have h′(us) = Hs, the standard “Holmstro¨m-formula”.
2 Note that Γs > 0
for λ ≤ 2. More importantly, irrespective of the signal ordering, we have Γs > Γs+1.
The third term, Λs, can be either positive or negative. If the compound signal of all
signals below s and the signal s itself are bad signals, then Λs < 0.
Since the incentive scheme is nondecreasing, when the order constraints are not
binding it has to hold that h′(us) ≥ h′(us−1). Thus, if µOC,s−1 = µOC,s = µOC,s+1 = 0
the following inequality is satisfied:
Hs × Γs − Λs ≥ Hs−1 × Γs−1 − Λs−1. (A.60)
Note that for the given ordering of signals, if there exists any pair of signals s, s−1 such
that (A.60) is violated, then the optimal contract for this ordering involves pooling of
wages. Even when Hs > Hs−1, as it is the case when signals are ordered according to
their likelihood ratio, it is not clear that inequality (A.60) is satisfied. In particular,
when s and s−1 are similarly informative it seems to be optimal to pay the same wage
for these two signals as can easily be illustrated for the case of two good signals: If s
and s − 1 are similarly informative good signals then Hs ≈ Hs−1 > 0 but Γs < Γs−1
and Λs > Λs−1, thus condition (A.60) is violated. In summary, it may well be that
2See Holmstro¨m (1979).
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for a given incentive-feasible ordering of signals, and thus overall as well, the order
constraints are binding, i.e., it may be optimal to offer a contract which is less complex
than the signal space allows for.
Application with Constant Relative Risk Aversion.—Suppose h(u) = ur, with r ≥ 0
being a measure for the agent’s risk aversion. More precisely, the Arrow-Pratt measure
for relative risk aversion of the agent’s intrinsic utility function isR = 1−1
r
and therefore
constant. The following result states that the optimal contract is still a bonus contract
when the agent is not only loss averse, but also slightly risk averse.
Proposition A.3: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold, h(u) = ur with r > 1, and λ > 1. Gener-
ically, for r sufficiently small the optimal incentive scheme (u∗s)
S
s=1 is a bonus scheme,
i.e., u∗s = u
∗
H for s ∈ B∗ ⊂ S and u∗s = u∗L for s ∈ S\B∗ where u∗L < u∗H .
Proof:
For the agent’s intrinsic utility function being sufficiently linear, the principal’s costs
are approximately given by a second-order Taylor polynomial about r = 1, thus
C(u|r) ≈
∑
s∈S
γs(aˆ)us + Ω(u|r) , (A.61)
where
Ω(u|r) ≡
∑
s∈S
γs(aˆ)
[
(us ln us)(r − 1) + (1/2)us(lnus)2(r − 1)2
]
. (A.62)
Relabeling signals such that the wage profile is increasing allows us to express the incen-
tive scheme in terms of increases in intrinsic utility. The agent’s binding participation
constraint implies that
u1 = u¯+ c(aˆ)−
S∑
s=2
bs
{
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)− (λ− 1)
[ S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
][ s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
]}
≡ u1(b)(A.63)
and us = u1(b) +
∑s
t=2 bt ≡ us(b) for all s = 2, . . . , S. Inserting the binding partic-
ipation constraint into the above cost function and replacing Ω(u|r) equivalently by
Ω˜(b|r) ≡ Ω(u1(b), . . . , uS(b)|r) yields
C(b|r) ≈ u¯+ c(aˆ) + (λ− 1)
S∑
s=2
bs
[
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
][
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
]
+ Ω˜(b|r) . (A.64)
Hence, for a given increasing wage profile the principal’s cost minimization problem is:
Program ME:
min
b∈RS−1
+
b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ) + Ω˜(b|r)
subject to b′β(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c′(aˆ) (IC′)
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If r is sufficiently close to 1, then the incentive scheme that solves Program ML
also solves Program ME. Note that generically Program ME is solved only by bonus
schemes. Put differently, even if there are multiple optimal contracts for Program ML,
all these contracts are generically simple bonus contracts. Thus, from Proposition II.2
it follows that generically for r close to 1 the optimal incentive scheme entails a mini-
mum of wage differentiation. Note that for λ = 1 the principal’s problem is to minimize
Ω˜(b|r) even for r sufficiently close to 1.
3. Appendix to Chapter III
Proof of Lemma III.3
In order to give the proof some structure, we proceed in several steps.
Claim 1: p(2, 0) > p¯ iff k(2) > k¯.
Proof: Follows immediately from rearranging. ||
Claim 2: k¯ < 1 iff µ > µ¯.
Proof: Rearranging yields
k¯ < 1 ⇐⇒ µ2 − 2y¯
(y¯ − θH)µ+
y¯
(y¯ − θH) < 0.
Define
f(µ) := µ2 − 2y¯
(y¯ − θH)µ+
y¯
(y¯ − θH) .
Straight-forward differentiation reveals that f(µ) is a strictly convex function, f ′′(µ) >
0, which reaches its minimum at µ = y¯/(y¯ − θH). The zeros of f(µ) are obtained by
solving
f(µ) = 0 ⇐⇒ µ¯1,2 =
√
y¯(
√
y¯ ±√θH)
(
√
y¯ +
√
θH)(
√
y¯ −√θH)
.
Let
µ¯1 =
√
y¯
(
√
y¯ +
√
θH)
and µ¯2 =
√
y¯
(
√
y¯ −√θH)
.
Obviously, µ¯2 > 1, which allows us to focus on µ¯1 because we are interested only in
values of µ from the interval (0.5, 1). Since, by assumption, θH ∈ (0, y¯), we have µ¯1 ∈
(0.5, 1). Thus, with f(µ) being a strictly convex function which is strictly decreasing
for µ < 1, letting µ¯ = µ¯1 concludes the proof. ||
Claim 3: p(h, h; q) < p¯ iff µ < µ¯.
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Proof: Rearranging yields
p(h, h; q) < p¯ ⇐⇒ µ2 − 2y¯ − q(y¯ − θH)
(1− q)(y¯ − θH)µ+
y¯
(1− q)(y¯ − θH) > 0
Define
g(µ) := µ2 − 2y¯ − q(y¯ − θH)
(1− q)(y¯ − θH)µ+
y¯
(1− q)(y¯ − θH) .
Differentiation with respect to µ reveals that g(µ) is a strictly convex function, g′′(µ) >
0, which reaches its minimum at µ = (2y¯− q(y¯− θH))/2(1− q)(y¯− θH) > 1. The zeros
of g(µ) are obtained by solving
g(µ) = 0 ⇐⇒ µ¯1,2 = 2y¯ − q(y¯ − θH)±
√
q2(y¯ − θH)2 + 4θH y¯
2(1− q)(y¯ − θH)
Once again, we are interested in values of µ from the interval (0.5, 1). Since for all
q ∈ (0.5, 1) we have
µ¯2 =
2y¯ − q(y¯ − θH) +
√
q2(y¯ − θH)2 + 4θH y¯
2(1− q)(y¯ − θH) > 1
we can focus on
µ¯1 =
2y¯ − q(y¯ − θH)−
√
q2(y¯ − θH)2 + 4θH y¯
2(1− q)(y¯ − θH) .
Straightforward calculations reveal that for q ∈ (0, 1) we have µ¯1 ∈ (0.5, 1). Thus,
with g(µ) being a strictly convex function which is strictly decreasing for µ < 1, letting
µ¯(q) = µ¯1 concludes the proof. ||
Claim 4: dµ¯(q)/dq > 0.
Proof: First, note that µ¯(q) is continuously differentiable with respect to q for all
q ∈ (0, 1). By definition of µ¯(q), the following identity holds:
g(µ¯(q)) = µ¯(q)2 − 2y¯ − q(y¯ − θH)
(1− q)(y¯ − θH) µ¯(q) +
y¯
(1− q)(y¯ − θH) ≡ 0
Rearranging and differentiation with respect to q yield
dµ¯(q)
dq
=
(y¯ − θH)µ¯(q)(µ¯(q)− 1)
2y¯(µ¯(q)− 1)− 2θH µ¯(q)− q(y¯ − θH)(2µ¯(q)− 1) .
In the proof of Claim 3 we established that µ¯(q) ∈ (0.5, 1) for q ∈ (0, 1), which imme-
diately implies dµ¯(q)/dq > 0. ||
Claim 5: ∀q ∈ (0, 1), 0.5 < µ¯ < µ¯(q) < 1.
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Proof: In Claim 2 and 3 we have already established that µ¯ ∈ (0.5, 1) and µ¯(q) ∈
(0.5, 1). It remains to show that µ¯ < µ¯(q) for all q ∈ (0, 1). Note that µ¯(q) is a contin-
uous and continuously differentiable function on the interval (−∞, 1), thus limq→0 µ¯(q)
exists and is given by
lim
q→0
µ¯(q) =
2y¯ −√4y¯θH
2(y¯ − θH) =
√
y¯√
y¯ +
√
θH
= µ¯.
From Claim 4, we know that dµ¯(q)/dq > 0 for q ∈ (0, 1), which establishes the result.
||
Combining Claims 1-5 establishes the desired result.
Proof of Proposition III.3
Let p(σ1, σ2; qr) denote the firm’s updated posterior belief about the true state of the
world being θ = θH after receiving report (σ1, σ2) ∈ M from the worker under a job
design which places the worker in r ∈ {1, 2} divisions during the first period. The
expected return from allocating the asset to project B exceeds the expected return
from allocating the asset to project A if and only if p(σ1, σ2; qr) exceeds
p¯ =
R¯
R¯ +∆
∈ (0.5, 1).
Since µ ∈ (0.5, 1) implies that p(l, l; qr) < p(l, h; qr) = p(h, l; qr) = 0.5 < p(h, h; qr) for
r ∈ {1, 2}, the following observation follows immediately.
Lemma A.4: For r ∈ {1, 2}, if p(h, h; qr) ≥ p¯, then Br = {(h, h)}. Otherwise Br = ∅.
It is readily verified, that µ∗(q)/µ∗∗(q) is increasing in q, which implies that p(h, h; q)
is decreasing in q. With the question of interest being whether the firm can benefit
from implementing job rotation compared to specialization, this observation renders
the case where p(h, h; q2) < p¯ uninteresting. In this case, B1 = B2 = ∅, i.e., under both
types of job design the asset is allocated to the riskless project A irrespective of the
worker’s report. Thus, job rotation can never be optimal because it comes along with
additional costs without providing any benefit. This leaves us with two cases in which
there is scope for job rotation to outperform specialization due to a more accurate
probability assessment. In the first of these cases, p¯ ≤ p(h, h; q1), the allocation rule
is the same under both types of job design, B1 = B2 = {(h, h)}. In the second case,
p(h, h; q1) < p¯ ≤ p(h, h; q2), allocation rules differ, B1 = ∅ and B2 = {(h, h)}.
It can be shown that p(h, h; q) > p¯ if and only if µ > µ¯(q), where
µ¯(q) =
2R¯− q(R¯−∆)−
√
q2(R¯−∆)2 + 4R¯∆
2(1− q)(R¯−∆)
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with µ¯′(q) > 0 and µ¯(q) ∈ (0.5, 1) for all q ∈ (0, 1). These properties of µ¯(q) fol-
low immediately from the proof of Lemma III.3. The following observation then is
immediate.
Lemma A.5: Given R¯, ∆, and 0 < q2 < q1 < 1, we have
(a′) p¯ ≤ p(h, h; q1) < p(h, h; q2) iff µ ∈ [µ¯(q1), 1) ;
(b′) p(h, h; q1) < p¯ ≤ p(h, h; ; q2) iff µ ∈ [µ¯(q2), µ¯(q1)) .
In both cases (a′) and (b′), job rotation can outperform specialization if the cost of
job rotation is sufficiently small. To formally establish this result, let P (q) denote
the probability of two h signals being reported for a given q. Moreover, let E[R|r]
denote the firm’s ex-ante expected return from asset allocation under a job design with
r ∈ {1, 2}.
Case (a′): Both types of job design lead to the same allocation rule, B1 = B2 =
{h, h}. Thus, E[R|2] > E[R|1] if and only if
P (q2)p(h, h; q2)(R¯ +∆) + (1− P (q2))R¯− c > P (q1)p(h, h; q1)(R¯ +∆) + (1− P (q1))R¯,
or equivalently, if and only if c < c¯, where
c¯ =
µ(1− µ)(q1 − q2)(R¯−∆)
2
.
Case (b′): Under specialization we have B1 = ∅, whereas under job rotation the
allocation rule is B2 = {h, h}. Thus, E[R + y|2] > E[R + y|1] if and only if
P (q2)p(h, h; q2)(R¯ +∆) + (1− P (q2))R¯− c > R¯,
or equivalently, if and only if c < c¯, where
c¯ =
µ(µ+ q2(1− µ))∆− (1− µ)((1− µ) + q2µ)R¯
2
.
It is readily verified that c¯ > 0 whenever µ ∈ (µ¯(q2), µ¯(q1)).
This establishes the desired result.
4. Appendix to Chapter IV
4.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma IV.1:
For any wholesale price wi ≥ P (0)− ki firm i’s input demand equals zero, whereas for
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wi < P (0)− ki the optimal input demand, q(ci), is strictly positive and characterized
by
MR(q(ci)) := q(ci)P
′(q(ci)) + P (q(ci)) = ci. (A.65)
Under the assumptions imposed on the inverse demand function, whenever q(ci) > 0
we have q′(ci) < 0, q
′′(ci) ≤ 0, pi′(ci) < 0, MR′(q) < 0 and MR′′(q) ≤ 0.
The upstream supplier’s profit from charging an active downstream firm with own
marginal cost ki < P (0) a wholesale price w < P (0)−ki is Π(w; ki) := wq(w+ki). With
Π(w; ki) being strictly concave on the interval [0, P (0)− ki] the optimal unconstrained
discriminatory wholesale price wd(ki) satisfies
q(wd(ki) + ki) + w
d(ki)q
′(wd(ki) + ki) = 0. (A.66)
We first show that wd(k) < wd(0). Suppose, in contradiction, that wd(k) ≥ wd(0).
Differentiation of (A.65) with respect to ci yields
q′(ci) =
1
2P ′(q(ci)) + q(ci)P ′′(q(ci))
=
1
MR′(q(ci))
, (A.67)
where the second equality follows from the definition of MR(q). From (A.66) it follows
that the optimal discriminatory wholesale price charged to a downstream firm with
own marginal cost ki satisfies
wd(ki) = − q(w
d(ki) + ki)
q′(wd(ki) + ki)
= −q(wd(ki) + ki)MR′(q(wd(ki) + ki)). (A.68)
In consequence, wd(0) ≤ wd(k) if and only if −q(wd(0))MR′(q(wd(0))) ≤ −q(wd(k) +
k)MR′(q(wd(k) + k)). Since
d
dc
[−q(c)MR′(q(c))] = −q′(c) [MR′(q(c)) + q(c)MR′′(q(c))] < 0, (A.69)
wd(k) ≥ wd(0) implies wd(0) ≥ wd(k) + k, a contradiction. Therefore, wd(k) < wd(0).
Knowing that wd(k) < wd(0), we next show that wd(0) < wd(k) + k. Suppose,
in contradiction, that wd(0) ≥ wd(k) + k. Then q(wd(0)) ≤ q(wd(k) + k), and in
consequence
0 > MR′(q(wd(0))) ≥MR′(q(wd(k) + k)) (A.70)
by marginal revenue being decreasing and concave. From above, we know that wd(0) >
wd(k), and thus, according to (A.68), we have
−q(wd(0))MR′(q(wd(0))) > −q(wd(k) + k)MR′(q(wd(k) + k)). (A.71)
Taken together (A.70) and (A.71) imply q(wd(k) + k) < q(wd(0)) and in consequence
wd(k) + k > wd(0), a contradiction. Thus, wd(k) + k > wd(0).
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When unrestricted in its price setting, U ’s profit from charging a common wholesale
price w is
Πu(w; k) :=


Π(w; 0) + Π(w; k) for w < P (0)− k
Π(w; 0) for P (0)− k ≤ w < P (0)
0 for w ≥ P (0)
,
Obviously, serving no firm clearly is not optimal. Moreover, under Assumption (A2),
it is never optimal to serve only firm I, i.e., we must have wu(k) < P (0) − k. Note
that Πu(w; k) is strictly concave on [0, P (0) − k]. By definition of wd(0) and wd(k),
wd(0) > wd(k) from above, and concavity of Π(w; ki) on [0, P (0) − ki] for i ∈ {I, E},
we have
dΠu(w; k)
dw
=
dΠ(w; 0)
dw
+
dΠ(w; k)
dw
> 0
for all w ∈ [0, wd(k)], which immediately implies that wd(k) < wu(k).
It remains to show that wu(k) < wd(0). With wd(0) < P (0)− k, under Assumption
(A2) we have
dΠu(w; k)
dw
∣∣∣∣
w=wd(0)
=
dΠ(w; 0)
dw
∣∣∣∣
w=wd(0)
+
dΠ(w; k)
dw
∣∣∣∣
w=wd(0)
=
dΠ(w; k)
dw
∣∣∣∣
w=wd(0)
< 0,
where the last equality follows from definition of wd(0), and the inequality follows from
the fact that wd(0) > wd(k) and Π(w; k) being strictly concave on [0, P (0)− k]. Strict
concavity of Πu(w; k) on [0, P (0)− k] then immediately implies wu(k) < wd(0), which
establishes the desired result.
Proof of Proposition IV.1:
We prove part (i) first. As a preliminary consideration, consider two active downstream
firms i and j with own marginal cost kj < ki. For w < P (0)−ki, we have 0 < q(w+ki) <
q(w + kj), and q
′(c) < 0 for all c ∈ [w + kj, w + ki]. The optimal quantity demanded
by a downstream firm with own marginal cost k˜ ∈ [kj, ki] at wholesale price w satisfies
P (q(w + k˜))− k˜ ≡ w − q(w + k˜)P ′(q(w + k˜)). (A.72)
Differentiation of this expression with respect to k˜ yields
d
dk˜
[P (q(w + k˜))− k˜]
= −q′(w + k˜)
[
P ′(q(w + k˜)) + q(w + k˜)P ′′(q(w + k˜))
]
< 0. (A.73)
Thus, a more efficient downstream firm charges a higher mark-up.
Now, in case (i), with F < min{F¯ d(k), Fˆ (k)}, we always have the optimal uniform
price bracketed by the optimal discriminatory wholesale prices: for F ≤ F¯ u(k) we
Essays in Applied Microeconomics and Management 149
have wd(k) < wu(k) < wd(0) by Lemma IV.1; for F ∈ (F¯ u(k),min{F¯ d(k), Fˆ (k)})
the optimal uniform wholesale price equals wR(F ; k) where wR(F¯ u(k); k) = wu(k),
wR(F¯ d(k); k) = wd(k), and dwR/dF < 0. Letting qdi and q
u
i denote firm i’s quantity
under price discrimination and uniform pricing, respectively, where i ∈ {I, E}, this in
turn implies that qdI < q
u
I and q
d
E > q
u
E. Welfare under price discrimination is
W d(F ; k) =
∫ qdI
0
P (x)dx+
∫ qdE
0
P (x)dx− kqdE − F, (A.74)
whereas welfare under uniform pricing is
W u(F ; k) =
∫ quI
0
P (x)dx+
∫ quE
0
P (x)dx− kquE − F. (A.75)
Then
∆W (F ; k) =
∫ qdE
quE
P (x)dx−
∫ quI
qdI
P (x)dx− k(qdE − quE)
< (qdE − quE)[P (quE)− k]− (quI − qdI )P (quI ). (A.76)
From (A.73) we know that P (quE)−k < P (quI ). Thus, qdE−quE ≤ quI −qdI , or equivalently
Qd(F ; k) = qdI + q
d
E ≤ quI + quE = Qu(F ; k), is a sufficient condition for ∆W (F ; k) < 0.
Parts (ii) and (iii) follow immediately from the reasoning in the text.
4.2. Downstream Competition
In this appendix we provide a detailed analysis if entry into the downstream industry
results in downstream competition as discussed in Section 5. The equilibrium con-
cept employed is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We solve the game by backward
induction, beginning in stage three.
Stage 3: For given wholesale prices and a given number of active firms in the in-
termediate industry, we determine the quantities produced of the final good by firms
active in the downstream market. If a downstream firm with own marginal cost ki is a
downstream monopolist, its demand for the input at a wholesale price w is
q(w + ki) =
{
1−w−ki
2
for w < 1− ki
0 for w ≥ 1− ki
.
If two firms i and j are active in the downstream market, then firm i’s best response
at wholesale price wi given that firm j produces quantity qj is
q(qj;wi + ki) = max
{
0,
1− wi − ki − qj
2
}
(A.77)
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For 2wi−wj < 1−2ki+kj and 2wj−wi < 1−2kj+ki the Cournot Nash equilibrium is
interior with both firms producing strictly positive quantities. The equilibrium quantity
of firm i 6= j is
q(wi + ki, wj + kj) =
1− 2(wi + ki) + (wj + kj)
3
. (A.78)
If 2wi − wj < 1− 2ki + kj and 2wj − wi ≥ 1− 2kj + ki, then firm j produces nothing
whereas firm i produces its monopoly quantity. For 2wi − wj ≥ 1 − 2ki + kj and
2wj − wi ≥ 1− 2kj + ki both downstream firms produce zero quantity.
Stage 2 Given wholesale prices wI and wE charged to firm I and firm E, respectively,
and correctly anticipating Nash equilibrium play in stage three, firm E enters the
market if its profits in the resulting market outcome in stage 3 exceed the entry fee.
If indifferent between entering and not entering the market, as a tie-breaking rule we
assume that firm E behaves as the upstream supplier U wishes.3 If profits for firm E
in the resulting market outcome in stage three are strictly negative, then E does not
enter the intermediate industry.
Stage 1 Correctly anticipating firm E’s entry decision in stage two and Nash equi-
librium play in stage three, U chooses wholesale prices wI and wE in order to maximize
upstream profits. In what follows, we refer to a duopoly as a situation, in which E en-
ters the downstream market and downstream demand is strictly positive for both firms
I and E. Again, when indifferent between implementing a downstream duopoly or
a downstream monopoly, the upstream supplier implements a downstream monopoly.
Let Πr{i} denote firm U ’s profit from implementing firm i ∈ {I, E} as a downstream
monopolist, and let Πr{I,E} denote firm U ’s profit from implementing firms I and E as
downstream duopolists. Superscript r ∈ {d, u} again refers to either a discriminatory
pricing regime or a uniform pricing regime. Moreover, in order not to clutter notation,
we will often suppress the dependency of downstream quantity choices on effective mar-
ginal costs as well as the dependency of optimal wholesale prices and welfare on the
entry fee and own marginal costs of the downstream firms.
Lemma A.6: Under Price discrimination,
(i) if
√
F ≤ (1/6)− (1/3)k, then U charges wholesale prices wdI = wd(0) = 1/2 and
wdE = w
d(k) = (1 − k)/2. This implements a downstream duopoly resulting in
quantities qdI = (1 + k)/6, q
d
E = (1− 2k)/6, and Qd = (2− k)/6;
3 We impose this alternative tie-breaking rule for expositional purposes only. Sticking to the original
tie-breaking rule, i.e., firm E enters whenever its profits are nonnegative, yields exactly the same
results.
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(ii) if (1/6) − (1/3)k < √F < (1/3) − (2/3)k, then U charges wholesale prices
wdI = w
R
I = 1/2 and w
d
E = w
R
E(
√
F ; k) = (3/4)− k − (3/2)√F . This implements
a downstream duopoly resulting in quantities qdI = (1/4) − (1/2)
√
F , qdE =
√
F ,
and Qd = (1/4) + (1/2)
√
F ;
(iii) if (1/3) − (2/3)k ≤ √F , then U charges wholesale prices wdI = wM = 1/2
and wdE = ∞. This implements a downstream monopoly resulting in quantities
qdI = Q
d = 1/4.
Proof:
Suppose U wants to implement a downstream duopoly. Then U chooses wholesale
prices in order to solve the following problem:
Program D-PD:
max
(wI ,wE)∈R
2
≥0
wI
1− 2wI + (wE + k)
3
+ wE
1− 2(wE + k) + wI
3
subject to qI =
1− 2wI + (wE + k)
3
> 0
qE =
1− 2(wE + k) + wI
3
> 0
F ≤
[
1− 2(wE + k) + wI
3
]2
Next, we show that for a sufficiently low entry fee, the solution to Program D-PD is
identical to the solution of the relaxed program, which only considers the latter two
constraints.
Claim 1: If
√
F ≤ (1/2)− (2/3)k, the solution to Program R
max
(wI ,wE)
wI
1− 2wI + (wE + k)
3
+ wE
1− 2(wE + k) + wI
3
subject to 2wE − wI ≤ 1− 2k − 3
√
F ,
also solves Program D-PD.
Proof of Claim 1: First, note that the latter two constraints of Program D-PD can
equivalently be replaced by the following condition:
2wE − wI ≤ 1− 2k − 3
√
F , (A.79)
which corresponds to the one constraint in Program R. The Lagrangian associated with
Program R is
L = wI 1− 2wI + (wE + k)
3
+ wE
1− 2(wE + k) + wI
3
− λ
{
2wE − wI − (1− 2k − 3
√
F )
}
. (A.80)
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With L being a strictly concave function, the associated Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
sufficient for global optimality. These Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given by
∂L
∂wI
=
1 + 2wE + k − 4wI
3
+ λ = 0
∂L
∂wE
=
1− 4wE − 2k + 2wI
3
− 2λ = 0
λ ≥ 0
(
= 0 if 2wE − wI < 1− 2k − 3
√
F
)
2wE − wI ≤ 1− 2k − 3
√
F
Consider the case of
√
F ≤ (1/6)− (1/3)k first. Suppose the constraint is not binding,
i.e., 2wE − wI < 1− 2k − 3
√
F . The complementary slackness condition then implies
λ = 0. Combining the two first-order conditions yields wholesale prices wI = 1/2
and wE = (1 − k)/2. It is readily verified that for
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k, at these
prices the constraint of Program R is satisfied. Moreover, under these wholesale prices,
all remaining constraints of Program D-PD are also satisfied: wholesale prices are
nonnegative, and associated quantities are strictly positive, qI = (1 + k)/6 and qE =
(1 − 2k)/6. Next, consider the case (1/6) − (1/3)k < √F ≤ (1/2) − (2/3)k. Suppose
that the constraint is binding, i.e., 2wE − wI = 1 − 2k − 3
√
F . The complementary
slackness condition then implies λ ≥ 0. Combining the two first-order conditions yields
wI = 1/2. Inserting this into the binding constraint leads to wE = (3/4)−k−(3/2)
√
F .
Solving for the Lagrange parameter yields λ = (−1 + 2k + 6√F )/6, which is strictly
positive for (1/6)− (1/3)k < √F . It is readily verified that for √F ≤ (1/2)− (2/3)k
all remaining constraints of Program D-PD are also satisfied under these wholesale
prices: wholesale prices are nonnegative, and associated quantities are strictly positive,
qI = (1/4)− (1/2)
√
F and qE =
√
F . This proves Claim 1. ||
Straightforward calculations show that U ’s profit from implementing a downstream
duopoly is Πd{I,E} = (1 − k + k2)/6 if
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k, and Πd{I,E} = (1/8) +
((1/2)− k)√F − (3/2)(√F )2 if (1/6)− (1/3)k < √F ≤ (1/2)− (2/3)k. Note that for√
F > (1/2) − (2/3)k, U ’s problem becomes more heavily constrained, such that U ’s
profit cannot be larger than for
√
F ≤ (1/2)− (2/3)k.
Next, suppose U wants to implement a downstream monopoly. Straightforward
calculations show that the maximum profit U can make when facing a downstream
monopolist with own marginal cost ki, the optimal wholesale price for U to charge is
w = (1−ki)/2, which results in downstream demand q = (1−ki)/4 and upstream profits
Πd{i} = (1−ki)2/8. Since U ’s maximum profit decreases in the downstream monopolists
own marginal cost, U always prefers I to become a monopolist over E becoming a
monopolist. Since under price discrimination U can charge E a prohibitively high
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price which keeps E out of the downstream market without affecting the price paid by
the incumbent firm I, U can always make I the downstream monopolist, resulting in
upstream profits of Πd{I} = 1/8.
In order to conclude the proof, we have to determine when U prefers to implement
a downstream duopoly over implementing a downstream monopoly. If
√
F ≤ (1/6) −
(1/3)k, Πd{I,E} > Π
d
{I} if and only if (1 − 2k)2 > 0. Thus, if
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (1/3)k,
U will implement a downstream duopoly resulting in quantities qdI = (1 + k)/6 and
qdE = (1 − 2k)/6. Next, if (1/6) − (1/3)k <
√
F ≤ (1/2) − (2/3)k, Πd{I,E} > Πd{I} if
and only if
√
F < (1/3) − (2/3)k. Thus, if (1/6) − (1/3)k < √F < (1/3) − (2/3)k,
U will implement a downstream duopoly resulting in quantities qdI = (1/4)− (1/2)
√
F
and qdE =
√
F , whereas for
√
F ≥ (1/3) − (2/3)k, U will implement a downstream
monopoly resulting in quantity qdI = 1/4. This establishes the desired result.
Lemma A.7: Under uniform pricing,
(i) if k < 2 − √3 and √F ≤ (1/6) − (7/12)k, then U charges a wholesale prices
wu = wu(k) = (1/2) − (1/4)k. This implements a downstream duopoly resulting
in quantities quI = (2 + 5k)/12, q
u
E = (2− 7k)/12, and Qu = (2− k)/6;
(ii) if k < 2−√3 and (1/6)− (7/12)k < √F < (1/6)− (7/12)k+(√1− 4k + k2)/12,
then U charges a wholesale prices wu = wRu(
√
F ; k) = 1 − 2k − 3√F . This
implements a downstream duopoly resulting in quantities quI = k+
√
F , quE =
√
F ,
and Qu = k + 2
√
F ;
(iii) if k ≥ 2 − √3 or √F ≥ (1/6) − (7/12)k + (√1− 4k + k2)/12, then U charges
a wholesale price wu = wM = (1/2). This implements a downstream monopoly
resulting in quantities quI = Q
u = 1/4.
Proof:
Suppose U wants to implement a downstream duopoly. Then U chooses the uniform
wholesale price in order to solve the following problem:
Program D-UNI:
max
w∈R≥0
w
2− 2w − k
3
subject to qI =
1− w + k
3
> 0
qE =
1− w − 2k
3
> 0
F ≤
[
1− w − 2k
3
]2
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First, note that if the second constraint holds also the first constraint holds with strict
inequality, i.e., if E demands a nonnegative quantity at wholesale price w, qE ≥ 0,
then I demands a strictly positive quantity, qI > 0. Moreover, the second and third
constraint together can equivalently be replaced by the following condition: w ≤ 1 −
2k − 3√F . Thus, Program D-UNI can be equivalently rewritten as
Program D-UNI:
max
w∈R≥0
w
2− 2w − k
3
subject to w ≤ 1− 2k − 3
√
F
Note that U ’s objective is maximizing a strictly concave function with a unique global
maximum attained at w = (2 − k)/4. Therefore, if (2 − k)/4 ≤ 1 − 2k − 3√F ,
or, equivalently, if
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (7/12)k, the optimal uniform wholesale price that
implements a downstream duopoly is w = (2 − k)/4, resulting in quantities qI =
(2 + 5k)/12 and qE = (2 − 7k)/12. Note that qE > 0—and thus also qI > 0—if
and only if k < 2/7. If
√
F > (1/6) − (7/12)k, the constraint becomes binding. If√
F ≤ (1/3) − (2/3)k, the optimal uniform wholesale price in order to implement a
downstream duopoly is given by w = 1−2k−3√F , resulting in quantities qI = k+
√
F
and qE =
√
F . If
√
F > (1/3)− (2/3)k, implementation of a downstream duopoly with
E demanding a strictly positive quantity and making nonnegative profits is not possible
with a nonnegative wholesale price.
Straightforward calculations show that U ’s profit from implementing a downstream
duopoly is Πu{I,E} = (2 − k)2/24 if
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (7/12)k, and Πu{I,E} = (1 − 2k −
3
√
F )(k + 2
√
F ) if (1/6)− (7/12)k < √F ≤ (1/3)− (2/3)k.
Next, suppose that U wants to implement a downstream monopoly. As noted
above, for a given wholesale price w, if E demands a nonnegative quantity, then I
demands a strictly positive quantity. Thus, under uniform pricing, the only possible
form monopoly can take in the downstream market is with I as downstream monop-
olist. Therefore, when implementing a downstream monopoly under uniform pricing,
U has to choose a wholesale price at which E does not find it profitable to enter and
demand a strictly positive quantity. From above we know that this requires the whole-
sale price to be sufficiently high, i.e., w > 1 − 2k − 3√F . Under our tie-breaking
rule that E does what U wants him to do when indifferent between entering and not
entering the market, U implements a downstream monopoly whenever he chooses a
wholesale price w ≥ 1 − 2k − 3√F . With the quantity demanded by downstream
monopolist I being qI = (1 − w)/2, by the choice of the wholesale price U maximizes
a strictly concave function with a unique stationary point at w = 1/2 subject to the
afore-mentioned constraint. In consequence, if 1/2 ≥ 1 − 2k − 3√F , or equivalently,
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if
√
F ≥ (1/6)− (2/3)k, then the optimal wholesale price to implement a downstream
monopoly is w = 1/2 resulting in quantity qI = 1/4 and upstream profit Π
u
{I} = 1/8.
If
√
F < (1/6)− (2/3)k, then the optimal wholesale price to implement a downstream
monopoly is w = 1− 2k − 3√F resulting in quantity qI = k + (3/2)
√
F and upstream
profit Πu{I} = (1− 2k − 3
√
F )(k + (3/2)
√
F ). Note that w = 1− 2k − 3√F ≥ 0 if and
only if
√
F ≤ (1/3)− (2/3)k, which obviously is satisfied for √F < (1/6)− (2/3)k.
In order to conclude the proof, we have to determine when U prefers to implement
a downstream duopoly over implementing a downstream monopoly. Combining the
observations obtained above, we have to distinguish four cases. (i) If
√
F > (1/3) −
(2/3)k, implementation of a downstream duopoly is not feasible. Thus, U implements
an unconstrained downstream monopoly resulting in quantity quI = 1/8. (ii) If (1/6)−
(7/12)k <
√
F ≤ (1/3)− (2/3)k, then Πu{I,E} > Πu{I} if and only if (1− 2k− 3
√
F )(k+
2
√
F ) > 1/8, or, equivalently, (
√
F )2 − ((2 − 7k)/6)√F + (1 − 8k + 16k2)/48 < 0.
For k < 2 − √3, this condition implies that Πu{I,E} > Πu{I} if and only if (1/6) −
(7/12)k <
√
F < (1/6) − (7/12)k + (√1− 4k + k2)/12, whereas for k ≥ 2 − √3 we
always have Πu{I,E} ≤ Πu{I}. Thus, U implements a downstream duopoly resulting in
quantities quI = k +
√
F and quE =
√
F if k < 2 − √3 and (1/6) − (7/12)k < √F <
(1/6)−(7/12)k+(√1− 4k + k2)/12, and a downstream monopoly resulting in quantity
quI = 1/8 otherwise. (iii) If (1/6) − (2/3)k <
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (7/12)k, where the latter
inequality implies k < 2/7, then Πu{I,E} > Π
u
{I} if and only if (2 − k)2/24 > 1/8.
This latter condition implies that Πu{I,E} > Π
u
{I} if and only if k < 2 −
√
3. Thus, U
implements a downstream duopoly resulting in quantities quI = (2 + 5k)/12 and q
u
E =
(2−7k)/12 if k < 2−√3 and (1/6)−(2/3)k < √F ≤ (1/6)−(7/12)k, and a downstream
monopoly resulting in quantity quI = 1/8 otherwise. (iv) If
√
F ≤ (1/6) − (2/3)k,
which implies k ≤ 1/4, then Πu{I,E} > Πu{I} if and only if (2 − k)2/24 > (1 − 2k −
3
√
F )(k + (3/2)
√
F ), or, equivalently, (
√
F )2 + ((4k − 1)/3)√F + (7k − 2)2/108 > 0.
This latter inequality always holds for k < 2 − √3, and thus is always satisfied in
the case under consideration. Thus, U implements a downstream duopoly resulting in
quantities quI = (2 + 5k)/12 and q
u
E = (2− 7k)/12. This establishes the desired result.
Proposition A.4: (i) W d > W u if and only if
(1.) k < 2−√3 and (1/6)−(7/12)k+(√1− 4k − k2)/12 ≤ √F < (1/3)−(8/9)k,
or
(2.) 2−√3 ≤ k ≤ 3/10 and √F < (1/3)− (8/9)k, or
(3.) 3/10 < k < 17/46 and
√
F <
√
(23/72)k2 − (5/18)k + (17/288).
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(ii) W d < W u if and only if
(1.) k < 2−√3 and √F < (1/6)− (7/12)k + (√1− 4k − k2)/12, or
(2.)
√
F > (1/3)− (8/9)k for k < 3/10 or √F >√
(23/72)k2 − (5/18)k + (17/288) for k ≥ 3/10, and √F < (1/3)− (2/3)k.
(iii) If
√
F ≥ (1/3)− (2/3)k, then W d = W u.
Proof:
First, note that for k ∈ (0, 2 − √3], (1/6) − (7/12)k + (√1− 4k + k2)/12 < (1/3) −
(2/3)k, (1/6) − (7/12)k + (√1− 4k + k2)/12 = (1/6) − (1/3)k if and only if k =
(
√
3− 1)/4, and (1/6)− (7/12)k + (√1− 4k + k2)/12 = (1/6)− (7/12)k if and only if
k = 2−√3. These observations together with Lemmas A.6 and A.7 imply that there
are five cases to consider that we labeled with Roman numerals in Figure IV.3.
(I) k < 2−√3 and √F ≤ (1/6)− (7/12)k:
Under both pricing regimes, U implements an unconstrained downstream duopoly,
resulting in the same aggregate output, Qd = Qu = (2 − k)/6. Under price dis-
crimination, however, the less efficient firm E produces a higher share of output,
qdE = (1− 2k)/6 > (2− 7k)/12 = quE. Thus, welfare is strictly lower under price
discrimination than under uniform pricing, W d < W u.
(II) k < 2−√3, (1/6)− (7/12)k < √F < (1/6)− (7/12)k + (√1− 4k + k2)/12, and√
F ≤ (1/6)− (1/3)k:
Under price discrimination, U implements an unconstrained duopoly resulting in
quantities qdI = (1 + k)/6, q
d
E = (1 − 2k)/6, and Qd = (2 − k)/6, whereas under
uniform pricing, U implements a constrained duopoly, resulting in quantities
quI = k+
√
F , quE =
√
F , and Qu = k+2
√
F . (1/6)− (7/12)k < √F implies that
aggregate output is larger under uniform pricing than under price discrimination,
Qd < Qu.
√
F ≤ (1/6)−(1/3)k, on the other hand, implies, that the less efficient
firm’s output is (at least weakly) lower under uniform pricing than under price
discrimination. Together, these observations imply that welfare under uniform
pricing exceeds welfare under price discrimination, W d < W u.
(III) k < (
√
3−1)/4 and (1/6)−(1/3)k < √F < (1/6)−(7/12)k+(√1− 4k + k2)/12:
Under both pricing regimes, U implements a constrained duopoly. Under price
discrimination, this results in in quantities qdI = (1/4) − (1/2)
√
F , qdE =
√
F ,
and Qd = (1/4) + (1/2). Under uniform pricing, the resulting quantities are
quI = k+
√
F , quE =
√
F , and Qu = k+2
√
F . While the less efficient firm’s output
being identical under both pricing regimes, qdE = q
u
E =
√
F , (1/6)− (1/3)k ≤ √F
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implies that aggregate output is higher under uniform pricing than under price
discrimination, Qd < Qu. This, in turn, implies that welfare under uniform
pricing exceeds welfare under price discrimination, W d < W u.
(IV) (1/6)− (1/3)k < √F < (1/3)− (2/3)k and (1/6)− (7/12)k+(√1− 4k + k2)/12
≤ √F :
Under price discrimination, U implements a constrained downstream duopoly,
resulting in quantities qdI = (1/4) − (1/2)
√
F , qdE =
√
F , and Qd = (1/4) +
(1/2)
√
F . Welfare under this pricing regime then is given by
W d =
∫ Qd
0
(1− x)dx− kqdE − F =
7
32
+
(
3
8
− k
)√
F − 9
8
(
√
F )2. (A.81)
Under uniform pricing, on the other hand, U implements an unconstrained down-
stream monopoly with I as the downstream monopoly firm, resulting in quantity
quI = Q
u = 1/4. Welfare under this pricing regime then is given by
W u =
∫ Qu
0
(1− x)dx = 7
32
. (A.82)
With F > 0, W d > W u if and only if
√
F < (1/3) − (8/9)k. Obviously, for
all k ∈ (0, 1/2) we have (1/3) − (8/9)k < (1/3) − (2/3)k. Moreover, for k ∈
(0, 2−√3], (1/3)−(8/9)k > (1/6)−(7/12)k+(√1− 4k + k2)/12. Last, note that
(1/3)−(8/9)k and (1/6)−(1/3)k intersect at k = 0.3. Thus,W d > W u if and only
if k < 0.3 and (1/6)− (1/3)k < √F , (1/6)− (7/12)k+(√1− 4k + k2)/12 ≤ √F ,
and
√
F < (1/3)− (8/9)k.
(V) k ≥ (√3−1)/4,√F ≤ (1/6)−(1/3)k, and√F ≥ (1/6)−(7/12)k+(√1− 4k + k2)/12
for k ∈ [(√3− 1)/4, 2−√3):
Under price discrimination, U implements an unconstrained duopoly resulting in
quantities qdI = (1 + k)/6, q
d
E = (1 − 2k)/6, and Qd = (2 − k)/6. Welfare under
this pricing regime then is given by
W d =
∫ Qd
0
(1− x)dx− kqdE − F =
20− 20k + 23k2
72
− F. (A.83)
Under uniform pricing, on the other hand, U implements an unconstrained down-
stream monopoly with I as the downstream monopoly firm, resulting in quantity
quI = Q
u = 1/4. Welfare under this pricing regime then is given by
W u =
∫ Qu
0
(1− x)dx = 7
32
. (A.84)
Thus, W d > W u if and only if F < (23/72)k2 − (5/18)k + (17/288) =: FW (k).
Note that FW (k) > 0 for k < 17/46 and FW (k) ≤ 0 for k ∈ [17/46, 1/2]. With
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FW (k) > 0 for k < 17/46, it is readily verified that d
√
FW (k)/dk < 0 for k ≤
17/46. Moreover,
√
FW (k) = (1/6) − (1/3)k if and only if k = 0.3. Thus,
W d ≤ W u if and only if k ≥ 0.3 and √FW (k) ≤ √F ≤ (1/6)− (1/3)k.
Last, for
√
F ≥ (1/3) − (2/3)k, U implements a downstream monopoly with I as the
downstream monopoly firm under both pricing regimes, resulting in quantity qdI = q
u
I =
Qd = Qu = 1/4. Thus, there is no difference in welfare under both pricing regimes,
W d = W u. Combining these observations establishes the desired result.
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